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THE EXPANDING NATION:
TOWARDS A MULTI-ETHNIC IRELAND

PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE

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Forward

This conference was the first of its kind in Ireland to bring together academics, the public sector, the voluntary sector and members of ethnic minorities and offer them an opportunity of debating issues of 'race,' ethnicity and nationalism as part of the process of social change in newly emerging immigrant 'host' societies previously characterised by 'outmigration' in the Irish and comparative contexts.

The conference enabled participants to consider the policy and practical implications of becoming a 'host' society for the majority society, 'old' ethnicities and incoming populations. It has also provided a forum to theorise and debate policy and other implications of the increasingly multi-ethnic nature of Irish society.

The conference was organised in association with the **Refugee Agency** and was sponsored by:
The Irish Times
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National and Transnational Migrant Communities : A European Problem

John Rex[1]

Ireland's major structural divisions

This conference is focused on a very specific problem. It should not be regarded as either the reflection or the cause of Ireland's many other problems of structural division. These structural problems include the division of Ireland into two, the Northern part being legally part of the United Kingdom and the Southern part an independent republic. The political parties of the South which are divided in their attitudes to the historic division of the society and parties in the North and the South divided on whether reunification should be sought by peaceful means or by armed struggle. All these are political divisions and those who support them are commonly known as Republicans who emphasise the connection between North and South and Unionists who regard Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. Such political divisions are associated with differences of religious practice and Republicans are commonly called Catholics and Unionists, Protestants. Differences of social class which have provided a major political dynamic in England are of less importance in both North and South Ireland, but are nonetheless present and cross-cut the differences about nationality in both North and South.

Ireland has also been for more than a century a country of emigration to the United States, England and Scotland and the British Commonwealth and Irish emigrants in the United States continue to play a part in the politics of Ireland.

None of these differences arise out of the multi-ethnicity of the Republic of Ireland; nor do they cause that multi-ethnicity. It is therefore necessary to indicate at the outset the specificity of the problem of multi-ethnicity in the Republic of Ireland with which this conference is primarily concerned.

Multi-ethnicity in the new Europe

The settlement of immigrants and refugees from one European society to another or from the non-European world in the European countries fifty years ago was a problem dealt with by the separate European nation states. In England, for example, national politics had to deal with the position of Irish, Caribbean and South Asian immigrants, while France was concerned with its immigrants from the Maghreb, Germany with its recruited "guestworkers" and Holland with its Indonesians, Surimanese Molccans and Turks. To these processes of primarily economic migration, however, there were subsequently added the problems presented by asylum seekers and political refugees.

The creation of the European Union involved new approaches to these problems. The EU had to allow for the movement of labour from one European country to another, while at the same time dealing with non-European immigrants from the so-called developing countries, both at points of entry to the EU, and when, as non-EU residents, they moved from one country to another. The resolution of these problems like those of the structure of the EU itself are still far from being fully resolved, but any individual European country has to look at them in the light of EU policies such as they are. Looking at the prospects of a multi-ethnic Ireland therefore involves looking at the developing problems and policies of Europe.

Whether one looks at the policies on multi-ethnicity within the European states or at the supra-national European level, however, what one finds is not a simple agreed model regarding the integration of immigrants and refugees, but very complex arguments about the meaning of integration and the definition of crucial terms. In what follows, therefore, I will deal with some of the complexities of these arguments before, finally, considering their working out in the contemporary Irish situation.

European responses to ethnicity resulting from immigration

There have been three major responses in Europe to dealing with immigrants at a national level which can broadly be called the assimilationist, guestworker and multicultural responses. In the assimilationist response, most strongly supported in France, emphasis is placed upon all individuals having equal rights through relatively easy access to citizenship, while the separate organisations and cultures of immigrant minorities are discouraged. In the guestworker response full citizenship is denied to the recruited guestworkers who become what Hammar has called "denizens" rather than citizens. (Hammar, 1990). Finally, in the multicultural response, separate cultures and organisations of minorities are recognised, without such recognition of difference being seen as standing in the way of the acquisition of citizenship. Different practices and attitudes to citizenship are therefore central to our discussion.

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The concept of citizenship

The debate about citizenship in Europe has been greatly influenced by T.H.Marshall's work, *Citizenship and Social Class* (1951). As Marshall saw it, as citizenship developed, the loyalty of citizens to the state would come to be more important than the loyalties of class. For this to come about fully, however, individuals would have to have this citizenship not merely on the legal and political level, but also in terms of social rights. Legal citizenship meant equality before the law, political citizenship meant sharing in the nation's decision making, while social citizenship meant having minimal standards of education and health care, a basic income in times of unemployment and ill health, and the right to protection by trades unions in regard to wages and conditions of work. These rights of social citizenship were seen as constituting the welfare state.

Marshall is, of course, silent on the question of the position of new immigrants into this welfare state and it is this new issue which faced national governments in dealing with the immigration of the fifties and sixties. One possible response involved a strange reversal of Marshall's conditions of citizenship. This was to say that efforts should be made to give immigrants social rights without their having legal and political rights. This, however meant that the protection of their social rights depended upon the benevolence of host society trades unions, churches and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) acting on their behalf rather than through the enforcement of their demands by their own organisations.

The assimilationist response, therefore, was to give priority to legal and political rights and to leave it to the organisations representing all legal and political citizens to fight for social rights. The guestworker response left it to host society institutions and organisations to deal with these problems. A third response was that of multiculturalism, which sought to reconcile the recognition of separate cultures and organisations amongst incomers with the granting of citizenship.

Criticisms of multiculturalism

(a) Radtke

Multiculturalism was subject to a number of different criticisms. In Germany, for instance, Radtke (1994), drawing on his experience of Frankfurt rejected the notion that immigrants should receive different treatment and be dealt with through separate institutions. For him what he called "the social-democratic welfare state" had resulted from compromise and reconciliation between a plurality of conflicting interests and any attempt to provide separately for immigrants would involve, not merely a failure to deal adequately with their problems, but to the undermining of the institutions of the welfare state.

(b) Rath

Rath (1991), in an important thesis criticising Dutch multiculturalism similarly sees the recognition of separate minorities as marking those minorities for unequal and inferior treatment. He does not consider the possibility that having recognised the minorities, it might be the purpose of government to ensure that they obtain equal treatment.

(c) Schierup and Ålund.

A different criticism of multicultural practice is made by Schierup and Ålund (1990) responding to Swedish multicultural policies. It sees the institutions of the Swedish welfare state using consultation with immigrants for its own purposes. In this system as they see it, the government sees the culture of immigrants in an essentialist way and as represented by elderly men who propagate traditional cultures. The problems of immigrants are unsatisfactorily dealt with, not, as Radtke suggested, because they are dealt with outside the institutions of the welfare state, but because they are dealt with within them. Moreover, because of the essentialist view of immigrant culture which is adopted, they take no account of the cultures of immigrant youth. Young immigrants, or the children of immigrants, as they see it live in a different cultural world. They form new syncretic cultures across ethnic lines and between the immigrant community and disadvantaged and dissenting members of the host society. A valid multicultural policy would have to deal with these new cultures.

(d) Cultural hybridity

Schierup and Alund's criticism can be seen as merging with a wider discussion of cultural hybridity as a factor in multicultural societies. According to Werbner and Modood (1997), one feature of multicultural societies is the emergence of biological and cultural hybrids. Intermarriage occurs and the children of these marriages produce new hybrid cultures, and these hybrid cultures may be seen as overcoming cultural differences and thereby facilitating multiculturalism, but, paradoxically, as also challenging both host society culture and the traditional culture of immigrant groups. This is a topic which I have dealt with in a different way when I discuss the complexities of ethnic mobilisation (Rex, 1996).

(e) Political Philosophy and multiculturalism.

Separately from sociology, multicultural societies have also been discussed by political philosophers. These philosophers, whose main concern is that of establishing the requirements of a liberal society and who had based their conclusions on the notion of individual rights, were forced to concede the notion of group rights both for concentrated sub-national units and for more

dispersed immigrant groups as being compatible with the requirements of liberalism. These have been the concerns of writers like Walzer (1982), Charles Taylor (1992) and Kymlicka (1995). Perhaps unfortunately much of their writing has been based upon reflections on the very complex Canadian experience.

The internationalisation of the debate about citizenship and multiculturalism

(a) Citizens rights and multiculturalism in the context of globalisation

Much of what has been said thus far assumes that the problems of citizenship and multiculturalism are to resolved within the context of nation states. The limitations of these arguments have been dealt with both by the theorists of globalisation (Robertson, 1992) and by sociologists like Soysal (1994) who argues that in the modern world citizenship and rights in nation states are now less important than human rights on an international scale which are the subject of intellectual discourse and which are to some extent upheld by international courts. Such observations are very relevant, but it should be noted that what Soysal is discussing is simply the first of the elements of citizenship discussed by Marshall. But looking at minorities within the nation state, however, their claims may be strengthened by the appeal to universal human rights. That it seems to me is the true relevance of Soysal's work.

(b) The European Union and the debate about social exclusion

In the European Union a different terminology is used to discuss the problems of citizenship in the discourse and debate about "social exclusion." The assumption here is that, after economic problems have been dealt with, a further goal of European society should be to ensure that no individuals or groups are socially excluded. The meaning of this, however, remains ambiguous. Clearly it does refer to those who are unemployed or poor, but there is always an implication that something more is involved. What this "something more" is, is not usually clearly stated. It could refer to Marshall's notion of the social rights of citizenship in the welfare state and it could refer to any group suffering discrimination. But, if these elements of social exclusion are specified, it would seem to be doubtful whether the use of the term "social exclusion" does anything more than allow European and national politicians room for political manoeuvre. Possibly the task of social scientists, who inevitably enter the debate about exclusion, since this is the source of research grants, is to specify exactly what sorts of social disadvantage and discrimination are involved.

The integration of immigrants

The debate about citizenship which emerges from the work of Marshall did not deal with the question of incoming immigrants and their integration into the welfare state. On the other hand some of the debate about multiculturalism paid no attention to legal, political and social rights. In the United Kingdom, however, there has been a debate about the extension of Marshall's notion of citizenship in the welfare state to include immigrants which at the same time extends the debate about multiculturalism by relating it to the notion of equality. Thus when he was called upon to define the term "integration", the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins defined it "not as a flattening process of uniformity, but cultural diversity coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance" (Rex, 1996).

There are a number of aspects of the definition which deserve comment.

Firstly, it sees the problem of integration of immigrants into society not merely as one in which two cultures confront one another, but in which host and immigrant cultures are both related to a set of norms and institutions affecting all individuals, which is sometimes referred to as the civic culture. Secondly, it refers not to any civic culture which might or might not be based upon equality but to the Marshallian notion of equal opportunity. Thirdly, it leaves one asking who enforces this version of the civic culture, whether it is simply a normative ideal or whether there are forces in a modern democratic society which struggle to see it realised. Related to this is a fourth point about how a government which supports the ideal justifies it to its electorate.

Normative ideals and the politics of interest in European nations

Clearly the possibility of the Jenkins ideal being realised depend upon the attitudes of a number of interest groups. Employers may have an interest in using immigrant labour and, even when new technology leads to the elimination of much labour intensive employment or when capital migrates overseas to employ labour there, both of which processes do occur, there do seem to be a number of jobs remaining which cannot be eliminated and which natives of the host society are unwilling to do. These include a range of services from relatively low grade ones like those of cleaners and delivery people to those in certain professions like those of doctors which do not attract sufficient native recruits. In private industry moreover there are many niches which do not attract enough native entrepreneurs. And which are inevitably filled by outsiders.

Organised labour and the organised professions are likely at first to resist the arrival of immigrants who will be perceived as threatening competitors, but in a corporate society, where unions and professional organisations share in policy making, they may well come to agree that some

immigration is essential for economic stability or growth. At this point they are more likely to concentrate on demanding that the immigrants have equal pay and conditions of employment.

More difficult problems arise from the perception of their situation by unorganised labour and by those who are unsuccessful in obtaining employment of a satisfying kind. Such groups may well be hostile to immigrants and blame them for their own situation. Thus one may expect the growth of a culture of "skinhead racism" amongst unsuccessful native youth. Political parties of the extreme right may recruit some of these skinhead racists, though there may be other ideological reasons for such parties' existence. As a result, one finds that some ten to twenty percent of the population support parties like those of the Front National in France, the Vlaamse Blok in Belgium, the party of Haider in Austria and other parties elsewhere. Moreover they have a wider influence on politics because the mainstream parties may adjust their own policies to hold or win back votes which they appear to be losing. In all of these political circumstances anything like the Jenkins ideal cannot be seen as a description of modern European societies, but simply as an ideal which has to be fought for.

The immigrants, of course, have an interest in seeing this ideal realised. They are not to be thought of as merely defending traditional culture but as having a developing culture which includes a struggle for equal treatment in their countries of settlement. More than this, however, there are many institutional aspects of the host society in the economy and the political and legal system which they will have to live with as part of the cost of migration.[2] They have to learn to operate in a world created by these institutions even while seeking to preserve aspects of their own cultures.

Cultural and religious tensions

It should now be added that the response of members of the host society will not be determined purely by their complex economic interests. Independently of this there is the question of cultural and religious differences and the fear of many members of these societies that they present new identities which challenge or threaten the existing national feelings of identity. Of particulars importance is the fear of alien religious identities, and, in contemporary Europe, especially of Islam. This becomes an important political factor at this point in history because of the growing confrontation between Islam and the Christian and secular West. Commonly Muslims are seen as "fundamentalist", a term which implies irrational and rigid behaviour as well as a commitment to terrorism. In my view this term has much in common with racist terms which suggest that the behaviour of a group is determined by its genetic constitution.

The public and private communal domains

In discussing the Jenkins ideal I have always emphasised (Rex, 1996) that it implies the existence of two separate domains. On the one hand, the public domain represented by the civic culture and the established institutions of the host society in all major secular matters. On the other the private communal cultures of the immigrant groups and of the host society itself. Integration does not mean a conversion from one communal culture to another. For immigrants it simply means recognising that their own culture has to be preserved within a larger secular environment.

The question of what belongs to the civic and institutional culture on the one hand and to private communal cultures on the other is not, of course, a simple one and there will be many areas of dispute. Not least there are likely to be problems in the educational sphere since schools are concerned both with basic moral education, which is a concern of the private communal cultures, and with preparing their students for participation in the modern secular world.

There are also other problems which arise. Those who campaign for human rights, especially women's rights, may not be willing to accept that family and marriage practices are a matter for separate communities to decide. There are also questions about the relation between the languages and religion of incoming groups and the official language and established religion of the host society. The line between the civic culture and the more private communal cultures is therefore difficult to sustain.

European interventions

However these problems are dealt with at national level, the institutions of the European Union have had to make their own response to the presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities. We should therefore note what has been discussed and decided in the European Parliament, in the Council of Ministers and in the European Commission.

The European Parliament has made a strong rhetorical response by making a declaration against "racism and xenophobia", but, since it has no legislative powers, what actually occurs depends upon the decisions of the Council of Ministers and the implementation of the Council of Ministers' decisions by the Commission.

[22] What I am saying here is that, although a set of rules of the game based upon the equality of all individuals should be at the heart of the civic culture, in established nation states there are also a number of institutions in the sphere of the economy, the polity and law which create the context within which immigrants have to operate and immigrants do accept this. This does not, however mean that they have to abandon their own more private communal culture for that of their hosts.

So far as the Parliament is concerned it is clear that the complexity of the issues involved in dealing with minorities including immigrant minorities are largely ignored or dealt with in an oversimplified way as part of a general strategy of opposing racism and xenophobia. The Council of Ministers, on the other hand, has the task of facilitating relations between the nation states of the EU while at the same time strengthening its borders with the rest of the world. At this level the question of immigration from outside is seen as one of tight immigration control and this problem is discussed along with the control of possible terrorism and of the drug traffic. Finally, the Commission whose duty is to implement the legislation of the Council of Ministers, actually takes the initiative in setting up policies and agencies to reflect both the ideas of the Parliament and the Commission. Perhaps the most important decision affecting immigrants by the Commission was the setting up of the Migrants Forum. This body which was to advise all the agencies of the Union on matters affecting immigrants was constituted by selected representatives of the organisation, both of residents who lacked political rights, especially Turkish guestworkers, and of those who had political rights but suffered social discrimination, especially most Black and Asian immigrants in Britain and many Maghrebians in France. This clearly confused two distinct groups in terms of the Marshallian categories those without political rights and those who, having these rights, suffered from a lack of full social rights. Again one sees here a lack of grasp of real sociological distinctions.[3]

Refugees and other political migrants

All that has been said so far concerns economic migrants or those who are assumed to have migrated to improve their job prospects. Since the immigration stop which became effective in the1970s, however, the principal group of incomers have been political migrants. These have included those seeking asylum under the Geneva Convention because they were in personal danger in their homelands, and a much larger class of political migrants who, although not qualifying under the Geneva Convention, were nevertheless fleeing from intolerable political circumstances such as civil wars or sometimes from ecological disaster areas. Thus one found in most European countries those who had had their asylum applications approved, those who were waiting for their applications to be considered, those whose applications had been rejected but could not be returned to their homelands because of conditions there, and some who had no case for asylum and were simply political migrants.

Governments have to justify their acceptance of refugees and other political immigrants on quite different grounds to those in terms of which they might justify the presence of economic migrants. What they have to do is to fulfil their obligations under the Geneva Convention, but such obligations are not necessarily recognised by their electorates, and governments have usually done little to persuade them. Such persuasion as does occur depends largely upon NGOs which do usually take up the cause of the welfare of refugees. They, however, are opposed by many members of the host society who see asylum seekers as economic migrants in disguise using asylum seeking as a way of evading strict immigration controls.

There is also the wider problem of political migration and here the response of host governments and societies will depend upon their political attitudes to the different groups involved. During the period of the Cold War those who were fleeing from Communism were best received. So too were Iranians fleeing from the regime of the Ayatollah, but other groups like Tamils from Sri Lanka, Somalis from the Horn of Africa, the Vietnamese boat people, or Kurds from Turkey did not have the same political prestige. Their right to acceptance and to welfare was again advocated mainly by sympathetic NGOs.

The fear of an influx of political migrants was often merged with a more general fear of illegal immigration which had to be dealt with by tighter immigration control. Rather than setting out to integrate these groups, governments were more inclined to adopt policies which would make it unnecessary for them to do so. They attacked all those who facilitated the migration, including both those who organised it for profit and those who carried them. The former were dealt with as criminals while the latter were required themselves to prevent immigrants from obtaining passages. Potential migrants were required to obtain visas before leaving their homelands and attempts were made to create "safe havens" where they would be guaranteed some degree of protection and therefore have no political excuse for migration.

[33] There were several problems involved in the setting up of this organisation. Firstly, it involved the marginalisation of all immigrant problems which instead of being dealt with by the European Parliament itself were to be discussed in a purely advisory body. Secondly, it was not clear on what basis particular minorities were chosen for representation (The Irish in Britain, for example, not being represented). And, thirdly, amongst those minorities who were represented which of their organisations should represent them. The most that could be said was that it provided for the creation of a lobby on behalf of all those suffering any form of discrimination or facing immigration difficulties.

The special problem of Gypsies[4]

One feature of all modern European societies whether capitalist or communist is that there are some groups, which in their own culture reject some of the premises of modernity, including especially the notion that membership of a modern society implies entering it through its occupational system. Such are the Sami of the Scandinavian countries and such are the Gypsies. Crosscutting this distinction is that between settled and travelling groups[5]. Gypsies are doubly outside of mainstream society in not entering its mainstream occupational system and as being travellers. They also have a distinct Romany culture which probably had its origins in India or in Egypt. They have had to exist within national societies but also have a transnational culture and transnational organisations.

Together with the Jews, who have found their own niches in certain types of business and in the professions, they have been regarded with fear and hostility. In the Nazi period Jews and Gypsies were subject to the murderous persecution of the Holocaust. In the post-war period hostility to Gypsies remains an important factor in many European countries and governments have had to develop special policies to deal with them just as they have had to develop special policies towards political migrants. Here again, however, governments have been responsive to the continuing hostility of their populations towards the Gypsies, have themselves reflected this hostility and engaged in persecuting them.

Any government which does not simply reflect this hostility, has nonetheless to deal with Gypsies through special policies. The problem which they face, however, is a complex one. Some Gypsies do wish to stay outside mainstream society and a policy towards groups of this kind has to be developed. On the other hand many Gypsies today do want to enter society and something has to be done to protect them against discrimination. Different countries have developed different policies in these matters. Some have sought pragmatically to develop policies which allow some place for Gypsies and Travellers, although they are always resisted in some degree by the host population. This is largely true of England. In other cases governments have both persecuted Gypsies or ignored their plight. This is most obviously true in the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

It is in these circumstances that Gypsies have come to form an important and very noticeable part of the totality of political migration. They can claim that they are subject to political persecution and discrimination, even though they do not qualify for asylum, and of course it is true that, if they seek to flee from their present countries to other countries which have more generous policies, there will be those entrepreneurs who will organise their flight, even if this means they themselves are regarded as criminal.

It has been necessary to stress the special position of Gypsies because in recent developments in Western Europe they have loomed large in what has been seen as the threat of immigration. The whole problem of developing policies for immigrant settlement must include some quite central consideration of the Gypsy question both at a national and a European level.

Policies for a multi-ethnic Ireland

Other contributors to this conference will deal with some of the specific problems which have arisen as Ireland becomes conscious of its new internal multi-ethnicity. My aim has been to look systematically at the way in which these problems have been dealt with and are being dealt with in other European countries and at the level of the European Union. It should be clear, however, that while these problems are being addressed there, they are very far from being solved and there is a great deal of conflict and confusion about them. I do believe, however, that familiarity with this debate might help to formulate realistic policies in Ireland. The following are, I think, some of the major problems to be addressed.

First it must be recognised that Irish people are likely to experience many of the same anxieties about immigration and multi-ethnicity and to show the same hostility towards immigrants as do the people of other European countries. It will be said, and rightly so, that the Irish are perhaps better equipped than some other peoples to understand these problems because their own kin have experienced migration and know something of the problems of being an immigrant. (The same might be said of Italians). There is nonetheless the likelihood that a rhetoric about this superior experience may cover considerable hostility in practice.

Secondly it should be recognised that there is likely to be considerable variety amongst the new ethnic minority communities now emerging in Ireland. There will be some migration of European

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[44] I use the term gypsy as a matter of convenience recognising that almost any term used may have pejorative or "politically incorrect" connotations. Clearly, however, there are groups both nationally and crossing international borders who have a distinctive Romany culture which has been in part at odds with the culture of European societies in both their capitalist and communist versions.

[5] In my own earliest research in Sparkbrook in Birmingham I encountered two clans of Irish Travellers who were not Gypsies but who had their own distinctive occupations and did not adhere to the norms of behaviour of the respectable working class. They actually lived by unpicking feather mattresses and selling the feathers but they used unlicensed vehicles and chose to live in the most minimal accommodation. More recently Britain has had the phenomenon of the so-called New Age Travellers, many from middle class families, who drop out of mainstream values, have no clear occupations and live in their own camps.

citizens who will present few problems and are unlikely to be denied rights; there will be some economic migrants taking advantage of new jobs which Ireland will have to offer; there will be communities of refugees and political migrants experiencing different degrees of political hostility; and there will be Gypsies.

Thirdly the question has to be faced as to what it would mean to say that Ireland was to be a multi-ethnic or multi-cultural society. Clearly there are many who would assent to the general notion without accepting the idea of a civic culture based upon equality. What need to be fought for are all three aspects of what I have called the Jenkins formula, namely the acceptance of cultural diversity, insistence of equality for all individuals in public matters, and, thirdly, the promotion of intergroup tolerance.

Fourthly, there are some problems about the political culture of Ireland and its institutions which are specific to it. It is a Catholic country, even though it has found a way of allowing a place for Protestants within it, and this may mean that it will not easily accept incomers of other more distant faiths and other cultures. It may also place restrictions on human rights which are at odds with ideas about individual human rights to be found in most other modern societies. This is most evident in the debate about abortion. On the other hand Catholicism contains within it its own kind of universalism in which race, ethnicity and nationality are not barriers to membership in a universal institution.

I expect that the conclusions which will be drawn here will be normative ones. That is to say we shall be arguing for a particular kind of multi-ethnicity in Ireland, but, if we are to be realistic we also have to recognise that such an ideal is something which has to be fought for in politics against what might be quite reactionary and racist forces.

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Multiple Identities in Ireland and Europe

Paul Gillespie

Introduction

Political discussion of multi-ethnicity and nationhood in Ireland should be placed in a wider historical, theoretical and normative setting which addresses the possibility that multiple political identities can emerge, and are emerging, to replace the singular, homogenous ones classically associated with the nation-state, its nationalisms and cultural essentialisms. Several central features of today's world - interdependence, economic globalisation, human rights universalism, international migration and regional integration - are creating these conditions (Soysal, 1994; 1996). They can greatly facilitate the development of multi-ethnic relations in host societies newly experiencing immigration such as Ireland. But there is nothing automatic here. This is highly contested ground, requiring political struggle and comparative analysis to create new political communities (Archibugi, Held & Kohler, 1998; Linklater, 1998). In this paper I will summarily outline some of the main forces making for such a changing world and facilitating the emergence of multiple political identities in Europe. I am guided by the idea that identity, including national identity, is historically and socially constructed, contingent not essentialist or primordialist (Brubaker, 1996). I will also suggest how Ireland fits into this world and conclude with some remarks on the role of the media in a more diverse and multi-ethnic society.

Homogenisation, race and ethnicity

Seen in a long historical perspective state and nation-building in Europe have been processes promoting homogenisation and singularity within national boundaries. The Westphalian state system established in the seventeenth century sought to impose a monopoly of the use of force, war-making capacity, money and law-making, language and cultural affairs - all those symbols of identification (Held, 1996; Mann, 1986). Singular national identities were constructed despite the continuing history and practice of diversity between the nation-states in Europe as a whole. These tendencies were greatly reinforced by the emergence of nationalism in its various guises in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, whether civic or ethnic, imperial or small state. Nationalism and industrialism intimately combined to create vertically organised structures in government, business, administration, military and political affairs, reflecting what Bukharin called a "monism of architecture" (Kaldor, 1996: 43-5). Sovereignty, territory and nationality were increasingly congruent with one another. Bonding of political loyalties and legitimacy and bounding of territorial borders were closely linked (Gillespie, 1996a: 34-5). All this contrasts with the overlapping politics and centres of authority characteristic of medieval societies, in which identities were multiple. Recent changes in international society and regional integration are opening up the possibility of retrieving such multiplicities; hence the term neo-medieval increasingly used to describe them (Bull, 1977; Eco, 1986; Patomaki, 1997).

From the perspective of multi-ethnic affairs it is worth noting that the categories of race and ethnicity, though different, are relatively recent constructions. The concept of race was unknown to the Greeks, Romans or in the Middle Ages. It took off from the seventeenth century, coinciding with the emergence of the nation-state; it found its full flowering in German romanticism, when *volk*, an ethnic or racial concept referring to blood, soil and language, took over from *populus*, the idea of a people organised as a political community (Hannaford, 1996). As Kenan Malik puts it, "the concept of race emerged ... as a means of reconciling the conflict between the ideology of equality and the reality of the persistence of inequality. Race accounted for social inequalities by attributing them to nature" (Malik, 1996: 6). There has been a tendency to transfer this function to culture more recently (Kumar, 1998: 127). Like the related idea of citizenship *populus* has a far older pedigree. The conflation of citizenship and nationality also originates from the last century, along with the associated vocabulary of assimilation, naturalisation, evacuation, exclusion, expulsion, liquidation and ethnic cleansing that has disfigured and bewildered modern political thought and practice. It is part of the argument presented here that unbundling citizenship and nationality will be one of the essential tasks in creating circumstances in which multi-ethnicity can flourish and racism recede.

We are familiar with the important distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms, underlying notions of citizenship based on residence or blood line and the different models for accommodating ethnic differences to which they have given rise. Through the nineteenth century ethnic/national definitions of identity tended to supersede civil/republican ones (Brubaker, 1992). From the perspective of nation-building in the classical period of European nationalism leaders sought to have it all their own way by demanding exclusive citizenship, border control, linguistic conformity and political obedience. There were important exceptions, notably the Austro-Hungarian Empire and arguably the multi-national British state.

But they too contained their privileged and dominant groups and their associated homogeneities and racisms. In this century we have seen the catastrophic culmination of these processes in world wars fought out in the name of racial theories and also the end of the empires which sustained them.

Changes in International Society

These categories of nationality, citizenship, sovereignty and territory and their bounding and bonding functions are becoming increasingly unbundled in line with greater economic and political interdependence between the developed states in Europe, by globalisation in a world setting - and by international migration. These changes are eroding the received foundations of political order, their territorial boundaries and moral imperatives, opening up space for multiple affiliations and allegiances above and beneath the nation-state (Cohen, 1996, 1997; Diner, 1998; Ruggie, 1993). As a result the single allegiance model of the nation-state, in which exclusive loyalty was demanded of its citizens based on these categories, is giving way to a more open, contingent and multiple set of identities, ranging through local, regional, national to supranational and even global dimensions. This includes those constructed from routes not roots, in Stuart Hall's words (Morley and Chen, 1996: 411-503). These are trends only, but real nonetheless, which must be pushed further if they are to become the foundations for new and more inclusive multi-ethnic communities. It cannot be assumed any more that the national encompasses total belonging and identity. In these circumstances identity begins at home but it cannot end there. The same applies increasingly to welfare and employment. As David Held puts it, in the political domain we are more and more subject to "overlapping communities of fate" and will therefore in the future need to be not only citizens of our own communities, but of the region in which we live and of the wider global order as well (Held, 1998: 27). This will require as great a leap of the political imagination in the 21st century as it took in the eighteenth century to extend democracy from the town meeting to the level of the national state (Beetham,1998: 59).

This is not the place to elaborate a theory of European integration, which I have attempted to do elsewhere (Gillespie, 1996a). Suffice it to say I don't agree that what is being constructed is a federal superstate superseding the nation-states. Rather is the national being embedded in the European and vice versa (Gillespie, 1998a; Laffan, Smith and O'Donnell, 1999; NESC, 1997). It is a multi-levelled polity, with many new points of political identification (Hooghe and Marks, 1997). There is a disjunction between legal sovereignty, which has been transferred, state sovereignty, which is increasingly pooled and popular sovereignty, which remains firmly anchored in national bases. Thus democracy, welfare and media remain predominantly national (Scharpf, 1997; Streeck, 1997). But, as Meehan puts it, "a new kind of citizenship is emerging that is neither national nor cosmopolitan but that is multiple in the sense that the identities, rights and obligations associated ... with citizenship are expressed through an increasingly complex configuration of common Community institutions, states, national and transnational voluntary associations, regions and alliances of regions" (Meehan, 1993: 1).

Laffan adds that "a European identity is not likely to transcend national identities but may develop as a weaker form of identity in a hierarchy or circle of identities" (Laffan, 1996: 98-99). Thus European integration does not - and should not - replace national government with large federal structures, but it embeds or enmeshes the national in the European, the European in the national. In this sense it seeks to domesticate inter-state relations, to transform diplomacy into politics. This is a radical project. It requires that democracy be deepened within the EU and extended internationally. It requires that demos and ethnos be separated and that European citizenship be developed on an international basis (Habermas, 1998; Weiler, 1995, 1998). It does not and should not base itself on a singular state, nation or people but on multiple identities and diverse allegiances. A federal superstate conceived on national models, such as that in the US, would betray not express the original post-imperial ideas on which the EC/EU is based (Gillespie, 1996a: 57-8).

The Treaty of Amsterdam institutionalises and communitarises new arrangements for dealing with migration, asylum and external boundaries, work that will proceed throughout the next five years (Tonra, 1997: 119-146). This is an ambitious undertaking, the hallmark of a polity in creation. It is characterised by an extensive debate about how open or closed the new frontiers of the European Union should be, and, of course, where they should be (Kostakopoulou, 1998). There are alarming signals of a fortress mentality developing among the state and political élites involved in the negotiations, playing to outbursts of racism and xenophobia in response to recent immigration, so much so that one can legitimately ask whether EU policy is genuinely committed to protecting rather than excluding immigrants (Bhabha, 1998). The question of whether universal human rights norms have deterritorialised notions of personal rights and made for a new post-national citizenship applying to immigrants, as argued by Soysal (1994, 1996) is contested by evidence of the continued strength of sovereign national governments and their capacity to impose their exclusionary preferences. Racial harassment and violence continue across EU member-states, along with discriminatory police behaviour, ghettoisation, employment policies and free movement rights (Morris, 1997; Bhabha, 1998: 602). European citizenship does not extend to third country nationals, who are thereby denied the admittedly limited

political rights it confers. Since there is no accepted pan-European meaning of citizenship, this exclusion effectively grounds such rights in the varying national definitions of citizenship and nationality (Baubock, 1997). There is a lively and interesting literature and debate about European citizenship, seeking to separate it from nationality in order precisely to escape from ethnic definitions and facilitate dual or multiple citizenship (Bader, 1997; Cesarani and Fulbrook, 1996; Kostakapoulou, 1996; Meehan, 1993; O'Leary, 1996; O'Leary and Tiilikainen, 1998; Schnapper, 1997; Shaw, 1997; Weiner, 1998). But the miniscule progress made in the Treaty of Amsterdam towards bringing it into practice makes one realise what a difficult task that will be, despite the political rhetoric about moving the citizen centre-stage (McDonagh, 1998: 79-94; Tonra, 1997).

This is all a reminder that what Goran Therborn describes as "an epochal change in European social history", the transition of Europe from emigration to immigration status, coincides now with these wider political changes. As he puts it, "ethnic - and largely continental ethnic - conflict has substituted for intra-European nationalist rivalry. The socio-political effect has been to weaken class cleavages and politics in favour of ethnic and other non-class ones" (Therborn, 1995: 51). He provides a richly argued and documented account of these changes. How they are organised over the next 10-20 years will probably shape the continental order for a much longer period to come.

Ireland is perhaps the last EU state to experience these changes; and because our history (including our very recent history and continuing experience) contains so much emigration, it is all the more difficult to come to terms with it. On the European scale the picture is also dramatic. The period of Europe's imperial hegemony and economic power in the world was also one of heavy emigration. Between 1850 and 1960 about half the population of Britain and Ireland in the year 1900 emigrated, for example, and a good third of the Italian population, according to the same calculation. But in the post-war period labour shortages, ex-colonial migratory flows and most recently the flow of asylum seekers and refugees from political collapse have in western Europe turned the tide, and in the process reversed the ethnic homogenisation of nation-state populations resulting from boundary changes, expulsions and repatriations.

A new heterogeneity and ethnic diversity has therefore emerged, which is more characteristic of long European traditions before the era of national homogeneity. And the scale of recent immigration is high in historical terms, as is clear from a comparison between West Germany and the United States. In 1969-70 net immigration into West Germany was 0.9 per cent a year of the resident population, equal to the American immigration in the top year of 1913. In 1989 net immigration into the Federal Republic amounted to 1.6 per cent of the resident population. As a result the foreign-born populations of Germany, France, Belgium and Sweden now probably equal or exceed that in the US, though not Canada or Australia (Therborn, 1995: 41, 49, 51). They are concentrated in big cities, such as London, Paris, Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Brussels, creating major problems of adjustment and a proliferation of racist/xenophobic parties and movements - and also, of course, counter-movements, of which the participants in the TCD conference are part.

EU enlargement plays to this game. Fears of further large-scale migrations from the accession states in central and Eastern Europe or from their neighbours to the east or south are injected into the accession negotiations. The Schengen arrangements for free movement must be accepted in full by the accession states according to the Treaty of Amsterdam. This has meant they are under strong pressure from states such as Austria and Germany to impose visa regimes with neighbouring states such as Belarus, Romania, Ukraine and Moldova, which could undermine good relations by foreclosing commercial and social interchange (*The Irish Times*, 1998). In Hungary disgraceful conditions for thousands of refugees in four holding centres have been criticised by the European Commission (Menasse, 1998). But, ironically, the Hungarian authorities believe they have to impose such a regime to create goodwill among EU governments in the accession negotiations - even if this seriously complicates relations with the 2.7 million Hungarian minority in Romania.

It is clear there will be a continuing tug of war between those who want to keep these new borders relatively open, not imposing too rigid controls and boundaries there, and those who believe they should be relatively closed. This is one of the central political questions facing Europeans today, with major implications for migration, multi-ethnicity and diversity. It can be understood as a struggle between two kinds of post-modern community (Patomaki, 1997).

A globalising capitalist model would include the following features: a would-be political community in decline (or the 'we'-feeling confined to a thin layer of élites); de facto and de jure blurring of distinctions between insiders and outsiders but a tendency towards closure; exclusive membership for many social spaces; overlapping centres of functionally organised power and generalised sense of powerlessness and insecurity among most of the population; emphasis on law and order in certain districts of multicultural cities and globalising commercial spaces; and threats of cultural/civilisational clashes on the boundaries of the community. An emancipatory and ecological model would rather aim to: build a new kind of political community; blur distinctions between insiders and outsiders and tend to keep them open; share

overlapping loyalties and democratisation, overlapping powers in the context of generalised popular empowerment; debate security, but include individual welfare and safety against ecological dangers.

This is schematic, but usefully highlights that political conflicts are not necessarily confined to a struggle between the nation-state and global or regional integration. There are alternative models of international integration on offer, including alternative approaches towards migration (Gillespie, 1997a). At the global level the same point applies. As Held argues, "it is important to grasp that globalisation does not require the neo-liberal policy mix to be endlessly followed. For globalisation's shape and form is contestable and open to political challenge. The hyper-globalist view represents a particular political and intellectual project, and it is not the only one". He suggests, for example, that taxes on capital turnover could be used to regulate the volatility of international markets; that new forms of international economic regulation need to be elaborated; that a global social contract could be developed to replace the Bretton Woods financial institutions set up at the end of the second World War; that new forms of democratic accountability be created at regional levels and through the United Nations, including, in due course, a new democratic UN second chamber (Held, 1998). Already human rights norms have at least partially superseded absolute state sovereignty in regulating migration (Soysal, 1996; Bhabha, 1998).

It is possible to look at multiculturalism in the same way, as the Slovenian theorist, Slavoj Zizek, argues. He defines multiculturalism as:

> the ideal form of ideology of this global capitalism ... The relationship between traditional imperialist colonialism and global capitalist self-colonisation is exactly the same as the relationship between Western cultural imperialism and multiculturalism: in the same way that global capitalism involves the paradox of colonization without the colonizing Nation-State metropole, multiculturalism involves patronising Eurocentrist distance and/or respect for local cultures without roots in one's own particular culture. In other words, multiculturalism is a disavowed, inverted self-referential form of racism, a 'racism with a distance' - it 'respects' the Other's identity, conceiving the Other as a self-enclosed 'authentic' community towards which he, the multiculturalist, maintains a distance rendered possible by his privileged universal position (Zizek, 1997: 44).

Against such multiculturalism he counterposes a universality based on the interests of those excluded by it, exemplified in the slogans "we are all immigrant workers", or "Sarajevo is the capital of Europe". Universality is thus counterposed to globalisation, in which such multiculturalisms continually reproduce populist fundamentalisms, hatred and violence: "Multiculturalist openness versus a new fundamentalism is thus a false dilemma: they are the two faces of today's post-political universe". Globalisation without universalism poses the question:

> Against this end-of-ideology politics, one should insist on the potential of democratic politicisation as the true European legacy from ancient Greece onwards. Will we be able to invent a new mode of re-politicisation questioning the undisputed reign of global capital? Only such a re-politicisation of our predicament can break the vicious cycle of liberal globalisation destined to engender the most regressive forms of fundamentalist hatred (Zizek, 1998 b, pp. 1008-9; see also Zizek, 1998a).

The political struggle on behalf of immigrants therefore poses some of the most profound issues in contemporary politics. I have argued that changes in international society open up the possibility of retrieving multiple identities which were part and parcel of the long European tradition closed by homogenising state and nation-building. Diversity is thereby reinforced as a core value, some would say the core value of European civilisation. Despite recurrent attempts to unite them by imperial, dynastic or political means Europeans have repeatedly resisted cultural homogenisation. The key question now is whether the invention of a more civilised means of living together - the post-war project of European integration - will be extended to the historical Others on Europe's boundaries, however contingently these are defined. Should Europe's Others not be conceived historically, in terms of its imperial and racist past, rather than as its geographical neighbours in Russia, the Middle East and North Africa? (Gillespie, 1996a: 165). That would give real meaning to L. P. Hartley's aphorism that the past is another country.

Ireland's multiple identities

Despite the evident hybridity that has characterised Irish identity over millennia, in this century we have experienced a classical set of exclusionary nationalisms and their associated essentialisms. That identity be defined as de-anglicisation - Ireland as not-Britain - was inscribed canonically by Douglas Hyde as the task of Irish cultural nationalism. This was perfectly

understandable in the context of imperial power and cultural renaissance. But here, as in Britain, there has been a struggle between ethnic and civic nationalisms and republicanisms (Kearney, 1997) and effectively, as in many other European states, they became intermingled. The achievement of the civic modernisation project of the last generation has rather been through Europeanisation and Atlanticisation substantially to reduce Ireland's anglocentricity. Just as the Canadian equivalent of "as American as apple pie" is reported to be "as Canadian as it is possible to be in the circumstances", so is it the case with Ireland.

Diversification of economic, political and cultural life away from preoccupation with and over-dependence on Britain over the last generation of EC/EU membership has been experienced as a kind of liberation and in fact has accomplished whatever independence is possible in a post-Westphalian world (Gillespie, 1996b). Membership of the EC/EU levelled the playing field with British ministers and enabled Ireland to develop contacts with other states, allowing for greater self-confidence. Culturally the same applied. Ireland has therefore reached this point of maturity through and by way of participation in integration, globalisation and migration, the very forces that are changing the world. This confirms a long-standing tradition in its literature and cultural life, where, as Declan Kiberd insists, Irish creativity was modern precisely to the extent that it engaged the Other in the name of a radical hybridity (Kiberd, 1995).

Europeanisation has also reawakened long-standing memories of previous engagements with the continent, which were obscured by the nineteenth century experience, including the great language shift, which has added to the emerging sense of multiple identities (Laffan and O'Donnell, 1998). They have led to a greater realisation that Ireland's nationalism is more akin to those in central and eastern Europe, thrown up by the collapse of empires there after the end of the first world war (Gillespie, 1998b). The role of majorities and minorities is one further similarity, which Frank Wright's pioneering study put in the context of ethnic frontiers (Wright, 1987). Another is the triadic structure of political interaction between nationalising states, external homeland nationalisms and national minorities proposed by Rogers Brubaker (1996) in his analysis of nationalism in central and eastern Europe, which is uncannily reflected in the structure of the Belfast Agreement. The agreement helps to deterritorialise Irish identity and refers explicitly to the possibility of sharing Irish and British identity, as many Protestants in Northern Ireland were happy to do before the troubles (Todd, 1995, p. 163). The principles built into it, including consent, parity of esteem, recognition of diversity and power-sharing amount to a lexicon of contemporary multiple identities and make it something of a model that other such conflicts may follow. The coincidence with profound changes in British political identity as it confronts the logic of devolution, the possibility of Scottish independence and the challenge of European engagement broaden the scope of these new Irish identities. The Council of the Isles will be a fascinating arena for many of them to be worked out. The agreement could not have been reached without the greater confidence created by European involvement and guaranteed by that broader umbrella as a means for Ireland to express its independent sovereignty. It is a reminder that the international aspects of the agreement, including the end of the Cold War and the European framework, are indispensable to explaining its success (Cox, 1997, 1998; Stephenson, 1998)

These changes have also helped to revalorise the Irish Diaspora as a source of Ireland's multiple identities and a potentially profoundly important resource going into a globalising 21st century (Gillespie, 1997b). The experience of Irish people abroad with multi-ethnicity could be especially valuable, as Presidents Robinson and McAleese have insisted. So, of course, to return to our main theme, is the reminder that Irish emigration was nothing if not about economic and political refugees and their access to the entire English-speaking world during the last three centuries in search of work, prosperity and political freedom. The same forces multiplying our identities may well make for a more generous and welcoming attitude towards immigrant communities who come here.

Ireland's prosperity also creates a demand for labour from abroad. But the difficulties placed in their way are sharp reminders that it takes political struggle and engagement to ensure this happens. There is no guarantee that these will be forthcoming; but certainly the changes outlined in this paper make it easier to argue the case and to broaden the definition of Irishness in a more inclusive fashion. The media have a particular responsibility to provide a space for such public discussion and to avoid irresponsible stereotyping of the issues at stake. In conclusion I would like to offer some thoughts on this subject, drawing from my involvement last year with the International Federation of Journalists' work on the matter (IFJ, 1997).

The media and multi-ethnic relations

As we have seen Europe has been transformed from net emigration to net immigration status in the post-war years - an epochal shift in its demographic and cultural circumstances. Labour shortages, post-colonial migratory flows and the great increase in the number of political and economic refugees have reversed the tendencies to ethnic homogenisation in the nation-states - and also created conditions within which racism and xenophobia can flourish if not vigorously contested. These historic changes present media professionals with a profound challenge - how to portray the more far-reaching diversity that now characterises European, and Irish,

society. It was defined by the EU Social Affairs Commissioner, Mr Padraig Flynn, in the following terms at an International Federation of Journalists conference on journalism, tolerance and racism in Bilbao in April 1997: "We are looking to present a more balanced picture of European society as it is - a diverse, vibrant, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic society, where difference is seen as a strength". The conference concluded that "diversity is a fundamental reality of human society, a means of cultural enrichment and a stimulus for economic and social development". It insisted that "tolerance actively pursued and with full access to media is necessary to realise diversity's potential". Condemning attempts to use media manipulatively for purposes of propaganda, it said governments have no proper role to play in the regulation of content and journalistic ethics, It declared that journalists should join together with publishers and broadcasting companies to reassert the core principles of professional independence, respect for the truth and the mission of media in support of citizenship, tolerance and democracy.

But journalists themselves have a particular and central role to play in portraying a more diverse European society fairly and accurately. They must be aware that ignorance and a lack of appreciation of different cultures, traditions and beliefs within media lead to stereotypes which reinforce racist attitudes and strengthen the appeal of political extremists. In particular journalists need to be aware of the potential impact of their words and images, given widespread and deeply-rooted fears of civil strife and social exclusion. If their role is to function effectively, their legal, social and professional conditions will need to be improved in cooperation with publishers and broadcasting authorities.

Recognition of the value and strength of diversity is therefore a fundamental means of coming to terms with the reality of contemporary European society. It involves acknowledging that circumstances and attitudes have changed and improved in the past and can do so in the future - but only if a common effort is made. Dialogue cannot be conducted without tolerance and respect for the other's point of view. Tolerance depends on the value given to the others, the recognition of and understanding of their point of view. It is not a mere lubricant of social order, but requires an active recognition of the right of diverse peoples to participate in society and give voice to their concerns. Exclusion and marginalisation lead to frustration and hostility. Dialogue involves disagreement as much as consensus: it is not a function of journalism to suppress political argument. Maintaining a critical distance from partisan positions is a means of ensuring journalistic professionalism, independence and objectivity in the pursuit of truth; soft uncritical journalism can make political wounds fester because positions are not expressed in the public domain.

The media have, therefore, an essential interest in defining tolerance as the space within which to disagree as well as to define differences in a multicultural and multi-ethnic society. But self-regulation in matters of content and journalistic ethics also carries its own responsibilities. It must be recognised that the media have much to do if they are to portray such societies fairly and accurately. They have to address the imbalances in recruitment, social mores and training which make many established newspapers and broadcasting outlets unrepresentative of the increasingly diverse society they service. These may perpetuate stereotyped and skewed reporting, which is bad for journalism, for societies which thereby fail to understand the positive achievements of ethnic minorities - and bad for media businesses which thereby fail to recognise the potential that new markets in a more diverse society can open up.

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Is sectarianism Racism? The implications of sectarian division for multi-ethnicity in Ireland.

Robbie McVeigh

My central thesis is a very simple one. The 'two traditions' on the island of Ireland - Protestants and Catholics - who were supposedly accommodated for the first time in the Belfast Agreement - are ethnic groups. These two social blocs - Protestant/unionist/loyalist and Catholic/nationalist/republican - are primarily distinguished from each other in terms of ethnicity. It does not follow from this that relations between them are necessarily made sense of in terms of racism. But it does mean that multi-ethnicity in Ireland is inseparable from sectarian division. The key point here is that Ireland was a multi-ethnic society long before the arrival of new minority ethnic groups in the post-war period - even if you ignore the long-standing Jewish presence in the county and the ethnic difference between Travellers and settled people which was marked at least from the end of the eighteenth century. Since the Plantation period, Protestant and Catholic blocs have confronted each other across a divide that in any other situation would be unproblematically recognised as an ethnic boundary. In this sense sectarianism doesn't just structure multi-ethnicity in Ireland in some peripheral way, it constitutes multi-ethnicity in a very immediate sense.

I have to acknowledge that while I think that this is true, it is hardly a widely held position. The Belfast Agreement itself is almost completely silent on the issue of ethnicity. When it does finally mention it - it is clear that it is only a quality possessed by minority ethnic groups - so the Agreement's understanding of ethnicity is fundamentally flawed in that respect. Nevertheless, the whole document is an exercise in accommodating ethnic difference and it crucially structures any wider discussion of multi-ethnicity in Ireland. For this reason alone there is every reason to return to the question of the relationship between racism, sectarianism and ethnicity in Ireland.

Debate around the racism/sectarianim nexus is neither new nor confined to Ireland. In the 1990s, Black British organizations have been increasingly concerned to have religion included as a category of identity protected by the British Race Relations Act (Modood et al, 1997). The Act already outlaws discrimination on the grounds of 'colour, race, nationality, or ethnic or national origins'. The campaign for the inclusion of religion promises to push discussion of the connection between religion and ethnicity centre-stage in contemporary debates about racism. The principal reason that religion is not included in existing British legislation is that, from 1965 onwards, there were concerns that 'race relations' legislation should not be 'complicated' by the Northern Ireland situation. These concerns had two important consequences. First, the Northern Ireland Government at Stormont requested that the Race Relations Act (1965) would not apply to Northern Ireland - since it might offer redress to Catholics who, at that time, were experiencing overt and direct discrimination by the Northern Ireland state (Farrell, 1980). As a result, religion - which had been included as a category in early drafts - was withdraw from race relations legislation. Second, religion was excluded from the legislation since it would have been embarrassing to have anti-religious discrimination legislation everywhere in the UK other than the place where it was needed most (Dickey, 1972). As a result, people of colour in Northern Ireland had to wait until 1997 to receive any legal protection from racist discrimination. Thus, trying to make sense of the interface between religion and ethnicity - and racism and sectarianism - is nothing new. Furthermore, it is clear that the evolution of the debate on the connection between racism and sectarianism has been structured as much by political imperatives as academic or legal debate.

Despite the legal separation of racism and sectarianism, people continued to identify similarities. In 1972 the British sociologist and 'race expert' Robert Moore provided an analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict entitled 'Race Relations in the Six Counties'. His conclusion to a comparative analysis of racism and sectarianism was unequivocal: 'the Northern Ireland conflict is truly race conflict' (1972: 37). Moore's only concern in terms of 'race relations in the Six Counties' was the ethnic dimension to unionist/nationalist conflict. There was no mention of minority ethnic groups in Northern Ireland; even though at the time there were long-standing Traveller and Jewish communities in the north, and the development of newer Chinese and South Asian communities was already underway. In short, his was an analysis of 'race relations' in the north without minority ethnic groups or 'People of Colour'.

Moore's analysis, however, raised another contrasting question. He was convinced of the appropriateness of locating sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland in terms of 'race relations' - for him sectarianism was about racism. Since then there has been a movement away from this analysis, towards an approach that - consciously or not - constructs sectarianism as *different* from racism. This interpretation has usually hinged on the argument that sectarianism is about religion rather than 'race' or

ethnicity (Bruce, 1986; Fulton,1991; Hickey, 1986). This approach implies that the Northern Ireland conflict as one with a specificity, if not a peculiarity, which requires a different approach to those grounded in ethnicity or 'race relations'.

The connection between racism and sectarianism has further complicated anti-Irish racism - particularly the question of whether it is appropriate to recognize the existence of anti-Irish racism in Ireland. The notion of anti-Irish racism has been developed to the point where its existence outside of Ireland is less and less contested (Curtis, 1991; Hickman, 1995; Hickman and Walter, 1997; Knobel, 1986). At present, however, there is no consensus on how to make sense of anti-Irishness in Ireland itself. For example, in Britain the Irish have been part of a broader minority ethnic and anti-racist coalition. The Commission for Racial Equality in Britain now regards the Irish community as one of its key constituencies (CRE, 1997). There is no evidence of this happening in Northern Ireland with the recently appointed Commission for Racial Equality (NI). Indeed, such moves would probably be resisted by minority ethnic groups in the north in order to avoid further sectarianization of their interests - they do not want anti-racism to be seen as a 'nationalist' or a 'unionist' issue.

The 'is sectarianism racism?' question has been central to those who have compared racism and sectarianism. Much existing analysis has lent weight to Moore's assertion. My own empirical work in this area found striking similarities between the lived experience of racism and sectarianism (McVeigh, 1990). While this aspect has been undertheorized in most academic literature, the experience and threat of racist and sectarian harassment and intimidation is what defines racism and sectarianism. Moreover, the centrality of violence means that policing becomes the key interface between the British State and racialized and sectarianized communities (McVeigh, 1994; Solomos, 1988). There are also broad similarities in the ways in which discrimination and otherness characterize racism and sectarianism as lived experience - to be Black or Catholic is to be discriminated against in a whole range of ways and disadvantaged across a whole range of indices. Each of these similarities suggests at least a significant overlap between racism and sectarianism (McVeigh, 1990).

Against this, it is clear that the experiences of racism in Britain and sectarianism in Northern Ireland are not identical. This is not, however, necessarily fatal for Moore's thesis. Racism assumes different forms in different situations - sectarianism might be very different to anti-Black racism in Britain but a form of racism for all that - just as racism against Travellers and refugees and Jews is very different in Ireland. The development of the specific concept of 'anti-Irish racism' makes this point very clearly. If anti-Irish racism exists, it is certainly very different from other racisms - in Britain and elsewhere. This makes anti-Irish racism particularly pertinent to the question of the relationship between racism and sectarianism.

Discussion of anti-Irish racism brings us right to the heart of the connectedness of the experience of Irish people and Black people in Britain. The issues of the *possibility* and the *specificity* of anti-Irish racism have been clearly articulated in the context of the Irish in Britain over the past ten years. This has involved a debate which has been politically heated at times. Some analyses have been eager to include Irish people in the analysis of racialized groups. One way of doing this was simply to identify the Irish as 'black'. Sivanandan - in the process of critiquing the concept of 'ethnicity' and wanting to include the Irish within anti-racist struggle - identifies the Irish as 'politically Black' (Sivanandan, 1983: 4). Others argue that, in the same way as Cox (1970) distinguished between racism and antisemitism, so a distinction must be made between racism (which is experienced by Black people) and the qualitatively different prejudice and discrimination experienced by Irish people.

In this analysis, colour - albeit mediated by colonial and post-colonial relationships - becomes the definitive interface within racism. This argument becomes definitional because, if racism is something which can only happen to Black people, then obviously White Irish people in Britain or Ireland cannot experience racism. This analysis denies the very possibility of anti-Irish racism (Connor 1987: 23). This debate is by no means exhausted but it is clear that the notion of anti-Irish racism has achieved new levels of acceptability - or perhaps even 'respectability'. In 1997, the British Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) published *Discrimination and the Irish Community in Britain* which provides a comprehensive analysis of the extent of anti-Irish racism. The CRE now regards the Irish as 'Britain's largest ethnic minority group' (CRE, 1997: 1). It takes substantial numbers of cases on behalf of Irish people (CRE, 1997: 3-4). Some of these cases have involved northern Irish Protestants whose own sense of identity was ethnically 'Protestant' and politically unionist - so, in Britain at least, anti-Irish racism involves discrimination against Irishness abstracted from religious, political and national identity (Hickman and Walter, 1997: 11). Furthermore, Hickman's definitive analysis of anti-Irish racism clearly regards anti-Irish racism and anti-Catholicism in Britain as different, if constantly overlapping, discourses (1995: 19-53). Thus, in the British context, sectarianism and anti-Irish racism are not the same thing.

This tends to suggest that sectarianism and anti-Irish racism are also discrete discourses in Northern Ireland. This is supported by the fact that no-one has suggested that Catholics in the north of Ireland *cannot* be sectarian. If Catholics are sectarian, and, if sectarianism is really racism, then they are either exhibiting anti-Irish racism (which appears absurd) or some other specific form of racism which has never

been named at all. This lends further support to the idea that sectarianism should continue to be theorized as different to anti-Irish racism.

This analysis provokes a further question: to what extent are both of these discourses different to anti-Black racism? A specific perspective on this is offered by the question of the experience of People of Colour in Ireland. It has become increasingly obvious that different minority ethnic groups experience serious and systematic racism from the White, 'majority ethnic' community in Ireland - both Protestant and Catholic (CAJ, 1992; McVeigh, 1998). So, how different is anti-Black racism in Ireland from sectarianism and anti-Irish racism?

Existing legislation already hints at the overlap between racism and sectarianism. The definitive *Mandla v Lee* decision (Mandla v Lee [1983] 2 A.C. 548) made two key points about the British Race Relations Act (1976). First, ethnicity was the most important and embracing of all dimensions of the Act; second, religion was often a constituent part of ethnicity. On the other hand, the Northern Ireland Fair Employment Act (1976) effectively recognizes politics and ethnicity (or 'perceived religious identity') alongside formal religious identity (Bell, 1996: 5-6). Thus, on both sides, the religion/ethnicity divide is increasingly blurred.

Addressing the relationship of anti-Black racism, anti-Irish racism and sectarianism raises theoretical questions that are usefully clarified by exploring the distinction between *ontological* and *dialectical* definitions (McVeigh, 1998). Put simply, the ontological focuses on what something *is*; the dialectical focuses on the social relations involved. Most analyses of racism take this focus on social relationships a stage further. They tend to see racism as an *asymmetrical power relationship* - that is, something which occurs across an ethnic boundary in an *unequal* way (McVeigh, 1995b: 17-21). The notion of *institutional racism* is central to this theorisation (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967). Thus, whatever their intent, Black people cannot be racist in the same way as White people since they do not have the power to be racist. Racialized minorities lack the access to social power - particularly access to state power - which is crucial to the reality of racism. From this perspective it is impossible to see racism as a thing in itself - it only makes sense to name something as racism in the context of asymmetries of power.

Attention to the ontological perspective throws some light on the racism/sectarianism interface. It is clear that racism is sometimes manifested in a specifically sectarian form and sectarianism is sometimes manifested in a specifically racist form. Thus, within racism against Black people, groups are often attacked in terms of being 'heathens' or 'Muslims' or with other religious labels. In Britain, in the aftermath of the Rushdie affair, Muslim was often used as an ethnic label to attack all South Asian people - whatever their religious identity. This is why so many anti-racist organizations are now campaigning to have religion included as a category protected by the RRA. Equally, within antisemitism and anti-Irish racism, anti-Judaism and anti-Catholicism add a specifically religious dimension to each of these racisms. So, there is no doubting the centrality of religious identity within notions of 'race' and ethnicity. Conversely, within sectarianism, ethnic labels like 'Taig' or 'Orangie' are often substituted for the generic use of 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' (McVeigh, 1995a: 637-9). Thus, from the ontological perspective, there is little substantive difference between racism and sectarianism. In this sense, according to the *Mandla v Lee* definition, the sectarian categories 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' fit the description of ethnicities, and sectarianism can be regarded as a 'race relations' situation.

The differences between racism and sectarianism become clearer, however, from the dialectical perspective. Put simply, these differences are rooted in the fact that anti-Irish racism characterizes relationships between British and Irish people, and anti-Black racism in Ireland characterizes relationships between 'People of Colour' and 'White' people, while sectarianism characterizes relationships between Catholic and Protestant Irish people. This means that, in the specific case of the Irish experience, there can be anti-Irish racism, anti-Black racism *and* sectarianism. These are all distinct social phenomena in Ireland.

In short, whether sectarianism is racism depends, not unnaturally, on how we decide to *define* both concepts. If we choose to define racism and sectarianism ontologically with a focus on ethnicity - as happens with most legislative definitions - then sectarianism seems indistinguishable from racism. If, however, we define racism and sectarianism dialectically, then they involve groups which are constituted in substantively different ways and the two phenomena maintain a discrete integrity. From this perspective, there are good reasons to suggest that racism and sectarianism are not the same thing. This is not, however, to endorse the fundamentally misguided analysis which I have characterized as the 'theological fallacy' (McVeigh, 1998). The theological fallacy is the notion that sectarianism in Ireland in general, and the Northern Ireland conflict in particular, should be explained in terms of religion.

This thesis simply does not stand up empirically. In every colonial situation where there was an identity between the religion of the settlers and natives, other signifiers - 'race' or colour or nationality - served to mark and reinforce the boundary between coloniser and colonised. This happened in Ireland too, before the Reformation when the infamous 'Statutes of Kilkenny' were used to prevent intermarriage (and other social intercourse) between Irish natives and English settlers who shared a common Catholicism. After the Reformation, of course, religion provided a

convenient signifier of difference between settler and native in Irish colonial history. This, however, was a *consequence* rather than a *cause* of ethnic differentiation forged at the colonial nexus. If we want to make sense of the connectedness of 'race', ethnicity and religion in Ireland, we have to go beyond the simplistic assertion that sectarianism is different from racism because it is about religion.

This is not to argue that religion plays no part in sectarian division. If religious labels like 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' are used to characterize social division then, to some extent, that division is 'about' religion. Rather than forcing us to accept the theological fallacy, however, this should instead encourage us to unpack the many secular dimensions to religious identity. It should challenge us to find the profane within the sacred, the ideological within the theological. In other words, religion is not about - or certainly not *only* about - religion. As sociologists have long pointed out, its other-worldly focus can often disguise the dimensions of religious identity which are uncompromisingly this-worldly. It is unusual to find any religious project with claims to spiritual power and authority which does not simultaneously make an attendant claim to temporal power and authority.

With regard to sectarianism then, the Northern Ireland conflict is not about religion except in so far as religion is about colonial history and ethnicity and racism. To paraphrase Moore 'the Northern Ireland conflict is truly not religious conflict'. The 'sociology of religion' very properly addresses the specific dynamics of social life attached to belief. This discipline includes the study of tensions within and between different manifestations of religious faith. The sociology of religion, however, *does not and should not include discussion of the vast majority of the causes and consequences of sectarianism in Ireland*. While religious ideas and faith inform aspects of sectarian belief and conflict, these are less important than other factors. Ultimately sectarianism is rooted in colonial history and politics and ethnicity rather than theology or religious practice (Liechty, 1993). Sectarian blocs are nominally religious - 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' - but the way that they are constituted approximates much more closely to ethnicity than it does to religious belief. Moreover, while it is entirely appropriate to study the religious dimensions to sectarianism, this is in principle no different to studying the religious dimensions to racism.

Conclusions

The comparative analysis of racism and sectarianism has much to offer in terms of unpacking the religion/ 'race'/ ethnicity nexus in Ireland and beyond. There is a 'resonance' between racism and sectarianism which means that comparing them offers unique insights into the nature of both. Whether or not sectarianism *is* racism, however, depends on the definition of racism adopted. From the perspective of the British Race Relations Act (1976), sectarian identity is indistinguishable from ethnicity and sectarianism is a 'race relations' situation. From the perspective of sociological notions of ethnicity, sectarianism involves different ethnic groups to racism and there is a point in maintaining the integrity of sectarianism as an explanatory concept - particularly in the context of social conflict in Ireland. In terms of broad distinctions: sectarianism involves the relationship between Irish Protestants and Catholics. Anti-Irish racism involves the relationship between British people and Irish people. And racism in Ireland involves relationships between majority and minority ethnic groups either constituted as 'White people' and 'People of Colour' or 'settled people' and Travellers. Whether or not sectarianism is seen as the same thing as racism, it should not be regarded as a 'religious' phenomenon. In so far as the two can be disaggregated, 'sectarianism' is about ethnicity much more than it is about religion. In this sense, sectarianism is much the same as racism - religion plays a part, but only a part - in the construction of both.

From this perspective it is clear that we already have a multi-ethnic Ireland. Moreover, this is not simply in the ontological sense of having increasing numbers of ethnic groups - majority ethnic (white, Irish), Travellers, Jews, Chinese, Africans, Asians and so on - all of us belongs to one of a growing number of these groups. It is, more importantly, true in the dialectical sense. It is striking that we are all multi-ethnic in this sense. Take two traditional categories: Traveller and Jew. Each of these has its ethnic symetre - non-Traveller (sedentary/Settled) and non-Jew (Gentile). Everyone of us in Ireland can situate ourselves in terms of *both* of these ethnic dialectics - we are either Jews or we are not; we are either Travellers or we are not. Both are about ethnicity - ipso facto we are already multi-ethnic. Even if we stick with these two dichotomies, we cannot properly tick only one box in a question which asks us 'What is your ethnicity' - despite the insistence in censuses and ethnic monitoring forms that we do. Furthermore, when we add sectarian ethnicities in Ireland, we are all either Protestant or not-Protestant, Catholic or not-Catholic - we have added a further layer of multi-ethnicity. Once we add the gamut of other ethnicities in Ireland the situation becomes even more complex - we are either Black or White, Chinese or non-Chinese, Asian or non-Asian, and so on. We all can situate ourselves in terms of these dichotomies - whether we are majority ethnic or minority ethnic within each dichotomy - and we all carry these ethnicities with us - in short, we are multi-ethnic.

The way in which we learn to live with multi-ethnicity and, more importantly from my point of view, learn to deal with racism, is crucially structured by the reality of this particular manifestation of multi-

ethnicity. Thus, with due respect to all our English guests, we wont learn how to dismantle Irish racism from English people. English perspectives on ethnicity just don't address the specific situation of 'multi-ethnicity' in an Irish context - however appropriate they may be the in the British context. Most importantly, from a minority ethnic perspective we have a *dual majority problem* - Irish Catholic hegemony in the south, Ulster Protestant hegemony in the north - neither even prepared to acknowledge its own ethnicity, let alone begin to address the issue of multi-ethnicity. There is a need for a radical decentring of these hegemonic identities. I don't mean tentative explorations of cultural traditions, I mean dismantling the whole lot of them. This is not to ask is it possible to have a society which doesn't have the Angelus on TV and radio but rather to ask how is it possible that we still have a society which insists that we have the Angelus; it is not to ask is it possible to have fewer loyalist parades through nationalist areas but rather to ask how is it possible that a celebration of sectarian triumphalism - the 12th of July - retains the status of a 'national holiday' in the north of Ireland. Challenging the hegemony of these majority ethnicities is a key part of building an anti-racist and inclusive multi-ethnic Ireland.

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The Right to Irishness: Implications of ethnicity, nation and state towards a truly multi-ethnic Ireland

Shalini Sinha

In our contemporary Irish society, there is only one view of 'Irishness'. That is, 'Irishness' as the national identity. In support of this, Ailbhe Smyth has written,

> ...in this place, this island, this *entity* [Ireland], the only identity (or sense of identity) allowed pride of place in public discourse is *national identity*: all other senses must be contained within that conflation, or denied. However, much we argue about the meaning of Irish national identity, we rarely question its right to *be* the dominant meaning (1996:146-7).

Given this central and dominant position, then, any discussion of a multi-ethnic Ireland must consider how national identity might accommodate multiple ethnicities. I will argue that the national identity, as it is, actively works against the notion of a multi-ethnic Ireland -- a notion which indeed has been a reality in Ireland both historically and today. Furthermore, as the national identity frames the Irish Constitution, thus having both policy and citizenship implications, we ought to question its right to *be* central.

While the *centrality* of the Irish national identity is rarely challenged, the identity itself is rarely defined. Having noted this, I will not define it here, but rather point out a few of its more troublesome, but relevant characteristics. Before doing so, I want to be clear that these particular characteristics in no way define the whole of the national identity. Rather than the sum total, they make up a part of that national identity which does exist and is a thorn in the side of any multi-ethnic society. By raising them, I also do not mean for us to stay focused on them, as we will gain much more by nurturing the many flexible characteristics of Irishness. Still, these require analysis in order to understand 'Irishness' and its difficulty with multi-ethnicity. The following aspects have all come into this identity as a result of the long and brutal history of oppression. In addition to being dominant and unquestioned, the Irish national identity is exclusive and reactive to the experience of oppression.

One effect of Ireland's history of colonisation has been to 'narrow' the Irish identity. Noting this, Sean Ruth exemplified the phenomenon,

So, a 'real' Irish person might be someone who is Catholic, nationalist, and a member of the GAA. The effect of this is that many people are either excluded by the group because they do not conform to some rigid stereotype or they themselves do not feel part of the group (Ruth, 1988:436).

With this we can see rigid definitions of 'authenticity' within Irishness. Thus, the limited construction of the Irish identity negates even the diversity among its members -- a diversity which has always been a part of its society. With such a trend amidst it, it is difficult to conceive of it giving way to multiple ethnicities.

Not only is this national identity restrictive among its members, it is also oppressive to some of its members. Meaney has pointed out that, 'in post-colonial southern Ireland a particular construction of sexual and familial roles became the very substance of what it meant to be Irish' (1993:6). In addition to constructing these roles, the Irish Constitution firmly positioned women in 'the home'. Thus, the national identity has worked to prevent full public participation of even those women granted membership within it.

Exclusive and oppressive characteristics of Irish national identity prevent any incorporation of a multi-ethnic Ireland. Robbie McVeigh, when noting some internal factors of the Irish identity which encourage racism (and which therefore, by definition, would be in contradiction to multi-ethnicity), has argued,

> The most immediate of these is the strength of community in Ireland. This had its roots in a rural setting, but has been reproduced in an urban environment. It has been reinforced by the process of sectarian conflict and social closure, especially in the north. Within the 'warmth' of the community, outsiders have always been perceived as profoundly problematic (McVeigh, 1992:41).

With such forces operating within 'Irishness', it seems futile to move toward a multi-ethnic Ireland without re-examining the Irish national identity.

Combined with this exclusiveness is an insecurity within the Irish national identity. Smyth (1996:151) suggests this insecurity results in the identity constantly reproducing a need for assurance. In this way, its exclusiveness is both continual and active in order to re-establish itself.

Smyth attributes this insecurity to the idea that the national identity is still very new. However, with this I disagree. Rather, while independence is relatively new in Ireland, I believe the Irish national identity has been forming over centuries, several of which were under oppression. As a result of this latter stage, the national identity with which we interact

today was formed in reaction to an oppressor, and is insecure because it is still reacting to that oppression. Thus, the contemporary identity has been founded on a position of threat, which also explains its exclusive nature.

The Irish national identity is founded in a history of oppression and subsequent struggle for independence. Ironically, while political independence is meant to signify liberation, it seems to me the national identities established at this time are all too often in reaction to oppression rather than liberating. Any identity which holds as its founding premise a position of being oppressed (by way of reacting to an oppression) is hampered from moving toward liberation. Thus, exclusion is inevitable.

As Smyth has noted, 'being "Irish" is about *not* being British.' The identity is formed in reaction to the oppressor. Inadvertently, then, it maintains the cycle of being defined by the oppressor, or what it is perceived the oppressor is not. With this, we can see that the roots of Irishness lay not in particularities of culture and tradition, but in particularities of history and politics. It is this characteristic of Irishness that makes it exclusive, and impossible for it to accommodate ethnic minorities, as other ethnic groups have their own history and politics. It is in reaction to the political and cultural oppression that 'Irishness' has been established, and that history cannot be removed from identity. In this way, group identity extends beyond culture and tradition to a group's shared experiences of history.

Here, I would argue that 'Irishness' is an ethnic grouping involving explicit and tacit forms of culture, history and tradition. People of 'ethnic' minorities, while they can learn to emulate 'Irish behaviour' (by speaking Irish, or even English with an Irish accent, and doing things in an 'Irish' way), specific to 'Irishness' is the experience and resulting impacts of their particular history of oppression which other ethnic groupings cannot 'inject' into their cultural psyches. With this, I have chosen to extend the definition of 'ethnicity' to include common history and patterns of behaving that are the result of reacting and coping with that history. Thus, other ethnic groupings could never be 'Irish' (the ethnicity, not the nationality).

I find it interesting that within Ireland, the *ethnicity* of 'Irishness' has been erased. Rather, Irishness has become synonymous with the nation. I have even heard the Irish media refer to the dominant majority as the "non-ethnic majority", as if there were no Irish ethnicity that sustained itself within the Republic. (I make the distinction within the Republic because clearly in Northern Ireland and the Irish diaspora there is recognition of an 'Irish' ethnicity.) Despite this selective amnesia, the 'Irish nation' was clearly built on an ethnicity.

Ronit Lentin has pointed out that at the time of political independence, 'Irish political elites mustered the people for nation-building by mobilising powerful ethnic memories' (forthcoming). She goes further to note, 'one result of equating Gaelic authenticity with political power, was ethnic homogeneity. Thus, notions of 'Irishness' as an ethnicity upon which an independent state was founded seem to have been consumed by contemporary national identity.

The result of an ethnicity defining membership to the national identity is an underlying notion of an 'indigenous right' to 'Irishness', which can be claimed by emigrants and their descendants living in the diaspora for generations (in which case that 'right' is handed down), but not by certain citizens of Ireland who have lived in Ireland for generations (as the 'right' is indigenous). Although there is no problem with having exclusive membership to an ethnicity -- indeed the very notion of 'ethnicity' involves exclusive definitions of a group in relation to how it differs from other groups -- there are unlimited problems of citizenship and equality when having exclusive membership to a 'nation' and where that nation defines the state.

As 'Irishness' has become synonymous with the 'nation', so too has the national identity become synonymous with the Irish state. This is problematic as Nira Yuval-Davis has pointed out, nations and states have never been mutually exclusive. She reminds us that,

> The concept of the 'nation-state' assumes a complete correspondence between the boundaries of the nation and the boundaries of those who live in a specific state. This, of course, is virtually everywhere a fiction… The effect of this fiction is to naturalize the hegemony of one collectivity and its access to the ideological apparatuses of both state and civil society. This naturalization is at the roots of the inherent connection that exists between nationalism and racism (Yuval-Davis, 1997:11).

Conflating Irish ethnicity, the Irish nation and the Irish state would not be problematic if Ireland was ethnically monolithic. However, this is not and never has been the case. Thus, a separation of ethnicity, nation and state are required.

Smyth (1996:148)has noted that, '"having" an identity ... appears to be a precondition of self-determination and independence.' Inclusion in the 'Irish' identity in some form, then, becomes necessary for marginalised, politically oppressed groups in Ireland. Without this, they remain without citizenship rights, and without a basis to demand equal status in Ireland. This identification cannot happen within the ethnic and dominant national identity. Rather than deconstructing this identity here (as it is an important identity in that it records and represents at least a partial history of the oppression and character of the survival for some Irish people, recognising that its

oppressive and narrow aspects require examination in other contexts), I propose shifting its influence to what it is -- an ethnic identification -- and proposing a new form of identification in terms of the Irish state.

One way of including ethnic minorities in an 'Irish' identity is by encouraging an Irish *state* identity. The focus of such an identity would be membership to the state and all its liberties, thus rendering irrelevant any racial, ethnic or gender criteria. Shifting this focus in identities would necessarily require amending the 1937 Constitution to include membership to the state. This brings us to the other, more urgent and practical issue of citizenship and rights in Ireland. Because of the persistent focus on an ethnic hegemony, the 1937 Constitution did not define membership to the state to include ethnic minorities. Lentin shows that this Constitution is,

> ...both gendered and ethnically exclusionary: the Constitution was religiously non-inclusive, it was based on sedentary values, it erased ethnic minorities and constructed a monolithic 'woman' as mother and carer whose place is firmly within 'the Family' (Lentin, 1998:).

If the 1937 Constitution can be taken as the most authoritative document guiding the construction of Irish society and outlining the responsibilities of the Irish state, then these characteristics of the document demonstrate institutional exclusion and racism.

Furthermore, within the Constitution, there has been no construction of a state identity distinct from the national identity. Rather, the national identity is considered central, stating that all those who have gained Irish citizenship are entitled to be part of the 'Irish nation'. However, no distinction is made between the Irish nation and the Irish state. As we have already seen, this conflation is problematic. Here, however, it has been institutionalised. Thus, I believe the Constitution must be further pushed to de-emphasise the 'Irish nation' and introduce the Irish state if we are committed to a multi-ethnic Ireland.

Inadvertently, the amendments to this Constitution as a result of the Multi-Party Peace Agreement reached this year in Northern Ireland may move us along this path. The agreement involved changing the wording of Articles 2 and 3 as follows. Where currently Article 2 reads, 'The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas' (Bunreacht na hÉireann), it would now read,

> It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish nation. That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland.
>
> Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its special ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage

(Agreement).

Where currently Article 3 reads,

> Pending the re-integration of the national territory, and without prejudice to the right of the Parliament and Government established by the Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory, the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of *Saorstát Éireann* and the like extra-territorial effect (Bunreacht na hÉireann),

a portion of it would now read,

> It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite all the people who share the territory of the island Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in the island... (Agreement).

Although the focus of the agreement was clearly to negotiate a settlement between the nationalist and unionist traditions, these changes have inadvertently recognised and legitimised other ethnicities within Ireland. However, the contradiction of multi-ethnicities within this 'one nation' is still problematic. This is particularly noticeable in the latter part of the newly written article 2 which reinforces the notion of a single culture of the Irish nation, and thus maintains the exclusion of other ethnicities.

What I am suggesting here is encouraging a *new way* of identifying in terms of the Irish state, where 'Irishness' is seen as membership and participation in a multi-ethnic state. Simultaneously, I am suggesting de-centralising 'Irishness' as a national identity, but seeing it as an ethnicity and one of many in the Irish state. To the nationalist Irish tradition which suffered brutal oppression for centuries and fought unrelentlessly to gain the current independence and space for its national identity, this may be seen as totally offensive. For us to say, *'Thank you for this space, now please move over'* is sure to re-open old wounds. However, it must be recognised that one can only re-open a wound which has not healed, and the current exclusiveness, fear and racism in Ireland is coming out of this threatened, victimised, wounded position.

While it may seem offensive to suggest that Irish people now 'move over' and share, of all things, aspects of 'Irish identity', it seems to me totally acceptable to request that they examine the wounds of oppression, to take great pride in their history, survival, courage and achievements and reach out and

share this strength with the world. That is, it seems fair to request that the Irish 'de-colonise' within their independent state, particularly when that request is coming from those who have experienced histories of oppression too. From de-colonisation can grow compassion, understanding and support -- all of which are needed to create an equal, diverse, enriched Ireland.

Thus, while it may appear unreasonable to demand an expanding and more flexible 'Irishness', it is in fact the most sensitive and generous of requests by people who have also experienced great oppression, because it is a request, and thus an opportunity, to move away from 'victimhood' and for us all to move forward together within the context of Ireland. I think there can be no greater tribute to a people.

Thus, I am proposing the establishment of a state identity for Ireland. When I first presented this idea, it was viewed critically. One colleague, for example, expressed the very valid concern that, as we already have so many different identifications to battle with, surely our attention should go to challenging and deconstructing them, rather than adding even more strands to what has traditionally been an immobilising web. To this I have both a response and a clarification.

First, while I take the point, I am also very aware that one needs an identity in order to confer power, and that many people in Ireland are prevented from participating in any legitimate identity which may link them to 'Irishness' (thus included, as opposed to linked to 'Ireland' as an outsider). Furthermore, the concern came from a privileged position in this context, where the person questioning does have access to the national identity, albeit limited, whereas ethnic minorities do not.

Second, when a previously oppressed and suppressed group goes to claim its identity, it is as though forging a new identity. The construction of the Irish national identity is testimony to this. Thus, the inclusion of ethnic minorities in 'Irishness' cannot avoid establishing new identities in some way, and my suggestion is not actually complicating the issue. However, I must be clear that what I am proposing, more than adding new identities, is a *new way of identifying* in Ireland. I am quite clear that to add a new identity will not automatically result in its inclusion, but rather leave us a second task of having to challenge the alignment of all identities. This seems more complicated and less liberating than my plan.

While 'Irishness' as an ethnicity may be recognised in Ireland, and thus join together with other ethnicities to form a state identity, we need to make sure we include the various ethnicities equally. We need to set an antiracist agenda more so than a multi-ethnic agenda. The problem of exclusion in other societies is a problem of racism, not of different groups living together. Ireland *is* a multi-ethnic society. It has been one historically, and it will continue to grow as such. The difficulty is with institutionalised racism.

Having established the need for a new identity, there is still the question of how to shift it. Aside from requiring institutional change in terms of amending the language of the Constitution and creating equal status legislation which acknowledges these shifts, there is a need for a social shift in the image if 'Irishness'.

Smyth has argued that Irish women have changed the national identity simply because their actions contradict its construction (1995). However, it is important to note that women are already included within the membership of that identity, and thus the contradiction of their actions has some influence on it. That is, they are not *excluded* from Irishness, although they are oppressed by its construction. Meanwhile, immigrants, Black Irish, Jewish, Traveller, and Muslim people, among others, are not considered Irish. Thus for them to shift Irishness may be more precarious.

In this sense, however, it is possible that ethnic minorities, by their very existence, can be seen to contradict 'Irishness' and therefore shift its meaning. However, they have existed in Ireland for a long time without this happening. Thus, I see the need to begin a process involving three elements. First, minority groups need to claim 'Irishness' and become visible in this claim. Second, we need to shift identification from the nation to the state. This involves a distinction between 'Irish' as an ethnicity and 'Irish' as state membership. Finally, an antiracist policy agenda is essential to making this shift.

This brings us to the familiar notion within the discussion of deconstructing identities which states that by naming an oppressed identity, the dominant identity is forced to acknowledge and question its own identity. However, given that being seen as 'normal' is a characteristic of dominance and privilege, I do not see how this could happen. Rather, while the oppressed group is naming and claiming its identity, the dominant group maintains an invisible, unquestioned position, and certainly maintains its stance as 'normal'. An example of this comes from the 'race' discussion. Although 'Black' groups, for example, have for quite some time now named and claimed their identity, this has not in itself shifted the stance of 'Whiteness'. McIntosh (1993) noted that learning about others who were underprivileged did not, in her dominant, White schooling, teach her that she was a member and participant in a group which was *overprivileged*.

Within feminism, it is clear that the turning point on 'Whiteness' came with White feminists making the connection between their frustration when trying to expose sexism to their male colleagues and the frustration of Black women when trying to discuss racism within the feminist movement. By making the connection of shared experiences of oppression (albeit of different oppressions), some White feminists began

to examine their privilege. Two lessons emerge from this: one, naming and claiming an oppressed identity does not necessarily pose a question for the dominant identity; two, in order for the dominant identity to be questioned, we must enlist the help of the dominant group.

Both the dominant group and the conception if 'Irishness' will benefit from shifting the exclusiveness and centrality of Irish national identity. First, and certainly not least, this will pose a challenge for those who *are* members but suffer an oppression within Irish identity (e.g. women, Protestants, disabled people, etc.). Second, the image of 'Irishness' is in danger of being damaged in the world as those who are being mistreated here from abroad will report this in their countries -- countries which have historically allied themselves with Ireland recognising their common history of oppression as well as Ireland's contribution to schooling and aid in their own countries. Furthermore, Ireland's position within the European Union has required Ireland to push through its experience of oppression. By shifting the traces of oppression still within its identity and developing a more equal state, Ireland can become a model for the rest of the world. A recent television tribute reported Nelson Mandella's thoughts when leaving prison: 'If I take my anger with me, then I am still their prisoner.' In this same spirit Irish people must overcome their anger.

Thus, Ireland's current social and political climate presents an ideal opportunity for shifting this identification -- via the agreements coming out of Northern Ireland, in Ireland's position in Europe, and in its image in the world. Not only is change necessary, it is possible and timely. As we move into the new millennium, I encourage all of us people of Ireland to work towards leaving the legacies of our present millennium behind and building a realist, liberating, multi-ethnic Ireland.

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Immigrants in Germany: A Welcomed Threat - Lessons for Ireland?

Angela Leahy

Introduction

In this paper I address the question of immigration into Germany. I outline the historical reasons for immigration into Germany, the socio-political consequences thereof and the 'human experience' involved. The paper explores the much debated question as to whether Germany can be described as an 'Einwanderungsland' (country of immigration) and examines some of the political reactions to immigration into Germany. As Germany is situated further along the continuum in relation to immigration than is Ireland, it is useful to critically analyse its particular approach to provide more insights into that of Ireland. I should like to state at the outset that it is not my intention to draw explicit parallels between Germany and Ireland but rather to provide a background which allows for comparison.

'Guestworkers'

The economic expansion of post-war Europe led to a mass movement of workers from southern to northern Europe. The entry of migrant workers into wealthier European countries began around 1945, grew strongly in the fifties and expanded rapidly in the late sixties and early seventies.

Unlike other wealthy European countries, West Germany did not begin recruiting foreign workers until 1956. This can be explained by the fact that West Germany's labour market had recruited vast numbers of refugees from East Germany in the earlier post-war years. West Germany's delay in recruiting foreign workers can also be explained in part by the country's slower post-war recovery (Castles et al., 1984).

The so-called 'Wirtschaftswunder' ('Economic Miracle') witnessed increased foreign investment, increased exports and expansion in labour-intensive sectors of the economy and saw the West-German GNP increasing by an average of 9.5 per cent from 1951 to 1956. The resulting increase in demand for labour was coupled with a decrease in supply. In 1960, for example, the number of available jobs exceeded the number of unemployed people. Although technological advances made it possible to replace some workers through capital investment, the shortage of labour could not be sustained. Indications of further shortages of workers in the future led to further pressure from industry to recruit workers from southern European countries which were experiencing a surplus of workers and a shortage of capital (Herrmann, 1992).

The recruitment of 'guestworkers' from outside Germany officially began with the signing of a German-Italian Agreement in 1955 (despite an average unemployment rate of 5.6 per cent). Subsequent bi-lateral agreements followed with Spain in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963 and Portugal in 1964. Those workers generally came from agricultural backgrounds and were consequently offered unskilled and physically demanding positions (Engelmann, 1991; Tichy, 1993).

As the recruitment of foreign workers grew, West Germany devised a highly organised, official recruitment system. The 'Bundesanstalt für Arbeit' (BfA) established recruitment offices in many Mediterranean countries. Its offices selected, tested and screened workers who were then brought to West Germany. The BfA operated on the basis that it received instructions from employers within Germany. Once recruited, employers provided accommodation for these workers, generally in the form of wooden huts on the relevant work-sites (Castles et al., 1984; Tichy, 1993).

The legal basis for the recruitment of foreign workers was the 'Arbeitsförderungsgesetz' (a law to promote employment) which obliged the BfA to avoid a scarcity of labour. Between 1955 and 1960 the number of foreign workers in Germany rose by 79,700 to 329,000. By the time the impact of the first post-war recession in Germany in 1966/67 was felt, there were already 1,000,000 foreigners working in Germany (Herrmann, 1992).

The decision to fill positions with foreign workers was generally supported by German society. The 1,000,000th 'Gastarbeiter' who arrived from Portugal in 1964 was, for example, celebrated and welcomed by government and media (Engelmann, 1991). No noteworthy public debate on alternative approaches to the labour market problems of the time or on the social repercussions of such organised immigration took place. The political parties, trade unions, employer associations, as well as charities and religious groups considered the recruitment of young men from Mediterranean countries into Germany a short to medium-term necessary, transitional phase (Herrmann, 1992).

Policies on the recruitment of foreign workers were based on the assumption that workers would be recruited, utilised, and disposed of according to market requirements in Germany. Workers recruited from abroad were generally regarded as temporary mobile labour units. The entry of dependants into Germany was discouraged as the main focus on recruitment remained the rotation of the flexible, foreign labour force (Castles et al., 1984). The social conditions of the immigrant population in Germany were not considered by the government or the public at large, with employers making decisions

on the extent and nature of employment of foreigners (Galanais, 1987; Mehrländer, 1984). O'Brien (1988, p 116-7) argues that the 'absolute primacy of economic concerns in the fifties and sixties precluded regard for aliens' special needs as non-Germans in German society' and that 'Germans treated aliens like mere commodities to be used and disposed of when necessary'.

I insert my translation of a short poem written some time between 1977 and 1979 by G. Chiellino (1984), a lecturer of Italian living in Germany here. It is entitled *'Change'* and illustrates the social standing of 'guestworkers' in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s.

A guestworker is made up of four parts
aliens law
residence permit
work permit
and
a foreigner.

By the middle of 1973 immigrant numbers had reached approximately 2.6 million, one of the first significant peaks in foreign population in Germany (Castles et al., 1984). The emerging recession, aggravated by the Oil Crisis and the threatened increase in unemployment, led the West German government to cease recruitment of foreign non-EEC workers outside Germany and to prevent foreigners from coming into Germany in order to seek work. This decision, which was made in November of 1973, became known as the 'Anwerbestopp' ('recruitment stop') (Herrmann, 1992; Spaich, 1991).

With the introduction of this 'recruitment-stop' the number of foreign workers in Germany began to decline. By September 1976, it had fallen to 1, 920, 895 (Statistisches Bundesamt). Many workers were forced to leave Germany due to the withdrawal of their work-permits and others left because they were either unemployed or faced loss of overtime or bonuses. Germany also actively encouraged workers to leave by offering bonus-payments to those who left

From the early 1970s, those immigrants who had decided to remain in Germany began to bring their families to join them. This tendency led to the foreign population increasing, despite the 'Anwerbestopp' (Oepen, 1983). From 1977 onwards foreign employment began to grow again. By 1981 it was again approaching 2 million. The aims of the 'Anwerbestopp', i.e. to control the growth of the immigrant population, were clearly not achieved. By September 1982 there were 4.7 million foreigners living in West Germany.

As many immigrant workers were joined by their spouses in Germany the birth rate within the foreign population began to rise. This development resulted in a situation where, in 1975, there were more unemployed than employed foreigners living in Germany. It was becoming increasingly clear that West Germany had acquired a foreign population which had not been anticipated when official recruitment began in 1955 (Castles et al., 1984; Spaich, 1991; Tichy, 1993). Furthermore, the mobility and flexibility of those workers recruited according to market demands had declined as non-working relatives and dependants were brought into Germany.

As this shift from labour migration to family settlement in Germany began to become apparent in the mid-1970s, conflicts between state and employers on future policy towards foreign workers emerged. These found expression in statements by employers' associations, political parties and various government departments (Castles et al., 1984). Employers sought to retain foreign workers and most 'Gastarbeiter' (guestworkers) did not wish to return to their countries of origin. In official terminology 'Gastarbeiter' was replaced by the term 'ausländische Arbeitnehmer' (foreign employees) thus indicating that foreign workers were no longer perceived as temporary workers who would eventually return home (Bielefeld, 1988).

With increasing numbers of foreign workers settling with their families in Germany throughout the 1970s, policies slowly began to be shaped by concern for the corresponding social problems and political tensions. While there was general recognition of the need to improve social conditions for foreigners living in Germany, the 'labour market' remained, however, the central theme in immigration issues.

The late 1970s and early 1980s saw 'integration' become a key issue in relation to immigrants living in Germany. However, the tension caused by promoting repatriation/returns and integration simultaneously, particularly in language education, illustrated Germany's contradictory stance on immigration. (For more details on some of the models put forward in relation to integration see Castles and Miller, 1998; Cornelius et al, 1994; O'Brien, 1988).

A shift to conservative politics in the Autumn of 1982 led to further restrictions on immigration and to the encouragement of repatriation. Labour market and economic factors once again became the key points in designing 'Ausländerpolitik' (Galanais, 1987). As a result, immigrants remained socially identifiable as such, thereby experiencing increased insecurity, marginalisation and ghettoisation (Castles, 1983; Oepen, 1984). G. Chiellino describes this in a later poem entitled *'Ghetto'* where he refers to the 'open walls' which 'blocked immigrants in'.

A growth in racist sentiment accompanied the changing political climate of the early 1980s. The 'Ausländerpolitik' of this time was described by many as an 'Ausländer Raus Politik' ('Foreigners Out Policy') and was considered not only to legitimise racist feelings towards immigrants but also to fuel them (Galanais, 1987). Foreign workers became scapegoats for unemployment and social tensions. Policies which aimed at preventing further immigration and which encouraged immigrants to

return to their countries of origin consequently found much support with sections of the German public.

Constant reiteration by the German government throughout the 1980s that Germany was not an 'Einwanderungsland' (country of immigration) left immigrants in doubt as to whether they should strengthen their connections with Germany or return to their countries of origin. It also prevented many from availing themselves of opportunities which could have helped integrate them into German society (Mehrländer, 1984).

Official emphasis on 'non-immigration' and exclusion of foreigners clearly conflicted with the earlier policy of recruiting foreign workers into the post-war economy in Germany. Together with liberal asylum policies (see section below) these earlier labour market policies had rendered Germany a country of immigration against its will. These policies produced a sizeable population of non-Germans in a Germany which officially did not consider itself an 'Einwanderungsland' (Winkler, 1992).

Clearly the human protagonists who found themselves in a Germany which did not fully recognise their position paid a huge personal cost in what was largely an economic arrangement which arose from a coincidence of needs. Germany required workers while poorer European countries required employment. Perhaps the most suitable comment with which to conclude this analysis of an economic bi-lateral policy which involved much human cost, is that of the Swiss playwright, Max Frisch, who reflected on 'Gastarbeiterpolitik' and stated:

'Wir riefen Arbeiter, und es kamen Menschen.'

('We called for workers but people came.')

Asylum-seekers and asylum law in Germany

Up until 1965 the number of asylum-seekers in Germany was insignificant. This situation changed dramatically in 1980s (Becker, 1993). The original reference to the granting of asylum in the German Basic Law read: "Persons persecuted for political reasons shall have the right to asylum" (Artikel 16, Absatz 2). Germany was thus the only country to give those considered to be politically persecuted an individual right to asylum in its constitution (Herrmann, 1992).

Up to 1973 asylum policies had not been a subject of political or public debate. Asylum-seekers only became a sizeable group in Germany around 1973. The increase in asylum-seekers occurred parallel to the increase in family reunification amongst foreign workers living in Germany which was mentioned above.

Those seeking asylum before the mid-1970s came mainly from Eastern-block countries. They were generally accepted into Germany without difficulty and the granting of asylum was approved without criticism (Wolken, 1988; Herrmann, 1992). Schuth (1988, p.173) attributes the willingness of West Germany to accept these asylum-seekers to 'anti-communist consent' on the part of Germany.

However, from 1974/5, the number of asylum-seekers took on new dimensions. 1977 marked an increase in numbers coming from Africa (Wolken, 1988; Herrmann, 1992). Despite various measures (such as the obligation to hold a visa for some immigrants) being taken to reduce the number of asylum-seekers in Germany, the number rose from 33,136 in 1978 to 107,818 in 1980. Asylum issues gradually became a key topic within public discussion on immigration as the media spoke of the 'Asylantenwelle' (wave of asylum-seekers) and many public figures voiced their dissatisfaction at the numbers of asylum-seekers coming to Germany. It was at this time, for example, that the Lord Mayor of the city of Essen refused to accept an increase in the number of asylum-seekers, giving the following explanation in a widely read Frankfurt newspaper (*Frankfurter Rundschau* 25 June 1980): "Damit die Flut nicht über uns kommt" ("So that the flood doesn't come over us.")

While the number of asylum-seekers dropped dramatically in 1981, 1982 and 1983 it began to rise again in 1984 and has continued to do so reaching 438,191 in 1992 (Statistisches Bundesamt). In the mid-1980s the granting of asylum became an important topic of political debate in Germany as the numbers of asylum-seekers had risen so dramatically. However, although asylum issues were constantly debated, no decision was taken on changes in asylum policy (Becker, 1993).

While the number of asylum-seekers continued to rise in the past two decades, the numbers of those granted asylum has remained low (Spaich, 1991; Herrmann, 1992; Tichy 1993). The percentage for 1990 was 4.4. per cent for example (Herrmann, 1992). In 1988, 7,621 people were granted asylum while 62,983 were refused (Tichy, 1993).

In 1992, nearly two thirds of asylum-seekers in Western Europe were in Germany - 5.5 asylum-seekers per one thousand Germans (Castles and Miller, 1998). On average more than 800 applications for asylum were being made daily (Herrmann, 1992). The limitation of Article 16 of the Constitution became a heated political issue and pressure mounted for restrictions. Despite differences between the political parties, a new asylum-law, restricting the right to asylum, was passed and came into action on the 1st of July, 1993. Under this law asylum-seekers coming to Germany via 'safe third countries' are returned to these countries. Those coming from countries of origin which are also considered safe, such as Bulgaria, Ghana and Romania, are given a shorter hearing. Shortened hearings are also possible in German airports. As a result, the number of asylum seekers dropped by approximately 26 per cent in 1993 (Aktuell, 1994).

The passing of the new law on asylum on 1 July 1993 was preceded and followed by much public and media attention where the image of Germany as a 'flooded country', 'sinking ship' and that of

immigration as an 'invasion;' or 'time bomb' featured strongly.

Since 1989 public opinion had become more critical of immigration and in particular of asylum-seekers. An EMNID (institute for public opinion research) survey conducted in December of 1991 found that more than 50 per cent of the German population believed that those coming to Germany intensified unemployment and 66 per cent were of the opinion that they were abusing the benefits of the German social system (Mühlum, 1993). On the other hand, changes to asylum-laws which seek to reduce the numbers of applications for asylum have been criticised by members of the legal profession, by groups acting on behalf of refugees and the political party 'Die Grünen' (Germany's Green Party).

Asylum issues in the late 1980s and early 1990s brought much public attention to the topic of immigration in general in Germany. Racist attacks on immigrants in Germany, particularly asylum-seekers, have increased in recent years and have been given much world media attention. The most notable attacks have been in Mölln in November of 1992 and in Solingen in May of 1993 when eight female Turkish immigrants were burned to death.

An Infas (Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft) study conducted in August 1991 showed that 40 per cent of the German population considered living with foreign immigrants as positive. This number was indicative of the increased hostility against foreigners in general which had become apparent in the late 1980s and the early 1990s as already discussed. However, as a reaction to the racist firebomb attacks in Hoyerswerda, which had taken place before those of Mölln and Solingen, this figure rose to 60 per cent in October 1991.

Hoyerswerda could be considered as becoming a symbol of German racism almost overnight. Reactions to the events in Hoyerswerda also epitomised the different stances on the part of Germans to immigration as a counter-movement which expressed solidarity and concrete support for immigrants and asylum-seekers developed in contrast to the increased extreme right-wing movement which headed attacks such as that in Hoyerswerda (Winkler, 1992).

Conclusion

Although the labour market/economic focus of policy and law on immigrants may have diminished steadily over recent years, the failure of successive governments and sections of the public to come to terms with the 'real' immigration situation in Germany hinders progress and renders the future uncertain for many immigrants. Winkler (1992) argues that those immigrants who came to Germany in earlier decades could have lived more easily through their more difficult times had politicians not failed consistently to acknowledge what was clearly a reality. Paradoxically a large percentage of 'guestworkers' found themselves living in an authentic immigration situation 'without' an immigration country.

In relation to asylum policy in Germany, 'restriction' is now clearly the key characteristic. The great majority of cases are rejected. In 1993 the success rate was about 4 per cent in Germany (compared to 10 per cent in Italy and 28 per cent in France) (Castles and Miller, 1998).

Ever since the first 'Gastarbeiter' arrived in Germany in 1955, Germany has wrestled with the reality of facing immigration, while its governments still reiterate the old 'assertion' that the Federal Republic of Germany is not an 'Einwanderungsland' (country of immigration) (Tichy, 1993; Bartels, 1991). Yet the reality tells a different story. With over seven million immigrants living in Germany, a large percentage of whom intends to stay there, Germany has clearly become an 'Einwanderungsland'. While politicians have consistently repeated that Germany is not an 'Einwanderungsland,' daily life in Germany constantly proves the opposite to be the case (Tichy, 1993).

Exactly how Germany can make the necessary transition to accept this reality has been the focus of a long-running debate. A key element of this debate centres on the definition of German citizenship. At the moment German nationality is (mainly) based on the principle of 'ius sanguinis' ('law of parentage') as opposed to the 'law of birthplace' ('ius soli'). The new Social Democrat/Green coalition government of Germany proposes to change legislation on naturalistaion thereby 'forcing', perhaps, a change in Germany's self-perception. A change to this exclusionary model of citizenship might go some way towards changing what Castles and Miller (1998, p. 202) describe as 'the rationale behind the seemingly absurd slogan' that 'the FRG is not a country of immigration' which has, as I have outlined, deeply affected all other policies and reactions to immigrants in Germany.

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Christianity, conversion and the tricky business of names: images of Jews in nationalist Irish Catholic discourse

Katrina Goldstone

> Then it dawned on me with certain suddenness that I was different from all the others; or like mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out of their world by a vast veil (W.E. B duBois *Souls of Black Folks*, 1903)
>
> If the problem of marking reveals itself, as Frantz Fanon describes it, 'in a thousand details, anecdotes, stories', or as DuBois suggests, in jokes, songs...., then one appropriate response would seem to be to re-write the stories..
> Thomas Holt,

Those quotes are emblems of some of the themes I've chosen to look at in relation to difference, how it has been marked in illiberal Irish nationalist discourse in both the past and the present and what the implications of designating difference are, both for those who experience it and those who mark it out.

I also want to emphasise that the racism and xenophobia we are currently witnessing is not a new phenomenon, but that old 'racisms' like anti-traveller feeling and antisemitism have preceded what we see today.

In thinking about how to tackle the theme of this conference, I thought a lot about how we mark difference in this country. I feel it is important to explore this thoroughly before we rush headlong towards some utopian vision of a multi-ethnic nation. For it seems to me that this vision will remain largely unfulfilled unless we confront and resist the barriers in both the past and the present that prevent the full and rich potential of not just imagining a multi-ethnic nation but actually living it. There seems at one level to be a sympathy and willingness to create this multi-ethnic nation. At least if all the professions about 'celebrating diversity' are to be believed. However I'm not convinced that some of this rhetoric is anything more than kneejerk sincerity and perhaps we all ought to think a little more carefully about what this really means. We have to fully acknowledge that racism is not new to Irish society and also we have to be aware of the many and dizzying forms it takes.

In both my academic and activist work to date, I have been very preoccupied with images and perceptions. I have been examining for the last number of years past images of Jews, both in official and popular contexts. I am part of a refugee solidarity group and much of our time is spent monitoring the media and trying to combat the many untruths about refugees that are being presented. When I first started to research the history of government policy towards Jewish refugees in the 1930s, I didn't know how central images and perceptions would be in the evolution of a restrictive policy, nor did realise how much I would have to confront the spectre of antisemitism and Chrsitian culpability. The more I study this kind of history, the sort not much taught in schools, the more I come to believe that it is imperative to look coldly at aspects of the past, to examine how old racisms, for instance, like anti-traveller feeling and antisemitism have helped to provide a bedrock for new prejudices to thrive. I have come to believe how vital it is to be aware that the language and images of yesteryear have helped to provide templates for the articulation of new fears, about a new group of Others/ strangers/ aliens, and sometimes the images are simply re-worked to fit contemporary circumstances. In some cases indeed whilst the targets of opprobrium have changed, the fears remain the same. Fears of engulfment, be it social or sexual, loss of identity - these themes occur and re-occur.

Take this editorial from the Tuam Herald:

> We have coming in on every boat, persons of every nationality and every religion and no religion - the greatest being to an alarming extent, the Jews. Now personally, these formerly chosen people may be very pleasant and very nice to meet, and one would not be inclined to object to the advent of a few of that class and creed, but when they come in thousands, as they are every year, and when settling here and displacing natives, it is a matter of public concern and serious importance (*Tuam Herald* re-printed in *The Irish Rosary*, April 1927)

That was written in April 1927 but it could have appeared yesterday and one only has to change the word 'Jews' to 'Rumanians' or'refugees' and one has something entirely contemporary. Language is one of the main frontiers of battle in the struggle for equality of representation. And in an increasingly popular or dumbed down culture, how we use it - or how we use imagery- to describe difference is crucial. Whether it be in the in the reckless exaggeration of the newspaper column or the cold, banal tones of the civil service document which justifies exclusion as those written about Jews in 1930s did, we have to be aware of what Frantz Fanon has referred to, as those 'thousands of ways ' of marking difference.

In August 1998 a Wexford councillor expressed fears that Rumanian men would attract and run off with impressionable Irish girls. (McDonald, The Observer, 30 August 1998). The threat of foreigners being attractive to Irish girls seems to be more significant than the fact that Irish girls are - and have been- routinely and viciously abused by teachers, nuns and indeed members of their own families. Racist literature circulated in the same month focusing on the sexuality of African men. (McGee, Sunday Tribune 9 August 1998) Protests like this , but as regards Jewish men and Christian girls occurred as a subtext in the discourse of Irish anti-semitism in the 1920s and 1930s. One extremist journal went so far as to issue a stern warning worded thus:

> To Our Christian Girls Fourteen days notice is hereby given that names and addresses will be published of Christian girls travelling with Jews (*Aontas Gaedheal*, June 21, 1935)

Indeed in the evidently sectarian murder of 2 Jewish men in 1923 it was suggested by one neighbour that it was a punishment for walking out with Christian girls. (Interview with David Cristol, 1994) Jewish lubriciousness or degeneracy has of course been a theme in antisemitism from the middle ages right down to the twentieth century. One Irish priest, Father Denis Fahey, who wrote a number of antisemitic texts in the 1930s referred to the theme in a book published and approved of by the Irish hierarchy. The targets change but the charges against Others remain the same. These are examples of popular fears if you like and how they can be used to mark the Other as 'different'. But bureaucratic language can also be employed in the marking of difference. I shall not forget the shock of reading for the first time the Department of Justice memo that set out why the entry of Jews to Ireland should be limited.

> In the administration of the alien laws it has always been recognised in the Departments of Justice, Industry & Commerce and External Affairs that the question of admission of aliens of Jewish blood presents a special problem and the alien laws have been administered less liberally in their case. Although the Jewish community in Ireland is only 3,907 persons according to the 1946 census, there is a fairly strong anti-semitic feeling throughout the country based perhaps on historical reasons, the fact that Jews have remained a separate community and have not permitted themselves to be assimilated and that for their numbers they appear to have disproportionate wealth (Dept of the Taoieach D/T S11007A 28 Feb 1953)

That document is referring to nearly 4,000 people in a population of over 3 million. In my research I could not find evidence that most Jews ran newspapers, banks or held high office or in fact had what one might call real power and I have been unable to establish what 'disproportionate wealth' means. Yet these reasons were used as legitimate justification for exclusion though it sounds for all the world like stereotyping to me.

In both illiberal nationalist and triumphal discourse there has consistently been a place for setting apart "Others', the not-Irish, the not-Catholic or not-Christian. But as well as the blindingly obvious ways of marking, more subtle distinctions can be made. Let's take for instance the tricky business of names. Leave aside that casual yet distinct way of marking that refers to a first name as a Christian name. Instead let's look briefly at how surnames and stereotypically Jewish surnames were used to indicate difference and at times to suggest shady behaviour. (Dail Debates, vol l 15 Nov 1933- 2 March 1934 :22 Nov cols 346-8; ibid, col 891; Dail Debates 29 Nov 1933 cols 696-8) This was a theme in a number of extreme anti-semitic journals, none of which had a long life. (*Aontas Gaedheal* vols 1-4 1935; *Penapa*, 1940) But it was also referred to in the Irish Worker as early as 1911 and was used in Dail debates about 'the alien penetration of industry.' (Keogh, 1998:55) In the 1930s the debate about alien penetration of industry formed a subtext in nationalist debates that attempted to clarify just what Irishness meant in the newly independent state.

> Alien penetration in Eire, the acquisition of property by aliens.. and the ease with which aliens could assume Irish names and trade under them were discussed at the 37th annual meeting of NAIDA. F.M.Summerfield said that it was too easy for an alien to come into the country and change his name by deed-poll. Non-nationals were getting their hands on the life-blood of the country in ever increasing numbers (*The Irish Times* 10 Feb 1942).

As early as 1933 a complaint was sent to the Department of Industry & Commerce by the president of the Federation of Irish Industries about 'the rapid incursion of Naturalized British Subjects, of an alien race - setting themselves up in back lanes and creating conditions which can only be described as appalling.'

In a debate on the Aliens Bill (later to become the 1935 Aliens Act, Deputy Patrick McGilligan referred to the business of changing names:

> Say you have a gentleman called Wassenfeldt or some name of that kind, that he decided to Irishise his name and that he becomes the O'maguire on a particular date. If it is

> later he may find there are too many O'Maguires in the countryand he can change his name to something else."(Dail Debates vol liv 14Nov-21 Feb 1935 14 Feb col 2034)

The reference to changing names could occur in business journals or in Dail debates. Even Taoiseach Eamon de Valera could not escape suspicion. At one point, in order to scotch the continuing and persistent rumour tht he was Jewish he made a statement in the Dail:

> There is not as far as I know a single drop of Jewish blood in my veins. I am not one of those who try to attack the Jews or want to make any use of the popular dislike of them. I know that they were originally God's people; that they turned against him and that the punishment which their turning against God brought upon them made even Christ himself weep (Dail Debates vol l 2 March March 1934 col 2514)

The innuendoes about De Valera's origins and the fact that Fianna Fail had the only Jewish TD meant that the accusation that Fianna Fail was 'too thick with the Jews' could be and was thrown up in the cut and thrust of political debate. (Dunphy:1995:161) The business about changing names is interesting, what is or is not a real Irish name and who has the right to change or assume an Irish name is part of the panoply of difference that has been created around certain groups in Irish society. It may seem a harmless sort of distinction to some but I think it well fits the criteria of the thousands of ways difference can be marked. And before we set out to create a truly multi-ethnic nation we must recognise both the tenacity and subtlety of the myths about who is really Irish.

In the imagery of Jews in past nationalist discourses distinction has frequently been made between the good Jew and the bad Jew (Alderman, 1992:256) the Jew that is acceptable to Irish society, and who have shown themselves to be both loyal citizens and ardent nationalists. Thus families like the Briscoes, the Solomons, the Wines and Michael Noyk can be presented as the ideal Jew who have both served their country and have excelled in the professional spheres. This type of argument is a legacy from the era of Jewish emancipation when in order to justify being granted full civil rights all over Europe in the 1850s and 1860s, Jews swopped official laws that proscribed their behaviour for unofficial demands that they prove themselves worthy of citizenship. (Garb, 1995:24)

We still hear echoes of this type of bargain today. Any immigrant or even a refugee is supposed to 'contribute' to society and is also expected to have standards of moral behaviour far above those used to judge the 'native' population. Funnily enough when one of our ex-Prime Ministers is investigated for fraud and other malpractices, we don't see editorial after editorial about the thieving propensities of all the Irish in the newspapers that publish story after story attempting to portray all asylum seekers, for instance, as liars and cheats. When one member of an ethnic minority does something, we are all branded as guilty.

To sum up, I would like us all to think more profoundly and imaginatively about how entrenched anti-foreigner rhetoric is in the Irish discourse of nationalism and Catholicism. In order to proceed towards this vision of a truly multi-ethnic nation we must fully acknowledge the legacy of such exclusivist thought before we can embark on a more progressive vision of the Nation.

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New Forms of Britishness: Post-Immigration Ethnicity and Hybridity in Britain

Tariq Modood

Introduction

Out of an immigration process which was conceived primarily as the importing of labour to take up jobs in the British economy which white people did not wish to do, there have emerged, for at least some of the migrants and their descendants, new communities capable of and perhaps wanting to maintain themselves as communities. New cultural practices, especially to do with the family and religion, have become a feature of the British landscape; skin colour, identities, place of origin or cultural community continue to shape the personal lives and relationships of even British-born individuals. The importance of cultural and ethnic differences, however, runs much deeper. Ethnic identity, like gender and sexuality, has become politicised and for some people has become a primary focus of their politics (Young, 1990). While not as prominent as in the United States, yet more so than on the European mainland (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, 1994), there is in Britain an ethnic assertiveness, arising out of the feelings of not being respected or of lacking access to public space, consisting of counterposing `positive' images against traditional or dominant stereotypes. It is a politics of projecting identities in order to challenge existing power relations; of seeking not just toleration for ethnic difference but also public acknowledgement, resources and representation.

For some time ethnic minority identities were studied by two rival, indeed hostile, approaches. The older approach derived from anthropology and emphasised differences between what were sometimes regarded as discrete cultures, usually studied in terms of their own internal logic and traditions, and worried about an `identity clash' for those of Asian descent but born and brought up in Britain, who were supposed to be `between two cultures' (Watson,1977). Partly in reaction to this form of anthropology, a neo-Marxian approach was developed which understood the formation of `blackness', indiscriminately encompassing all non-whites, in terms of societal racism, cultural oppression and anti-racist struggles (CCSS, 1982). More recently, new perspectives have been sketched. Stuart Hall has argued that from the mid- to late 1980s ‘a significant shift has been going on (and is still going on) in black cultural politics' (Hall 1992:252). Not only does this entail a recognition of a diversity of minority identities, ‘a plural blackness', but also an understanding that ethnic identities are not `pure' or static. Rather, they change in new circumstances or by sharing social space with other heritages and influences. Moreover, this also challenges existing conceptions of Britishness (Gilroy, 1987). For, if ethnic minority identities are not simply products of cultures of extra-British origin, but owe something to the stream of British life, then they too contribute to that stream, and so their existence belies the dichotomy of ‘essentially black' and ‘essentially British'. This has opened the way for talk of ‘the black Atlantic’ - a shared heritage and experience of blacks in Africa, the USA, the Caribbean, Britain and Western Europe as a basis for a transnational culture and discourse.

In the same period of time there has also emerged an ‘Asian' identity based on a hybridic Asianness, rather than a regional, national, caste or religious identity derived from one's parents, and sometimes directly influenced by or modelled on forms of ‘black pride' and black hip-hop or rap music (Baumann, 1990). Additionally, and more recently, there has been an increase in Muslim activism and consciousness, giving rise to intense debate about identity and the emergence of new magazines such as *Q-News* which emphasise a British Muslimness and reject ethnicity as un-Islamic and speak of a global Muslim consciousness (Modood et al ,1994).

What is particularly exciting about these ethnic identity developments is that increasingly ‘ethnicity’ or ‘blackness’ is less experienced as an oppositional identity than as a way of being British. Moreover, this is happening at a time when some in the wider British public, including the new Labour Government, is emphasising the plural and dynamic character of British society, and speaking openly of `rebranding Britain’ (Leonard, 1997).

Political Blackness and Asians

I do, however, have some reservations about the ‘new blackness’ line of Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy. My three inter-related criticisms are that, firstly, that these socio-cultural theorists invariably focus on the Afro-Caribbeans; secondly, that they speak of a plural `blackness’ which they expect Asians to fit into but which most Asians are not interested in; thirdly, they are guilty of a woeful neglect of religion.

Let me illustrate the last two by offering some findings from The Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities in Britain, of which I was the principal researcher. The survey method, of

course, has many limitations, especially in relation to complex topics like those of identity. Nevertheless, if we bear in mind that all research methods have their limitations and cannot be substituted for each other, so that no one is *the* method, then this survey has the potential to offer what small-scale ethnographic studies, armchair theorising and political wishful thinking cannot. [6]

The survey found that South Asians, including those born and raised in Britain, strongly associated with their ethnic and family origins; there was very little erosion of group identification down the generations. Despite the various forms of anti-racist politics around a black identity of the last two decades - an identity which politicians and theorists have argued is *the* key post-immigration formation (Modood, 1994) - only a fifth of South Asians think of themselves as black. This is not an Asian repudiation of 'the essential black subject' in favour of a more nuanced and more pluralised blackness (Hall, 1992) but a failure to identify with blackness at all.

Religious identities

Rather than skin-colour, which was prominent in the self-descriptions of Caribbeans, it was religion that was prominent in the self-descriptions of South Asians. This owes as much to a sense of community as to personal faith, but the identification and prioritisation of religion is far from just a nominal one. At a time when a third of Britons say they do not have a religion, nearly all South Asians said they have one, and 90 per cent said that religion was of personal importance to them (compared to 13 per cent of whites). While about a quarter of whites attend a place of worship once a month or more, over half of Hindus and seven out of ten Sikhs attend once a month or more and nearly two-thirds of Muslims attend at least once a week. Even amongst the young expressions of commitment were exceptionally high: more than a third of Indians and African Asians, and two-thirds of Pakistani and Bangladeshi 16-34 years old said that religion was very important to how they led their lives compared to five per cent of whites (though nearly a fifth of Caribbeans took this view). It is clear, therefore, the presence of the new ethnic minorities is not simply changing the character of religion in Britain by diversifying it, but is giving it an importance which is out of step with native trends.

The centrality of religion to the constitution of South Asian communities and ethnic identities can be further illustrated in a number of ways. Very few Asians marry across religious and caste boundaries and most expect that their children will be inducted into their religion. The demand, especially by Muslims, that children be taught and allowed to hold acts of worship in their parents' religion in state schools, and that the state should fund Muslim schools (on the same basis as the Christian and Jewish schools are funded) has been an object of political activism and conflict. Religious dress codes that require adherents to wear turbans or headscarfs or cover their legs continue to be resisted by acts of discrimination and exclusion at schools and workplaces and are the objects of legal rulings. Despite the fact that at least five major South Asian languages are spoken in Britain, and most Asians have some facility in more than one of these languages, each linguistic community is strongly connected to a religious community (Modood et al, 1997: 308-312).

Religion, moreover, is particularly worth exploring in relation to British socialisation. For, firstly, it marks a significant dimension of cultural difference between the migrants and British society. Not only did most of the migrants have a different religion to that of the natives, but all the indications are that they, including the Christians among them, were more religious than the society they were joining. Not only was this likely to have been the case at the time of migration and in the early years of settlement but it is true today. Secondly, one of the major social changes that has taken place in Britain during the lifetime of most Asian settlers has been the decline of indigenous religious observance and faith, and so religion among ethnic minorities is an important test case of the effect of British socialisation. Thirdly, generally speaking, most of the cultural practices of migrants and their descendants usually decline with the length of their stay in the society to which they have migrated. This is usually so with language, dress, arranged marriages and so on. It is also the case with religion, though perhaps descendants of migrants are more likely to keep alive a distinctive religion rather than a distinctive language (this has certainly been the case with the Jewish and Indian diasporas, for example, though not with the Chinese diaspora). Rather, what makes religion exceptional is that, if not

[6] The survey explored only certain dimensions of culture and ethnicity. For example, it did not cover youth culture and recreational activities such as music, dance and sport. These cultural dimensions are likely to be as important to the self- and group-identities of some of our respondents as the features we gathered data on. Moreover, almost all the questions asked in the survey provided indications of how closely people affiliated to their group of origin. We did not explicitly explore ways in which members of the minorities had adopted, modified or contributed to elements of ways of life of other groups, including the white British. For full details on all aspects of the Fourth Survey see Modood et al, 1997.

generally, at least in British society, religion is now strongly correlated with age: the older a Briton is, the more religious s/he is likely to be. Yet, the longer migrant have been in Britain the greater the likelihood of a decline in their original culture. So, in the particular case of religion, age and length of residence in Britain work against each other.

We found, indeed, that while there is not a uniform linear pattern, the longer people's life has been in Britain, the less likely they are to say that religion is very important. Testing for the independent effects of age and length of residence in Britain through an analysis by logistic regression, we found that for Indians and Pakistanis the age and length of residence effects more or less cancel each other out, but among Bangladeshis and African Asians length of residence has about twice the effect as age does. This means that, in the case of the last-mentioned groups, the decline in religion through British socialisation is being only partially reversed by age.

New forms of ethnicity

The Fourth Survey does however offer for the first time some large data-set evidence that ethnicity is coming to mean new things. Distinctive cultural practices to do with religion, language, marriage and so on still command considerable allegiance. The case of religion has already been mentioned. A further example is that nearly all South Asians can understand a community language, and over two-thirds use it with family members younger than themselves. More than half of the married 16-34 year-old Pakistanis and Bangladeshis had had their spouse chosen by their parents. There was, however, a visible decline in participation in distinctive cultural practices across the generations. This was particularly evident amongst younger South Asians who, compared to their elders, are less likely to speak to family members in a South Asian language, regularly attend a place of worship or have an arranged marriage.

Yet, as has been said, this did not mean that they ceased to identify with their ethnic or racial or religious group. In this respect the survey makes clear what has been implicit in recent 'identity politics'. Ethnic identification is no longer necessarily connected to personal participation in distinctive cultural practices, such as those of language, religion or dress. Some people expressed an ethnic identification even though they did not participate in distinctive cultural practices. Hence it is fair to say a new conception of ethnic identity has emerged.

Traditionally, ethnic identity has been implicit in distinctive *cultural practices*, this still exists and is the basis of a strong expression of group membership. Additionally, however, an *associational* identity can be seen which takes the form of pride in one's origins, identification with certain group labels and sometimes a political assertiveness.

The ethnic identities of the second generation may have a weaker component of behavioural difference, but it would be misleading to portray them as weak identities as such. In the last couple of decades the bases of identity-formation have undergone important changes and there has come to be a minority assertiveness. Identity has moved from that which might be unconscious and taken-for-granted because implicit in distinctive cultural practices to conscious and public projections of identity and the explicit creation and assertion of politicised ethnicities. This is part of a wider socio-political climate which is not confined to race and culture or non-white minorities. Feminism, gay pride, Quebecois nationalism and the revival of Scottishness are some prominent examples of these new identity movements which have come to be an important feature in many countries in which class-politics has declined. Identities in this political climate are not implicit and private but are shaped through intellectual, cultural and political debates and become a feature of public discourse and policies, especially at the level of local or regional government. The identities formed in such processes are fluid and susceptible to change with the political climate, but to think of them as weak is to overlook the pride with which they may be asserted, the intensity with which they may be debated and their capacity to generate community activism and political campaigns.

Some of the differences in culture and identity can be partly explained by place of birth, period of residence in Britain, occupational class or by a combination of these and related factors, but underlying them was an irreducible difference between groups. Easily the strongest influence on South Asians' identity was their age at the time they came to Britain. Getting on for half of those who migrated after they had reached the age of 35 exhibited a 'strong' behavioural identity; one eighth of them were in the 'weak' group (Modood et al, 1997:334-336). In contrast, half of the South Asians who had been born in Britain were members of the `weak' behavioural category. An important contrast between groups, perhaps related to the influence of religion, is between African Asians and Indians (about 90 per cent of whom are Sikhs and Hindus), and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (over 95 per cent of whom are Muslims). On a range of issues to do with religion, arranged marriages, choice of schools and Asian clothes, the latter group take a consistently more 'conservative' view than the

former, even when age on arrival/birth in Britain and economic position are taken into account. The fact that the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are more likely to come from rural backgrounds, and, in particular, from poorer rural backgrounds, is bound to be relevant, and perhaps also the attitudes and practices in relation to gender-roles, marriage and ties of kinship (Ballard 1990). The sense of 'siege' and `threat' that some Muslim peoples have historically felt in the context of Western colonialism and cultural domination, and to which rural peoples in particular responded through a 'defensive traditionalism' may also be a factor (Modood,1990).

Britishness

A misleading picture would be conveyed if I did not add that besides colour and religion, other ethnic identities were also mentioned by Fourth Survey respondents, and indeed, that ethnic/racial/religious identification was of course not universal. For East African Asians, for example, their job was as important an item of self-description as any other.

The Fourth Survey also uniquely allows us to explore British national identity by bringing a large data-set to bear on the question. It is quite clear that the identities discussed above, various as they are, do not necessarily compete with a sense of Britishness. More than two-thirds of Asians said that they felt British, and these proportions were, as one might expect, higher amongst young people and those who had been born in Britain. The majority of respondents had no difficulty with the idea of hyphenated or multiple identities (see also Runnymede Trust, 1998). But there was evidence of alienation from or a rejection of Britishness. For example, over a quarter of British-born Caribbeans did not think of themselves as being British. In separate in-depth interviews we found that most of the second generation did think of themselves as mostly but not entirely culturally and socially British. They were not however comfortable with the idea of British being anything more than a legal title, in particular they found it difficult to call themselves 'British' because they felt that the majority of white people did not accept them as British because of their race or cultural background; through hurtful 'jokes', harassment, discrimination and violence they found their claim to be British was all too often denied (Modood et al., 1994: ch.6).

Yet at the same time, the trend in all groups, however, is away from cultural distinctness and towards cultural mixture and intermarriage. The trend is not equally strong in the various groups. For example, among the British-born, of those who had a partner, half of Caribbean men, a third of Caribbean women, a fifth of Indian and African Asian men, a tenth of Pakistani and Bangladeshi men and very few South Asian women had a white partner. In our survey, 40 per cent of Caribbean children who were living with two parents had one white parent. The Caribbean-white, the black-white, social, cultural, sexual and generational mix is now so deep in Britain that it is bound soon to have a profound impact on the idea of a black identity, a black community, though these matters are not yet being discussed in public. What is openly discussed by leading black analysts is the vibrant strength of a black British cultural identity in the mid-1990s. Darcus Howe has spoken of black people having 'a social ease and confidence now that we have not had before' (Younge, 1995). Henry Louis Gates Jnr believes that 'a culture that is distinctively black and British can be said to be in full flower' (Gates, 1997: 196), and Stuart Hall has argued not only that 'black British culture could be described as confident beyond measure in its own identity' (Hall, 1998: 39), but also that young black people have made themselves `*the* defining force in street-oriented British youth culture' (Hall, 1998: 40).

Some, indeed, have argued that the hope for multiculturalism lies in the development of new syncretic and hybrid youth cultures centred on black musical forms like rap and hiphop, and their Asian equivalents (Gilroy 1987). There is however a real danger in identifying transatlantic music with hybridity. It sets up an ideal of integration that all minorities, regardless of their distinctive character and aspirations, are expected to, indeed pressured to conform to. Such pressure may usually take the form of peer conformity, media and fashion messages, but can also be a matter of policy, as in Berlin, when social and youth workers are employed to teach Turks rap in the hope that they may become more like American and British blacks. It is important that hybridity or youth is not assumed to produce just one kind of cultural formation. The current popularity of the new Islamic identities among the young is indicated by the many Muslim student societies found in British universities and colleges. Different minorities will wish to and come to relate to the mainstream in their own way, and while some ways may prove more prevalent than others, an approach characteristic of one group should not be elevated to a paradigmatic status.

Nor should we assume that groups which are most culturally distinct or culturally conservative are least likely to feel British and vice-versa. It has already been mentioned that the Caribbeans, of all non-whites the culturally and socially closest to the white British, had the highest proportion who dismissed identification

with Britishness - more than the Pakistanis and the Bangladeshis, the most culturally conservative and separate of these groups. This certainly should not be taken to imply that the cultural conservatism consists in simply wanting to be left alone as a community and not making political demands upon the public space. For example, half of all Muslims wanted state funding for Muslim schools. The political demands of Muslims such as these are not akin to conscientious objections, to principled exemptions from civic obligations, but - akin to other movements for political multiculturalism - for some small degree of `Islamicisation' of the civic. Not for getting the state out of the sphere of cultural identities, but for an inclusion of Muslims into the sphere of state-supported culture.

My emphasis that different minorities will and should be allowed to relate to British society in their own way, to connect to different parts of society, to make their own linkages and syntheses is not to deny that the black achievement in youth music, and indeed youth and popular culture in general, including sport, is something quite extraordinary. A group that comprises less than two per cent of the population has, both in terms of quantity and quality, established itself as a leading-edge presence in urban youth culture in the face of racism, social deprivation and relative exclusion from positions of power and wealth. From being pariahs many black people have become objects of desire, with many young whites envying and imitating their `style' (cf Hall in Gates, 1997: 196). It is worth emphasising that this black British cultural success, like some other aspects of Caribbean settlement in Britain, has been highly inclusive. For while born of an assertiveness and a search for dignity, and while sometimes oppositional, it has also been a movement of integration, of wanting to be included into the British mainstream, of sharing and mutual respect (Phillips and Phillips, 1998, and Part 4 of the BBC television series, *Windrush*, to which this book is an accompaniment). It has, inevitably, been largely a black-white relationship but some young Asians and others have been drawn into it too. Black music, then, has indeed played an important role in the development of contemporary British multiculturalism, but it is not the whole picture. Consider, for example, some of the larger sources of the multicultural character of London.

An open and plural Britain

Over one and a half million of London's population of seven millions are not white, easily the largest single presence of non-whites in Europe, and forming nearly a quarter of the city (Storkey et al, 1997). Additionally, about ten per cent of the whites are not born in England, and there are communities of over 10,000 from thirty four countries, including about a quarter of a million from Ireland (Storkey et al, 1997). London is a leading centre of world communications, finance, trade and tourism, all these flows contributing to its cosmopolitan character and further reinforcing it, as business and tourism is attracted to London by its distinctive multicultural character and its ability to cater to diverse groups.

Among the many factors that could be cited to explain these features of London, let me just emphasise one factor that does not focus on ethnic minority groups but contrasts the kind of openness found in Britain with the kind of openness found in continental Northern Europe. Northern Europe has come to develop the most extensive and generous form of the welfare state and a related political culture has played a major role in defusing the nationalistic conflicts within Europe earlier this century. Yet multicultural thinking, including amongst the progressive opinion, is weak. The Northern European city in which multiculturalism is most a matter of debate and fact is surely Berlin, the city in the region which has a marked recent American and British influence. The history of Northern Europe has been a regional one and so its contemporary political openness is focused on the constituent parts of the region. In contrast, Britain has had an oceanic or maritime history that has brought it into contact, for good or for ill, with many parts of the world. The Empire brought the British into contact with a degree of cultural heterogeneity not experienced by Northern Europeans. French history does have parallels with the British, though the comparison only highlights that both in imperial and contemporary settings the French are less tolerant of cultural plurality than the British. It is these different histories of contacts and tolerance that is part of the explanation of why today it is the case that London is not simply an English or a British or even an European city, but a world city. And why a characteristic of British culture, despite its self-image of insularity, is the readiness to borrow and mix ideas and influences, as supremely exemplified in the English language.

This has particular relevance to Britain's relations with its European neighbours and to European political integration. It is often said that Europeanism and multiculturalism are contemporary developments out of a common politics. There may be some people in Britain who are equally enthusiastic about both developments but this is not generally true in

Europe as a whole.[7] For Britons and mainland Europeans are open to outsiders in different ways. Europeans have sought to put the excesses of nationalism behind them by seeking rapprochement with their neighbours but see no inconsistency in requiring cultural assimilation from non-European origin migrants. The British, especially the English, are less open to their European neighbours but are less hostile than most Europeans to multiculturalism and to international exchange. This I think gives Britain and especially British multiculturalists a 'mission' in Europe, that is to make Europe more open to the world and to multicultural situations, perhaps to be a bridge between Europeans and non-Europeans.

Conclusion

While there is, then, much empirical support for those theorists who have emphasised the fluid and hybridic nature of contemporary post-immigration ethnicities in Britain, Stuart Hall's suggestion that groups are so internally complex that they have become `necessary fictions' (Hall 1987: 45; 1992: 254) is much exaggerated. Moreover, the theoretical neglect of the role of religion reflects a bias of theorists of `difference' that should be urgently remedied. British race theorists had assumed that there was a deep racial/colour divide. Contemporary developments suggest that ethno-religious divisions will prove more persistent.

The new emphasis on British mixedness, on ethnic hybridity, however, is important. For it helps to highlight that ethnicity is very different from nationalism - a fact that is sometimes obscured when we talk about 'minorities'. Hybridity is clearly not a sub-state nationality (in the way of Scottishness or Catalan), it is a form of complex Britishness. This is particularly worth emphasising because in Britain there are people who want not just to be black or Indian in Britain, but positively want to be black British or British Indians (Hall, 1998; Jacobson 1997). They are less seeking civic rights against a hegemonic nationality than attempting to politically negotiate a place in an all-inclusive nationality. The contrast between ethnicity and nationality is politically important. Right-wing commentators used to worry about the threat that Commonwealth migrants and their descendants posed to Britishness. It is clear now that many in these ethnic minority groups think of Britain, appropriately reimagined and restructured, as a unifying identity. It is in fact mostly those groups that have a national-territorial base in the British Isles and a historical grievance with the British state who today shrink from the label `British'. While Pakistanis in Bradford have been coming to an understanding of themselves as British, it is the Scots and the Irish - both within and outside their territorial nations - that are in denial about being British, who see one national identity as incompatible with another. [8]

In Britain at the moment a unitary British identity no longer looks feasible. This is not a cause for panic. For, contrary to what both Enoch Powell and some radical anti-racists predicted, there is a desire for a hyphenated Britishness amongst `immigrants' and their descendants. At the same time a new non-right wing discourse of Britishness led by Tony Blair has recently emerged. These two developments can be brought together. Each development is somewhat embryonic, and certainly multiculturalism, which so far has been largely a social, a bottom-up movement, requires greater mainstream political commitment and leadership than it has received hitherto. The change in attitudes that is required amongst the white British is a real political challenge. Equally important is the right kind of multiculturalism: a multicultural Britishness that is sensitive to ethnic difference and incorporates a respect for persons as individuals and for the collectivities that people have a sense of belonging to. That means a multiculturalism that is happy with hybridity but has space for religious identities.

Both hybridity and ethno-religious communities have legitimate claims to be accommodated in political multiculturalism; they should not be pitted against each other in an either-or fashion as is done all too frequently by the celebrators of British Asian hybridity (e.g., Rushdie, 1991; Kureshi, 1995) and by some liberal political philosophers (e.g., Waldron 1992). Hanif Kureshi in his novel, *The Black Album* (1995) suggests that British Asian youth is being pulled by `sex, drugs and rock `an roll' , on the one hand, and by communal religious solidarity on the other hand. It is fascinating that the incompatible but separately attractive polarities identified by Kureshi amongst Asians resonate with Prime Minister Tony Blair's thinking about Britain. On the one hand, there is a celebration of stylish, creative hedonism (London as a world leader in *couture*, pop music, restaurants, night clubs and so on). On the other hand there is a passionate plea to renew the

[7] Indeed, even in Britain, the career of Roy Jenkins, the Home Secretary who led the way on racial equality and went on to become the Head of the European Commission, suggests that the more deeply involved in European politics one becomes, the less sympathy one has for British multiculturalism.

[8] Interestingly, non-whites in Scotland and Wales do often have a sense of identification with these nations (Saeed et al, 1996) but non-whites in Britain rarely think of themselves as Europeans (Runnymede Trust, 1998).

ethical springs of community and to put duty and high-minded responsibility back into citizenship. The making of British Asian identities thus, no less than the black culture that is already so prominent, has the potential to influence and be shaped by the remaking of Britishness.

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Ireland and refugees/asylum seekers: 1922 - 1966.

Eilís Ward

This paper presents a critical overview of the development of state policies towards refugees and asylum seekers from the foundation of the state up to 1996[9] I suggest that it is important, in looking at the situation today, that we examine the past also.

The paper will present the evolution of state policies in three distinct periods. Overall, we can see a positive evolution over time, albeit an evolutionary process that was largely ad hoc, marked by the absence of institutional learning and in which civil society, and not the state, consistently took the lead. This situation, I will argue, did not change until the early 90s when the state began to move towards responsible participation in UN refugee programmes and implementing its responsibilities towards asylum seekers according to international law. While the more recent changes are outside the brief of this paper it is possible that some of the gains made in these past few years, are in danger of being lost.

I propose to briefly look at each of these three periods and will then conclude with some analytical comments. There is, however, one point to be kept in mind - there will always be gaps in our knowledge in relation to how Ireland responded to requests for asylum over the years. We will simply never know how many were turned away at sea or airports and records on programme refugees, until the 1990s, are very minimal. For instance, the file in relation to the Chilean refugees who arrived in Ireland in 1972 has gone 'missing' somewhere between the Department of Justice and the Department of Foreign Affairs.[10] The lack of critical records affects not just researchers but has meant that successive governments have not had access to the kind of evaluative information on past experience required for policy development.

Historical closure: 1922 - 1956

The first period, from the foundation of the state up until UN membership in 1956, can be characterised by its closure towards the plight of refugees and asylum seekers. Ireland did its best to keep its doors shut tight against the millions displaced during and after World War 11.

In 1922 the new state inherited British legislation in relation to aliens. Under a Fianna Fáil government in 1935 two pieces of legislation were introduced. The Nationality and Citizens Act and the Aliens Act established the framework through which all issues relating to non-nationals were to be processed[11]. In Ireland, as was the case throughout Europe, the concept of 'refugee' was undeveloped and Irish migration policies viewed the world in terms of two groups of people; 'citizens' and 'aliens'. In 1939 the number of the latter in Ireland totalled just 2,610. The majority of these were natives of the US, (1,297), the second largest group comprised of Germans (326) followed by Italians (189), French (160) and Russians (126).[12]

At a pan-European conference held before the outbreak of World War 11 (in anticipation of increased flows of people displaced by the war) the state argued that, as a country of out-migration, and one marked by very high rates of unemployment, it could not offer shelter to the displaced of Europe. Not surprisingly given this response few were, in the event, granted asylum. Only 588 'aliens' were allowed enter Ireland between 1939 and 1945 - the majority being Austrian or German - excluding British evacuees who, under the constitutional arrangement between Britain and Ireland, did not come within the ambit of the Alien's Act. Not only did Ireland reject many asylum requests, many of which were supported personally by well known individuals within the state, it went out of is way to discourage Jews from applying for refuge. The evidence of antisemitism amongst officials in the Department of External Affairs (the Department later changed its name to Foreign Affairs) at the time has been well documented as a factor which mediated how Ireland responded to the crisis within Europe.[13]

However, Ireland did not entirely turn its back on war relief efforts in Europe and funding was made available to Vatican agencies and to

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[9] A fuller version of this paper appears in Ward, Eilís, 1998. "Ireland's Refugee Policies: A Critical Overview, in O'Driscoll Denis (ed.), *The Irish Human Rights Yearbook 1998,* Dublin, Roundhall, Sweet and Maxwell.

[10] Personal communication with official from DFA, Oct. 30 1996.

[11] Amendments to the Aliens Act, in 1946 and 1975, and details of a letter from the Department of Justice to the UNHCR in 1985 provided the legal framework for state policy up to the changes proposed in the 1996 act.

[12] "Irish Review and Annual Supplement", *Irish Times,* January 1 1940.

[13] See Ward, Eilís 1996 "Ireland's Refugee Policies and the Case of the Hungarians" in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Royal Irish Academy, Vol. 7: 131-141. See also, Keogh, Dermot, 1998. *Jews in Twentieth Century Ireland,* Cork University Press: Cork

the Red Cross working in Poland and Spain between 1940-45[14]. Unease at home in relation to Irish post-war deprivation led Éamon de Valera (then Taoiseach) to announce in 1947 that no relief efforts would be allowed damage Ireland's own economic needs.[15]

In the period after the war, Ireland retained its policy of closure despite the regional effort to cope with the millions left homeless and displaced by the war. The bureaucracy was not entirely at one on this decision, however, as is evident from debates leading up to the amendment of the Aliens Act. While de Valera, wanted to take up to 1,000 refugees, the Department of Industry and Commerce opposed such a move on rounds of cost to the state. The Department of Justice suggested that 250 could be taken - provided they did not stay on. The Department specifically opposed the acceptance of Jews. Two changes in policy were made however (in 1946 and 1950), both leading to acceptance of a small number of carefully defined refugees whose acceptance was subject to specified criteria. [16]

Ireland's distancing from the massive war relief effort in Europe meant, furthermore, that the state was not a participant in the intergovernmental efforts of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950 and the establishment of the International Convention on Refugees in 1951 (hereafter known as the Convention). Arising from the need to categorise such a regime in international law, as well as in practice, we can see during this period the evolution of the Convention definition of a refugee as opposed to a migrant or a displaced person. The Council of Europe was involved in this regime development and in 1951 it requested all European states to account for all persons who 'for reasons of race, nationality, or political opinion, were unable to return to the territory from which he or she came'. Ireland submitted that there were 846 such persons in the state. Two years later this number had dropped to 450.[17]

Reluctant participation in refugee regimes: 1956-1980s

During the second period, from 1956 up until the late 1980s the state was a reluctant participant in the international refugee regime of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). While accepting programme refugees, it did not provide the means for their immediate and long term needs through resettlement programmes. This period saw the arrival of Hungarian, (1956), Chilean (1973-1974), Vietnamese (1979) and Iranian Bahá'i (1985) programme refugees who came under the protection of a UNHCR relief effort. Little is known (as yet) about numbers of individuals who may have sought asylum in Ireland during this period - a fact partially explained by the 30 year rule on access to state archives. This section will briefly refer to each of these groups.

The Hungarians.

Immediately after joining the UN in 1956, Ireland announced that it would participate in the UNHCR's resettlement programme for those displaced by the Soviet invasion of Hungary that year.[18] As the first programme refugees to come to Ireland the 530 Hungarians were symbolic of Ireland's newly articulated concern to participate in the arena of world politics at the UN. The refugees were brought to an old army camp outside Limerick, a decision based on capacity, which established the Department of Defence as the principle government actor in refugee issues for decades to come. The ad hoc resettlement committee established by the government was headed by that Department and included the Irish Red Cross which was charged with administering to the refugee's daily needs. It was assumed that the Hungarians would find employment and would not be a burden on the state. By 1958 however, all but 61 of the original group had left Ireland again and many of those who remained were them unemployed or dependent on the state.

For all sides the Hungarian experience was largely an unhappy one. The key difficulty rested on the fact that the Hungarians came to Ireland believing it a country of temporary refuge prior to a final move elsewhere. The Irish government thought otherwise. Following considerable activism on the part of the Hungarians[19] (in which the UNHCR was involved but to a limited degree) the government attempted to re-negotiate their asylum in another state. Through the intervention of the Irish Catholic Church, a Canadian Catholic Church organised resettlement scheme agreed to take the majority of the Hungarians. Some travelled secretly (they literally 'disappeared' from the camp and were believed to have gone to the UK. A small group returned to Hungary.

The difference in understanding on the status of the Hungarians between the Irish government and the Hungarians themselves was fundamental to the difficulties that emerged. It is possible that the differences resulted from

[14] See Ward, Eilís, 1996. *Op cit*

[15] Speech to Dáil Éireann, March 1947.

[16] See Ward, Eilís, 1996, Ibid., for details

[17] See Ward, Eilís, 1996. *Ibid*

[18] See Ward, Eilís, 1996. *Ibid.*

[19] Amongst the actions staged by the Hungarians was a hunger strike

communication lapse between the representatives of the Irish state who had travelled to the camps in Austria where the displaced Hungarians were staying and the UNHCR. But the government and its agents showed a minimal understanding of the needs of refugees beyond providing accommodation, food and weekly 'pocket money'. Effectively, no resettlement programme existed and the Hungarians were expected to become absorbed into the local population. Their living conditions in the army camp were very basic and inadequate. Families, for instance, did not have control over their own food preparation but were catered for centrally by the Red Cross.

The Chileans.

The second group of programme refugees who came to Ireland was also in flight from a hostile political regime albeit one of the right. Following the coup in Chile in 1972 a group of Irish people campaigned for acceptance of a quota of refugees and following UNHCR pressure and domestic lobbying the government agreed to participate in the relief programme. Between 1973 and 1974 120 Chilean arrived. Of all refugee groups least is perhaps known about the Chileans. This is partly because concerns about their personal safety led to a low key approach to their reception, but also because of the minimal role played by the state in their resettlement and, of course by the fact that most of those who came have since left.

Their resettlement was privately sponsored by the ad hoc group of individuals who formed themselves into the Committee for Chilean Refugees in Ireland through a network of their personal contacts largely in the semi-state sector and with the help of religious groups. On the foot of advance negotiations the Chileans were housed in local authority housing in Shannon, Galway and Waterford places were located on AnCo training schemes. Chilean children were expected to adapt quickly to the Irish school environment[20]. Following a period of approximately two years the Committee 'pulled back' from providing close assistance in order to encourage independence and autonomy[21]. However, difficulties in securing employment remained with the Chileans[22]. Voluntary repatriation began in the late 1980s when the Chilean government announced that many of those who had gone into exile following the coup were now welcome back to the country. Of the 120 who originally came only a tiny handful now remains in the state.

The Vietnamese.

At a UN special conference in Geneva in July 1979 the government announced that it was taking 'boat people' from the conflict in Vietnam. The decision to do so can, again, be explained by the lead taken by private citizens and church organisations in lobbying for Ireland to participate in the international response. The Irish media and public opinion were very exercised by the tragic plight of the Vietnamese and a ground swell of sympathy had been created. Behind the scenes the UNHCR was also pressurising Ireland to accept some refugees as it did all signatories of the 1951 Convention. Finally, and as first time holder of the Presidency of the European Commission, Ireland may have felt burdened to set an example[23]. The importance of this particular combination of factors, coming together at a particular time in Ireland's history to produce a decision to accept programme refugees, is underlined by the fact that the government had, on several occasions in previous years, refused to participate in other similar UNHCR operations.

In 1979, 212 Vietnamese refugees arrived. That number rose to 408 in 1989 under the family reunification programme. The Vietnamese who came to Ireland were ethnically diverse and mostly of poor peasant or fishing backgrounds but were united by one common factor: low levels of literacy and formal skills. While they were welcomed heartily in the media, many, including church leaders, were critical of the small number taken in and wanted Ireland to be more open to providing a home to the boat people.

In response to pending arrival, the Vietnamese Refugee Resettlement Committee was established by the government under the authority of the Department of Defence. After an initial period in reception centres (for some in a Dublin Hospital, for others in a private Church premises) families were dispersed in local authority housing throughout Dublin and other urban centres. Language training was provided partially through the VEC and vocational training was provided by AnCo. The Catholic Church, through the Irish Episcopal Commission for Emigrants, co-ordinated and provided support through, *inter alia*. the acquisition of houses outside the Dublin area. In addition, a Church

[20] Frieda McGovern, 1990. "Vietnamese Refugees in Ireland, 1979-1989. A Case Study in Resettlement and Education." Unpublished M. Ed Thesis, TCD.

[21] Personal interview with founding members of the Committee for Chilean Refugees, October 23 1996. The interviewees were quick to stress however, that while they carried out most of the work in a voluntary capacity, full and sympathetic support was given by the semi-state agencies and local authorities they dealt with in regard to training, housing and service provision

[22] Minister for Foreign Affairs, David Andrews in *Dáil Debates*. Vol. 311, January - February 1979, Col 1158.

[23] McGovern, Frieda, 1990. *Ibid.*: 118.

appeal brought in material assistance and raised public support for the project.[24]

The absence of published sources during the early years render a comprehensive analysis of the programme difficult. The extent of involvement of church organisation other voluntary groups prompts the conclusion that the state 'devolved' its responsibility to civil society. Following an initial reception and the provision of a minimum institutional response the refugees were expected to fit. Language training in the early years was 'inadequate' based largely on teachers with no training in the area[25] and children's progress in schools was dependent on the interest of teachers. When placement occurred on AnCo training courses, no special account was taken of language or cultural differences. Within communities where the Vietnamese settled mediation and support was largely provided by church members.

In 1985 the Vietnamese Refugee Resettlement Committee was subsumed into the Refugee Resettlement Committee (RRC), founded that year under the authority of the Department of Foreign Affairs. By this stage it was clear that the Vietnamese were undergoing significant difficulties in resettlement and in finding a place in Irish society. These difficulties were acknowledged by the RRC which subsequently sought to devise a coherent approach to the complexity of the issue. Its 1985 Annual Report proposed, for instance, that a case would have to be made to AnCO for special treatment of refugees who have a language problem'[26]. Indeed, the lack of command of English emerged throughout the subsequent years as a central variable in explaining difficulties encountered by the Vietnamese in finding jobs and completing vocational training. The RRC established in 1989 that only 25 percent of the Vietnamese were economically self reliant; 16 percent were very dependent on the agency; 36 percent were fully dependent on the state for economic survival and 4o percent had 'precarious livelihoods'.[27]

However, many of the Vietnamese adapted their skills and determination to be productive and independent of state benefit[28]. In particular they found a niche in the fast food and restaurant business. Many involved in fast food production, however, fell foul of the rigours of the Casual Trading Act 1988 - particularly the cost of licensing. In 1989, the number of families involved in fast food ventures dropped from 38 to 20[29]. By 1990 it was almost impossible for Vietnamese families to acquire licences to trade under the Act[30] but many businesses did survived. In 1995 a total of 106 out of a population of 534 were owners or employees in the business while only 11 were employed 'elsewhere'.[31] All the Vietnamese have been naturalised as Irish citizens.

The Bahá'is.

In December 1985 25 Iranian Bahái's, victims of religious persecution, arrived in Ireland as programme refugees. Again we find that the decision to accept them resulted from persistent domestic lobbying by, in this case, the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahái's of the Republic of Ireland which gave a commitment to provide for them. They were to be no 'burden' on the state other than the cost of their transport to Ireland, provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs. As with the Chileans, the Bahái's resettlement programme was privately sponsored. The Assembly provided all services such as the airport reception, assistance in setting up homes, finding employment and English classes and closely monitored and nurtured their integration into Irish society. In September 1990 all Bahái's took up Irish citizenship.

It is clear that enormous care and attention were paid to the need of the refugees and privatisation is not necessarily the key variable in explaining the successful resettlement that occurred. The Assembly maintains that the success was facilitated by the easy manner with which the Iranians integrated into, not just their Bahá'i community, but their local community in general. Keeping families together but dispersing the total number was a factor that engendered smooth integration.[32] The Bahá'i refugees had an entry into Irish society mediated by the network of co-religionists which not only embraced but validated their culture, language and religious differences and allowed their co-existence within the wider Irish society. The professional qualifications of many of the Bahá'i refugees (such as in pharmacy, accountancy and veterinary

[24] Personal interview with Fr. PJ Byrne, formerly of the Irish Episcopal Commission for Emigrants, October 24 1996

[25] McGovern, Frieda, 1990.

[26] Refugee Resettlement Committee, *Annual Report*, 1986.

[27] Refugee Resettlement Committee, *Annual Report,* 1989

[28] Refugee Resettlement Committee, *Annual Report,* 1986.

[29] Refugee Resettlement Committee, *Annual Report* 1989.

[30] Refugee Resettlement Committee, *Annual Report* 1990.

[31] Statistics provided by the Refugee Agency, 1995. A total of 51 were unemployed the remainder were in full time education, training, working in the home or in other categories such as having special needs

[32] Personal interview with a member of the Bahá'i community in Ireland, June 5 1996.

medicine) meant they arrived with transferable skills which, importantly, also conferred status on them in local communities. The kinds of problems that characterised the experience of other programme refugees, such as unemployment and language acquisition difficulties, were remarkable in their general absence among the Bahái's.

Toward responsible participation 1980s – 1996

In the third period, from the late 1980s on, the state moved slowly towards responsible participation in international regimes pertaining to both refugees and asylum seekers. The term *towards* must be stressed however as during this period of transition much of the state's response to asylum seekers in particular is characterised by the closure of the previous decades. This section will briefly refer to asylum seekers; the arrival of Bosnian programme refugees; the changes in state policy reflected in the establishment of the Refugee Agency; the promulgation of the 1996 Refugee Act and finally institutional changes within the Department of Justice.

Ireland and asylum seekers

For Ireland the global changes brought by the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in one immediate and dramatic phenomenon: a rise in the number of individuals requesting asylum on our shores. As a satellite within the USSR's international political and economic system, Cuba was one of the first countries to feel the blow. For many Cubans the Aeroflot's stopover on the Moscow to Havana flight at Shannon airport provided an escape route. Because of these changes in global politics, Ireland was forced to respond to significant numbers of asylum seekers; Cubans (and indeed others from the former Soviet Union) who landed in Shannon seeking their rights under the 1951 Convention.

But there was a second factor which may also have increased Ireland's profile as a potential place of refuge. Changes in domestic asylum and welfare legislation in the UK, France and Spain removed parity of access to welfare provision between nationals and asylum seekers[33]. In Ireland, asylum seekers were entitled to equitable social welfare provision while awaiting their claim. However, both these factors alone do not explain the increases in asylum claims and, it must be recognised, both imply an element of calculation available to the claimant that is very often non-existent. The figures for claims for asylum between 1988 and 1996 tell the story clearly. As we know, the pattern of dramatic increase in asylum applications was to continue.

Numbers of Asylum Seekers 1988 - (July) 1996.

Year	No. of applicants
1988	49
1989	36
1990	60
1991	31
1992	39
1993	91
1994	355
1995	424
1996	600

In the face of such change, however, it became evident that the state was simply not prepared in terms of resources, training of personnel, experience or capacity. The Department of Justice, which implements migration policy at a domestic level, did not have the capacity or indeed experience to respond adequately. The absence of domestic legislation to enact the requirements and responsibilities of the 1951 Convention became glaringly obvious. This legislative gap could be ignored so long as there were few individuals seeking refugee status in Ireland.Demands for change within Ireland also came from other external sources. There was external from within the European Union for a co-ordination of Irish with other EU member state's policy.[34] This co-ordination eventually resulted in the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Convention and, importantly in the case of Ireland, the adoption of the Refugee Act of 1996.

In the absence of preparation and institutional capacity, how did the state actually respond to the policy lacunae that the increasing claims of asylum seekers revealed?

The weakest aspect of the state's response, exacerbated by the absence of domestic legislation (and more recently, by the failure to enact the legislation) was the delay in processing claimants' cases. It was not unknown for asylum applicants to be imprisoned while awaiting judgement on their case. But this was not the norm. Most applications faced a somewhat lesser evil of delays of up to three and four years. An interpretation service was not always available. Claimants were also denied an avenue of appeal once a decision was made. All asylum seekers were entitled to accommodation provision, unemployment benefit and access to the Supplementary Welfare Allowance scheme of the local Health Board. While awaiting judgement applicants were not entitled to work a factor which, it was claimed, exacerbated the poverty

[33] Personal interview with official from the Department of Justice, July 31 1996.

[34] For over view, see for instance, Baubock, Reiner, (ed.) 1994. *From Aliens to Citizens: Redefining the Status of Immigrants in Europe*, Aldershot, Avebury.

and social exclusion which many already faced[35]. A profound difficulty was derived from the fact that no domestic legislation existed leaving asylum seekers stripped of rights while awaiting a decision. The enforced idleness by preclusion from the labour market coupled with past losses and an uncertain future within a legal limbo take their toll.

And what do we know of the rate of success or failure in applications at this point. In 1996 the Department of Justice claimed that it could not be more specific than to say that '10 to 15 percent of cases for refugee status and permanent leave to remain are granted each year'.[36]

While the state provided basic services during the waiting period[37] there were important breaches in the total picture. In this breach we find that NGOs such as the Irish Refugee Council (IRC) fulfil important functions. The IRC, works closely with the UNHCR, liaises with state agencies and, *inter alia*, provides free legal advice on the application process, English language classes, social events and advocates on behalf of asylum seekers. However, asylum seekers are not idle in the general sense nor did they remain invisible in Irish society. In 1995 the Somali Refugee Community (SRC) was launched in Dublin.[38] A Cuban Asylum Seekers Association was also founded[39]. More recently the more advocacy-orientated organisation, the Association of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Ireland (ARASI) has been founded.

The founding of the Refugee Agency.

The Refugee Agency was established in 1992 to co-ordinate the admission, reception and resettlement of Convention refugees. Its brief does not include asylum seekers unless and until they are granted Convention status under the application process. A main factor in the development of the Agency was the gradual shifting of responsibility from the Department of Defence, the lead agency since the Hungarian experience, to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). In 1985 the dominance of the Department of Defence was broken with the establishment of the Policy Advisory Committee, which reported to the DFA, and the Refugee Resettlement Agency, which had executive responsibility for resettlement and was linked to Defence. Both merged into the Refugee Agency, officially established by Ministerial Order in 1992.

That change asserted the authority of the DFA over refugee policies and established the parameters of policy as derived from international law and not exclusively domestic concerns The Refuge Agency is structured around a Director and a Board consisting of representatives of relevant Departments, five persons appointed by the Minister and one UNHCR representative. This structure, which resembles that of a government task force or a local partnership, is unique in the landscape of government agencies. Much of the Board's work involves formulating policy. Given that all provider Departments and the NGO sector have an input into that process, there is a tendency towards a consensual ownership of recommendations. Thus, for the first time, a denominated actor existed within the state machinery, with a budget, clear lines of authority, an interdepartmental and inter-sectoral structure and a clearly defined brief for refugees.

The Bosnians, 1992

The establishment of the Refugee Agency cleared the way for the state's participation in the UNHCR programme for the resettlement of Bosnians displaced by the war in the former Yugoslavia. In advance of the first arrival a working party was established and a reception plan was put in place derived largely from a Draft Action Plan on refugees which had been circulated through relevant Departments in 1991. The arrival of the refugees in Dublin in September 1992 received much media attention and was placed in the context of Ireland's contribution to the impact of the on-going war which, like the conflict in Vietnam, had created popular sympathy.

Unlike any of the previous programme refugees, the Bosnians arrived to find, in place, a coherent reception and resettlement programme. Housing was located in private rented accommodation and language training provision was contracted out privately to a specialised agency. Strategic efforts were made to involve Bosnians in the running of the reception centre and the appointment, by the Agency, of a welfare officer and a resettlement officer to assist at specific stages of the programme all underlined the norm changes at the level of state policy. Specialised medical care was provided for those who came with Medavac.

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[35] See Irish Refugee Council 1995. "The Right To Work Campaign", submission to the National Anti-Poverty Strategy, printed in *Didéanai*, Irish Refugee Council, Dublin, Vol. 1, No. 2.

[36] Personal interview with official from the Department of Justice, August 8 1996. See also Department of Justice, 1996. "Guidelines on the procedure for the reception of asylum applicants", Department of Justice, Dublin

[37] In Europe it is not unusual for the state to play a role in welfare provision for asylum seekers as defined minimally in international law. However in some other jurisdictions the state funds NGOs to provide language training, support and advice.

[38] See *Didéanai*, 1995: 15 for details

[39] "Surge in Asylum Seekers", *Irish Press,* March 11 196.

However, securing work proved elusive for many Bosnians despite their skills and motivation. In 1993 it was recognised that special employment schemes were required to ensure progress beyond training and placement on the live register[40] Since then the Refugee Language and Training Programme (RLTP) has been established, the Bosnian Community Development Project (BCDP) has extended its services and furthermore provides employment for Bosnians. Funding has been secured for a special programme for Bosnian women under the title of the Zena Project.

The Bosnian resettlement programme symbolises a long-awaited coming of age of the Irish state in its responsibilities to Convention refugees. It also provides a model of good practice that can be replicated and built upon in the future.

Changes in the Department of Justice

While the low numbers of asylum applications historically may have been adequately if extremely slowly processed through the immigration section of the Department of Justice the huge increase in asylum applications in the 1990s rendered this system longer tenable. In 1996 the Department established a section, with a permanent staff of three, whose function was to deal solely with asylum claims. In recognition of the particular needs of asylum seekers and of the need for immigration officers to be aware of the rights of all such persons, training was provided by the UNHCR. The 1996 Act provided the domestic legal framework required to outline rights and responsibilities of both the state and its agents and asylum seekers themselves.

The 1996 Refugee Act

The most significant change in relation to asylum seekers and refugees was, undoubtedly, the 1996 Refugee Act. The origins of the act are to be found in both the need for internal institutional direction and, arguably more importantly, the need for harmonisation with the changes then on-going within the EU towards all migration policies. The Act had a torturous journey through the Oireachtais but its promulgation provided the first opportunity for the state - the parliament, the administration, the executive and the state agencies involved in service provision - to carry out a comprehensive debate on policy.

It is not within the brief of this paper to examine the Act[41] and brief mention will be made here of some of its more significant implications. In the summer of 1996 the Department of Justice produced new guidelines on processing asylum applicants. These establish, *inter alia*, that asylum seekers are entitled to assistance from the state in the meeting of their immediate physical and other needs. Consequently the functions of immigration personnel have been expanded and Health Board Community Welfare Officers are to be denominated as co-ordinators for their needs. Training was provided for those dealing with asylum seekers: both immigration officials and civil servants. An appeals route has been created and the processing of claims has been quickened.

An important point must be made here. While recognising the positive changes that have occurred, and that the state still has a long way to go[42] it must be kept in mind that a period of 40 years passed before the state fulfilled its obligations under the 1951 Convention (signed by Ireland in 1956) and produced domestic legislation. This failure to provide the basic framework for policy implementation and development underlines the lack of concern by the state for the issue of asylum seekers and refugees.

Conclusion.

In conclusion I would like to make 6 points.

It is clear that during the period of national reconstruction and economic autarky the ideology of the state precluded extending responsibility to those who were not citizens. This included, with very few exceptions, those who were fleeing genocide in Nazi Germany and Nazi occupied Europe. The form of nationalism which took hold in Ireland, perhaps given the bloody history of the evolution of the state and of the final break with British rule, was narrow, inward looking, uninformed by any internationalism and sought, most of all to protect Ireland from all that was 'other'. Thus migration policy, or attitudes to aliens must be seen in the context of the project of Irish nationalism, which produced, *inter alia,* the Censorship of Publications Act of 1928 (banning most foreign films, books and magazines), and the Control of Manufactures Act of 1932 and 1934 (making ownership of manufactures by non-Irish impossible).

In valorising the carriers of that political identity, nationalism clashes with an acceptance of the universality of human rights. This requires a widening of the community 'of concern' to all peoples regardless of their national identity.

[40] Refugee Agency 1993. *Annual Report.*

[41] For a more thorough analysis see Byrne, Rosemary 1998. "The 1996 Refugee Act" in D. O'Driscoll (ed.). *Op Cit.*

[42] Among the many critics of government policy in the light of delays in implementing the 1996 Act was former President Mary Robinson, UN Commissioner for Human Rights. See "Robinson urges State to speed up decisions on asylum-seekers" in *Irish Times,* March 9 1998.

During the 1920s and 1930s as the Irish state sought to find economic autonomy and foster self-reliance, such cosmopolitan values were lost to the idealisation of a very narrowly defined Irish nation. This is not to deny the influence of anti semitism during this period in, at least the Departments of Justice and Foreign Affairs. However, we can consider the migration laws of the time as enabling the state to police the boundaries of the nation rather than to share in and facilitate humanitarian responses to the catastrophic reality of Europe before, during and after World War II.

- The first shift in nationalist closure to responsibility towards the 'species' came with Ireland's membership of the United Nations. The state's move towards engagement with multi-lateral organisations such as the UN, and later the Common Market (as it was then), can of course be explained by strategic and economic necessity. But with that went an openness to participation in humanitarian efforts; or a recognition of the universality of human rights and the need for international regimes to provide for them. As we saw, however, the flourish shown in the acceptance of the Hungarians, may not have been more solidly founded than a diplomatic gesture to, as a Dáil critic commented at the time, 'show off what we could do.'[43]
- Despite the norm changes following UN membership and Ireland's participation in the European integration process, the state did not at any stage take a lead in accepting and providing for UNHCR sponsored refugees. In the cases of the Vietnamese, the Chileans and the Bahái's we have seen that domestic civil society both spearheaded the campaign for acceptance (supported by pressure from the UN) and, to a great extent provided resettlement supports. This laissez faire policy did not change until some years after the arrival of the Vietnamese when their difficulties in relation to the labour market forced an evaluation of what had passed for policy. The response to the Bosnians was the first comprehensive and coherent approach taken by the state.
- Throughout the history of refugee and asylum policies, Irish legislators and indeed, the bureaucracy (the civil service) were often much less liberal than civil society and elements in the Catholic Church. But during times of real economic hardship public opinion did not look too kindly on state expenditure on non-nationals; those outside the moral community of the Irish nation. This popular closure is neither unusual nor surprising given the superiority of the 'national interest' and the 'national community' over other kinds of interests and communities in the evolution of the nation-state system.
- In relation to asylum seekers, the Irish State appears to have remained in a state of closure until the early 1990s. This analysis must however, be attenuated by the fact that we do not know - and probably never will know - the full picture. We do not know how many potential claimants were turned away before they set foot on Irish soil.[44] We do know that very few were successful. When the figures began to dramatically change, the state was ill-prepared, ill-equipped to deal with and institutionally ignorant of the complex needs of asylum seekers. The changes referred to here do provide an enabling framework for the evolution of policies that respect the spirit and intent of the 1951 Convention (that every person has the right to make a claim for asylum and states have a responsibility to facilitate that). In this context, the delays in implementing the 1996 Refugee Act, and the troubling noises coming from the Department of Justice about welfare provisions for asylum seekers, along with the much-touted creation of a 'Fortress Europe', are to be regretted.

[43] Deputy McQuillan to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Frank Aiken in the Dáil. *Dáil Debates.* vol. 161, col. 630, 2 May 1957.

[44] In1992, 27 Kurds were returned to a flight at Shannon airport with the 'assistance' of the Gardaí

Porous nation: from Ireland's 'haemorrhage' to immigrant inundation

Jason King

"It only takes one leaky section in the walls of Fortress Europe," declares Pillar, an immigration officer in Donal O'Kelly's 1993 play *Asylum! Asylum!,* for "the flood of immigrants [to] pour in and swamp the continent" (153). Ireland's points of entry, in particular, he adds, need to be "plugged", as part of a strategy of containment for an imminent European refugee crisis. O'Kelly's play thus encapsulates sentiments that have become widespread, as not just reported but inculcated by a large cross-section of the Irish media, in the past couple of years (Collins, 1997; Pollak, 1998; Watt, 1998). As Phillip Watt observes, "the repeated assertion that there is a flood or tide of refugees and asylum-seekers coming to Ireland" has helped create an "atmosphere of fear" and intolerance towards them (Watt, 1998: 29). And yet, the invocation of 'floods and tides' to describe Irish migratory processes is not limited to Ireland's recent upsurge in asylum applicants. Rather, it can be attributed to a recrudesence of metaphors of *fluidity* that have characterized Irish emigration for at least one hundred and fifty years, following the 'Famine tide' of 1847. My paper examines the evolution and transformation of these metaphors of fluidity in the period between the Famine and the Dublin Convention (1990), to trace the effects of historical Irish outmigration on perceptions of recent immigration.

To begin, it is now commonplace to remark that the rhetoric of migration frequently represents population displacements through metaphors of fluidity. Writers employing legal, academic, and journalistic registers all tend to describe population movements as 'influxes' and 'outflows', 'immersions' and 'outpourings', 'floods', 'tides' and 'waves', with varying degrees of self-consciousness about the impact of their figurative language upon perceptions of migration. What is less commonly noted, however, are the discourses underlying these metaphors of fluidity and how they become transformed over time, that is, the extent to which these metaphors themselves are diachronically constructed, and subject to modification and periodization, rather than ahistorical, immutable, and static figures of representation. What I want to do here is telescope the representations of two historically disjunctive moments in patterns of Irish migration and survey the evolution and transformation of metaphors of fluidity between them. In other words, I want to focus first on the period of the rapid expansion and institutionalization of the emigrant trade in the 1830s and 1840s leading up to the Famine migration from Ireland, and then I want to turn to the reverse flow of increasing asylum-seekers coming into the country in the 1990s, as part of the same process of *discourse transformation* underlying Ireland's transition from an emigrant to an immigrant host society.

My argument, then, is that whereas in the mid-nineteenth century representations of Irish out-migration were usually encapsulated within a larger *Gothic* discourse that depicted it through metaphors of haemorrhaging, blood-letting, and collective anemia for the social disruption caused by population depletion. This ultimately becomes superseded in the 1990s by an emergent discourse of social Darwinism, rooted in the residue of natural selection, competition for limited resources, and economic determinism, that has come to represent the arrival of asylum-seekers into Ireland as a form of *natural disaster.* In other words, in the period between the Famine and the Dublin Convention (1990) Gothic Supernaturalism gradually gives way to Natural Selection in conditioning metaphors of fluidity for Irish migratory processes.

What these discourses emphasise in common, however, is the underlying *passivity* of the Irish nation before migratory pressures that render it prostrate and unable to regulate the population movements that traverse its borders. For whether migration is portrayed as a form of social enervation or immigrant inundation, both discourses construct Ireland as porous, vulnerable, and subject to external migratory controls. Each of these discourses thus also gives rise to fundamental anxieties not only about the liquidation of international boundaries but also, more specifically, about the *self-selectivity* of those migrant populations who first would exit and then enter the Irish nation.

In the Famine period, for example, Irish Nationalist and Tory Unionist commentators alike opposed the out-migration of either the "industrious classes" of an independent Catholic "yeomanry" or the 'lower order of Protestants' through recourse to the same Gothic metaphors of 'draining life-blood', splintered 'bone and sinew', and social haemorrhage. These, in turn, became absorbed into a critique of the Union as either in need of Repeal or imperial retrenchment for purposes of population retention.

More recent constructions of refugees 'flooding into Ireland,' on the other hand, shift the discourse to apprehensions of strained resources that are figured in terms of an imminent natural disaster. It is partially this rhetorical strategy, for example, that enables the Irish Department of Justice to circumvent existing statutory protections for asylum seekers enshrined in the Irish Refugee Act (1996) with minimal opposition, because of the ostensible need for

ad hoc, contingent and discretionary procedures as measures of 'containment' for the 'refugee crisis' that then become normative as Ireland's refugee reception policy (Byrne, 1997).

Yet to whatever extent Ireland suffers from a 'refugee crisis' it is clearly a crisis of representation: one in which the image of the refugee has become over-determined so that conceptions of enforced migration, whereby refugees come to Ireland because of a well founded fear of persecution abroad, are increasingly destabilised by perceptions of asylum-seekers as economic agents, who invoke a discourse of human rights to cloak their exploitation of Ireland's 'generous' social and economic entitlements. Finally, then, what each of these Gothic and Social Darwinist discourses give rise to is a conception of migratory self-selection in which, to put it bluntly, 'back then', at the time of the Famine, it was always the best -- 'the country's best blood and strength' -- who left, whereas now in the 1990s it is always the worst (economic aliens, parasites, spongers) who would come to Ireland.

Unlike today, in the mid-nineteenth century, both Irish Nationalist and Tory Unionist commentators feared population depletion rather than immigrant inundation. They each employed a Gothic discourse to object not just to the phenomenon of migration in general but specifically the departure of their respective population cohorts, and the evacuation of their social bases of support. Each group envisioned Ireland as an *organic* entity whose steady loss of people they imagined as a form of degenerative illness or social haemorrhaging. William Carleton's 1848 novel *The Emigrants of Ahadarra*, for example, combines each of these Gothic metaphors in describing first "the contagion for emigration" (269), and then America as an "overgrown cupping glass… drawing [out] the best blood of our country" (252). Likewise, in his preface for the novel, Carleton seeks to staunch "the unparalleled tide of emigration which has drained, and is still draining, this unhappy country of its best blood and strength" (v). His conflation of migration here with both a form of illness, its malignant remedy of blood-letting, and a surging tide involves what the cognitive theorists Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 97-104) term 'complex coherences across metaphors'. For although such metaphors for migration as 'illness', 'blood-letting', and an 'unparalleled tide' "do not provide us with a single consistent concrete image, they are nonetheless coherent and fit together" to the extent that their "overlapping entailments" (105) each figure migrancy as an abnormal, aberrant, and unnatural social condition. In other words, Carleton resorts to a series of affective images and emotive metaphors of fluidity that provide powerful Gothic sanctions against further departures from Ireland, rather than imagining it as a routine social phenomenon.

What is most significant about Carleton's representation of migration, however, is not just his affectivity but also his *selectivity.* He specifically laments, for example, the loss of Ireland's "*best* blood and strength," in effect, the 'life-blood' of Irish nationalism.[45] For although Carleton himself was neither an Irish nationalist nor a Roman Catholic except in the most tenuous fashion, his novels invariably feature the affluent, agrarian Catholic middle-class who would spearhead both O'Connell's Repeal movement as well as the Young Ireland organization in their opposition to the Union and Anglo-Irish rule.[46] Population depletion for Carleton is thus especially a tragedy of class dislocation. It is the sectional migration of what he terms "a respectable and independent class of Irish yeomanry" (86), in particular, that most imperils the well-being of the nation's body politic. Especially grievous for Carleton, then, is the spectacle of "the industrious, moral, and respectable portion of our countrymen abandoning the land of their birth and affections" (88); "this, indeed," he writes, "is a *kind* of depletion which no country can bear long" (86).

Once again, Gothic metaphors of blood-loss and haemorrhaging predominate here, as Carleton outlines the plight of "the decent and respectable farmer… who, loving his native fields as if they were of his blood, would almost as soon part with the one as the other" (89). On the other hand, "the great mass of pauperism" (89), landlord neglect, onerous legislation and taxation for Famine relief, and ultimately the political connection with Great Britain itself, all "lie like an incubus upon the energies of the country" (89). "Like Frankenstein in the novel," Carleton concludes, this confluence of social, economic, and political forces, once "conjured up," must "press heavily upon the independent class of farmers and yeomen" until they either need leave Ireland or are "unquestionably destroyed" (168). He thus explicitly employs a Gothic register to isolate Ireland's 'lower orders', along with the Union, as major precipitants rather than unwilling participants in emergent mass-migration. Monstrous images of

[45] For an insightful discussion of Gothic conventions in nationalist writing of the Famine period, see Sean Ryder. 1996. "Reading Lessons: Famine and the *Nation*, 1845-1849," in Chris Morash and Richard Hayes (eds*) Fearful Realities: New Perspectives on the Famine*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 151-163.

[46] For several recent discussions of Carleton's social diagnoses and class affiliations, see King, Sophia Hillan. 1997. "'The Condition of Our People': William Carleton and the Social Issues of the Mid-1840s," in E . Margaret Crawford (ed) *The Hungry Stream: Essays on Emigration and Famine*. Omagh and Belfast: Centre for Emigration Studies, Ulster-American Folk Park & Institute of Irish Studies, Queen's University: 175-184; Morash, Chris. 1995. *Writing the Irish Famine*. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 162-168; and Vance, Norman. 1990. *Irish Literature: A Social History – Tradition, Identity and Difference*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell: 136-153.

blood-loss, an 'incubus', and finally Frankenstein all accumulate to mystify emigration as a supernatural agent of adversity rather than a rational response to economic distress.

Accordingly, Carleton's disaffection towards migration, predilection for 'strong farmers', and invocation of Gothic imagery all coalesce in the plight of the affluent McMahon family, the eponymous *Emigrants of Ahadarra*. As a representative example of "honest industry, enterprise, and independence" (88), they epitomize middle-Ireland in their tenacious effort to remain on the land despite intense social and economic pressure to leave. In their struggle to reconcile an innate "principle of attachment" with a "strong tendency to emigration" (88), they embody a much larger social tension that besets the Irish nation as a whole. For, as Carleton explains at length,

There is not, in any country in the world, a population so affectionately attached to the soil – to the place of their birth – as the Irish. In fact, the love of their native fields, their green meadows, the dark mountains, and the glorious torrents that rush from them, is a passion of which they have in foreign lands been known to die. It is called *Home Sickness*, and we are aware ourselves of more than one or two cases in which individuals, in a comparatively early stage of life, have pined away in secret after their native hills, until the malady becoming known unfortunately too late, they sought once more the green fields and valleys among which they had spent their youth, just in time to laydown their pale cheeks and rest in their native clay for ever those hearts which absence and seperation from the very soil had broken (264).

Emigration thus is explicitly identified in the form of "home sickness" as a supernatural agent of pathology, to the extent that it even becomes a physiological condition. This metaphorical construction is further reinforced by the lurking figure of vampirism, in the guise of a fetishised 'attachment to the soil' or one's 'native clay' that can only be sundered upon pain of a mysterious wasting illness, marked by its youthful victims, symptoms of gradual social withdrawal, and an increasingly anaemic and pallid complexion.

In effect, emigration in the form of "home sickness" becomes symptomatic of a much larger degenerative condition, one that would seemingly equate the fate of the nation with a string of Gothic heroines spanning from LeFanu's Carmilla to Bram Stoker's Lucy Westrena and Mina Harker in *Dracula.* Indeed, it is precisely such a fate that would appear to befall Carleton's young heroine Dora McMahon in *The Emigrants of Ahadarra*: for after she learns of her own impending departure from Ireland, "a deadly paleness settled upon her face" (230). "From the moment she felt assured that emigration to America was certain," Carleton writes, "she manifested a depression so profound and melancholy, that the heart of her brother Bryan, who alone knew its cause, bled for her" (269) What each of these figures have in common, then, is a degenerative condition that is not only a symptom of migration but also a metaphor for displacement, a manifestation of the national condition in each of their respective, personal spectacles of withering away. For it is impossible to dissociate Gothic convention here from social commentary, as Carleton's sensational plot contrivances and remonstrances against migration become increasingly intertwined. The McMahon family would appear to embody the fate of the prostrate Irish nation itself, losing its lifeblood before the spectre of migration.

In the Famine and pre-Famine periods, however, it was not just the Irish nation that was felt to be imperilled by continuing population depletion. For writers in the avowedly conservative and Tory Unionist *Dublin University Magazine*, it was the continuing exodus of what they termed 'the lower order of Protestants' in the 1830s that threatened the security of the Union between Great Britain and Ireland. Like Carleton, the *Dublin University Magazine* was *selectively* opposed to emigration and the disappearance of a segment of the Protestant population that was felt to play a foundational role in the defence of the Union against predatory Roman Catholicism. Its opposition to migration differs from Carleton, though, to the extent that it is predicated on preserving confessional allegiances rather than social formations of class, on anxieties about the disappearance of the bastion of Protestantism rather than affluent peasant families from either of Ireland's religious traditions. Unlike Carleton or their Irish nationalist counterparts, writers in the *Dublin University Magazine* would demand a renovated, strengthened Union between Great Britain and Ireland as a hedge against a further Protestant exodus. Imperial retrenchment rather than Repeal (or at least a more progressive form of landlordism, as Carleton advocated) was their chosen panacea for population depletion.

Despite these ideological differences, however, the *Dublin University Magazine*'s writers would also invoke the same Gothic discourse and stylistic conventions to oppose emigration as Carleton or their nationalist adversaries. For example, the *DUM* would stigmatise the Protestant exodus as 'unnatural' and a social abomination through recourse to the same Gothic imagery and corporeal metaphors of blood-letting and collective anaemia employed by Carleton in the Emigrants of Ahadarra. Thus, the ongoing outflow of Protestants from Ireland, the *DUM* would lament at some length, is an "evil" that is "gradually increasing":

[For]the stream is widening its banks every successive year, so as to promise to exhaust before long the whole Protestant population by its increasing drain; it is a slowly consuming and wasting malady that is working its noiseless and secret way through the land; and as consumption in the human form pales the cheek of beauty and prostrates the strength of

youth, and then gradually and almost imperceptibly draws its victims unresisting to the grave, so is this evil, breaking and rendering powerless the Protestant interest, and promises so to waste its once mighty energies, that day after day it becomes weaker and weaker, and so will, almost without a struggle, vanish from the land ("On the Emigration of the Protestants," 471).

In short, there can be no preservation "of the Protestant interest, *when those who are the bone and sinew of that body shall have abandoned the country for ever*". What emerges here, then, is a succession of extended and overlapping metaphors for population depletion and social enervation, in which the tenor of Protestant migration is equated first with a form of haemorrhaging, drainage, and anaemic loss of blood, then secondly, in pathological terms, with a form of disease that has all of the attendant imagery of consumption. But both cases are rendered with such Gothic overtones of foreboding and evanescent malice that these initial metaphors for the migratory process become compounded with a sense of moral agency, yet another lurking figure of vampirism to complete the equation of Protestant out-migration with a sinister loss of blood and social withering. Furthermore, like in Carleton's novel, each of the three vehicles for the metaphor of Protestant out-migration and diminution of the 'Protestant interest' here -- as haemorrhaging, consumption, and vampirism -- foreground its *abnormality*, its aberrant rather than routine occurrence within the imperial circulation of peoples and commerce. Finally, then, whereas Carleton resorts to Gothic metaphors of fluidity to lament the loss of an independent Catholic yeomanry ostensibly at the heart of the Irish nation, here it is the migration of the lower class of Protestants that is figuratively seen, as a form of haemorrhaging, to curtail the life span of the Union. In both cases, though, the Irish nation or the Irish Union is envisioned as equally passive and helpless before the very population losses that would inevitably hasten its own demise.

If we turn now to more recent perceptions of refugees 'flooding into Ireland', the Irish nation is similarly envisioned as passive, porous, and subject to external migratory controls, albeit for very different reasons. For whereas in the mid-nineteenth century, metaphors for migration were entirely constructed in terms of national depletion, fluid seepage, and loss, the reverse flow of increasing asylum-seekers into Ireland tends to be imagined as a form of immigrant inundation, a population stream that threatens to *drown* the nation in place of its traditional drainage. Underlying this change in perceptions, I have suggested, is a discourse transformation in which Gothic Supernaturalism gradually gives way to Natural Selection in conditioning metaphors of fluidity for Irish migratory processes. Against the backdrop of Ireland's transition from an emigrant to an immigrant host society, an emergent discourse of Social Darwinism has gradually superseded its Gothic predecessor, to reconstruct Irish migratory processes in terms of 'floods', 'tides', and as a variant of natural disaster. Under this rubric of Social Darwinism, immigrants to Ireland, mainly asylum-seekers and refugees, are associated not with human rights violations but economic survival strategies, competition for limited resources, and outright opportunism, as the 'spillover' of other nations' poverty that puts Ireland's capacity to sustain its own populace under strain. Accordingly, in the period between the Famine and the Dublin Convention, 'haemorrhaging' has gradually given way to 'sponging', 'vampirism' to 'parasitism', 'blood-lines' to the 'dole-queue', and more recently, the 'brain drain' to a 'traffickers' haven', as dominant images for would-be migrants in the popular conception and collective perceptions of population displacement. In other words, what surfaces here is a series of paradoxically *mixed metaphors* for migratory self-selection, conveying the impression that 'back then' it was always the most enterprising who left, whereas now it is always the least enterprising who would come.

Evidence of this Social Darwinist mindset is more than apparent in recent press coverage and theatrical productions about asylum-seekers and refugees. As Andy Pollak (1998: 15) alleges, "sensational headlines, misleading statistics, unsourced claims, and often plain demonising of asylum-seekers" have frequently marked this press coverage, especially that of the Independent Newspaper Group. For example, calamitous imagery equating recent immigration with a form of natural disaster has been the recurrent theme in headlines such as "5000 Refugees flooding into Ireland,"[47] and "Demand to curb… tide on refugees".[48] The ensuing apprehension of strained resources informs further headlines like "Services face overload as refugee flood continues,"[49] "Refugee Flood to spark home crisis,"[50] "Asylum seekers and homeless vie for shelter,"[51] and "Crackdown on 2000 sponger refugees"[52] The dominant themes that emerge here are those of a resource burden and burgeoning criminality, both of which come together under the notional banner 'refugee crime-wave'. Even more inflammatory are alarmist headlines that implicitly link the two to augur social extinction, such as "Refugee rapist on the rampage"[53] and "Refugees flooding maternity hospitals,"[54] that incite fear of

[47] *Irish Independent*, 29 May, 1997.
[48] *Sunday World*, 20 May, 1997.
[49] *Sunday Business Post*, 18 May, 1997
[50] *Irish Independent*, 12 June, 1997.
[51] *Irish Times*, 9 May, 1997.
[52] *Irish Independent*, 7 June, 1997.
[53] *The Star*, 13 June, 1997.
[54] *Evening Herald*, 6 June, 1997.

racial contamination in the very act of inhibiting the host population's capacity to reproduce itself.

What entails from such calamitous imagery, then, is a growing sense of necessity for extraordinary measures and the use of discretionary powers to 'contain' the refugee crisis, including the suspension of statutory protections for asylum-seekers in the delayed implementation of the Irish Refugee Act. In times of crisis and natural disaster, in other words, the nation must resort to contingency measures it normally would not countenance to ensure its self-preservation. Calamity, contingency, the threat of extinction, the struggle for reproduction, and instinctive self-preservation: all of these, of course, are variants of a principle of Natural Selection within a larger Social Darwinist discourse.

The influence of Social Darwinism on the public perception of refugees in Ireland is also the subject of Donal O'Kelly's play *Asylum! Asylum!* (1993). O'Kelly's play was written well before the onset of the refugee crisis, but it anticipates many of its themes, inflammatory tone, and conventions of representation. The play is a work of Agitation Propaganda that pits Joseph Omara, a refugee from Uganda, against Leo and Pillar, both of them ambitious Irish immigration officers who seek to deport Joseph as part of larger European project of sweeping expulsions and boundary consolidation. As the drama unfolds, its central conflict increasingly hinges on contested definitions of refugee status: the story of a Ugandan in Ireland whose right to remain depends solely upon whether he is perceived to be an economic alien, or a genuine asylum-seeker fleeing from a well-founded fear of persecution abroad. Joseph's adversaries, then, articulate their mission in familiar terms of disaster prevention and national self-preservation; they envision themselves as a bulwark against the aforementioned danger of 'immigrant floods,' 'a swamped continent', and 'leaky sections in the walls of Fortress Europe' (153).

Behind their calamitous metaphors of fluidity, however, lies the more stark, socio-economic parlance of limited resources, unemployment, immanent overpopulation, and the prevailing assumption that "there's no room for anybody else… [Europe's] full up" (120). Indeed, according to Pillar, the ultimate "criterion for enforcement of [Ireland's] immigration barrier" (165) is, quite simply: "survival… survival of the fittest… [For] everybody knows it's a jungle out there" (167). Ireland's immigration policy and a discourse of Social Darwinism thus coalesce, once again, as explicitly linked manifestations of a prevailing ideology of natural selection. 'Survival of the fittest' is merely transplanted from competing organisms to sovereign nations and blocs of nations in the ever present struggle against the threat of extinction.

Where *Asylum! Asylum!* founders, however, I want to suggest, is in its treatment of illegality. For although Joseph Omara admits to having been a "small-time smuggler" (151) and petty criminal in Uganda, his case nevertheless remains unassailable no matter how narrowly one construes the definition of refugee status: he bears visible signs of torture (123); suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (128-129); has come to Ireland directly from a notorious refugee producing area, without passing through any ostensible Safe Third Country that would make him subject to exclusion under the Dublin Convention; and he is befriended by Irish nationals, including members of Dublin's legal establishment. The play's dramatic irony thus hinges on a discrepancy between the immigration officers' perceptions of Joseph as a "chancer" (124), a story-teller, and a master of "the immigrant's twist and turns" (145), and the inference the audience inevitably draws that he is, *without doubt*, a genuine refugee. In other words, what the play is agitating for is that Ireland should uphold its self-acknowledged, forty-year old obligations under international law to receive asylum-seekers, as stipulated in the Geneva Convention.[55]

The point I want to make though is that there should be no occasion for drama here; and the very fact that the play need be written in the first place says something about the sorry state in which Irish immigration and refugee reception is currently envisioned. Moreover, in preaching to the converted with such a loaded scenario, Asylum! Asylum! also effectively obfuscates the more vexing issues surrounding recent Irish immigration, such as, first of all, the nation's glaring lack of any immigration policy whatsoever, determination of absorptive capacity, or statement of a notional desirable rate of increase in lieu of its so-called crisis proportion. Secondly, Ireland's ethical and historical obligations to permit at least a portion of its economic aliens and non-coerced migrants humanitarian leave to remain, in conjunction with its robust economic expansion that increasingly implicates Ireland in a growing network of socio-economic disparities world-wide. As Phil Marfleet (1996: 6) remarks, "differentiation between 'economic' migrants, 'refugees' and others [remains] meaningful only for those most determined to perpetuate systems of exclusion". By viewing Ireland's immigration strictly through the lens of human rights violations and refugees, *Asylum! Asylum*! usefully encapsulates the very limited parameters in which the entire debate is currently framed. It is, after all, very easy for Ireland to insist it is being flooded with immigrants, in the absence of any normative criterion or water marker by which to measure its population overflow.

In conclusion, in a spirit of intervention, I would like to suggest that the point here is not to refute but to *refigure* these metaphors of fluidity, in a manner more sympathetic to the plight of Ireland's

[55] The Geneva Convention is shorthand here for both the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and its 1967 Protocol.

economic aliens, asylum-seekers, and refugees. In *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), Lakoff and Johnson (1980) state that "metaphors may create realities for us, especially social realities". "In most cases," they add, "what is at issue is not the truth or falsity of a metaphor but the perceptions and inferences that follow from it and the actions that are sanctioned by it" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 156; 158).

"We… pay the cost of this bad [press] coverage," confirms Khaled Ibrahim of ARASI,[56] for "it leads to attacks from people who don't know the reality" (*Irish Times*, February 25, 1998, 10). Metaphors of fluidity, like that of refugees flooding into Ireland, thus generate a network of social entailments that incur hostility towards would-be migrants, bring pressure to bear on governmental agencies to control and contain the perceived immigration influx, and even give rise to a backlash against visible minorities long settled and established in the country, all because of often misleading presumptions about their economic impact upon Irish society. And yet, most demographic pronouncements about population excess in twentieth-century Ireland, notes J.J. Lee, contain a "number of silent assumptions, untested empirically," that appear untenable by any comparative criterion (Lee, 1989: 381).

By the same token, Ireland's refugee crisis involves such a small order of magnitude on a comparative European or global basis, that it seems more the result of bureaucratic inertia and discretionary policy than any failure in the nation's absorptive capacity to take in would-be migrants. What follows is that Ireland suffers from a form of metaphorical rather than population excess.[57] We need therefore to reconfigure established metaphors for Irish migration, perhaps even viewing recent immigrants as a badly needed transfusion of people and labour supply to help fuel Ireland's continuing robust economic growth. Likewise, the Canadian journalist Victor Malarek's prognosis of the so-called Canadian 'refugee-crisis' in the late 1980s has equal bearing on Ireland today:

> although the number of people claiming refugee status has been growing, -- Malarek writes -- compared with the thousands accepted by [other] European nations, the [Irish] wave is more like a cresting stream; compared with front-line Third World countries, with millions of refugees confined to camps, it is [but] a trickle (Malarek, 1987: 129-130)

The reconfiguration here of more established metaphors of fluidity, replacing 'floods and tides' with 'streams and trickles', contests the social reality and economic anxieties they construct. It enables a new, comparatively adjusted perspective on Ireland's immigrant reception, hopefully one that is more sympathetic and less antagonistic towards asylum-seekers and refugees. For whether the traditional metaphors it would replace appear Gothic or Social Darwinist in tone, they have left a misleading impression about the underlying causes, consequences, and order of magnitude of Irish migratory processes.

[56] Association of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Ireland.

[57] "Less amenable to calamitous imagery," suggests Rosemary Byrne, is the mundane reality of "administrative paralysis" that remains the underlying cause of the "Irish crisis" (110).

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Social distance and language training: a case study of the Irish-Vietnamese community

Vera Sheridan

Introduction

The origins of this case study lie in a period of English language teaching dating from September 1995 until March 1998 encompassing a psycho-social group study using Schumann's classic study of Alberto as a model (Schumann 1976, 1978). The students at the Vietnamese English Language Centre were young Vietnamese and Vietnamese/Chinese adults living in Dublin, where they had resettled as part of family reunification. Their rate of second language learning should have progressed very quickly in such an ideal learning situation. However, this was not the case and so were there any social factors to account for the phenomenon? Some students were perfectly capable but did not wholeheartedly embrace the new language. This was despite its importance for their future if they were going to go on to further training and seek employment outside the traditional ones in the restaurant and take-away business in their own community. As psychological states are difficult to evaluate and given the lack of a translator from outside the community, I decided to focus on social distance (Schumann 1976, 1978). However, this does not imply that psychological factors were absent as some students undergo a change in personality or fail to sustain their motivation. There seemed to be *no one single* factor which stood out with regard to this situation but some combination of factors which interacted to produce language learning that did not seem to progress as would be expected given that these students were residing in the host country. For the purposes of this conference I will concentrate principally on the social factors after a brief overview of the theoretical framework to the study.

Ethnicity

The ebb and flow of individuals across the 'ethnic boundaries' that Barth speaks of (Barth 1969: 9) does not imply that after time these social boundaries are worn away. These invisible lines of difference remain despite changes in individuals' lives such as groups of people thrown together during a process of accommodation to a new country, its language, culture and the thorny issue of interacting with its people. We need to ask what this means for a group and also for an individual in that group. What relevance does it have to the Vietnamese living here and to the individuals in our study? For group identity Barth states:

> Categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained *despite* changing participation and membership in the course of individual life histories (Barth 1969:9-10).

In other words, one group can be in regular contact with another, socially and through employment for example but will still maintain separate identities. Also some activities will mean incorporation of the smaller group into the larger as in a national education system. Exclusion can mean some intangible bar to employment or not socialising in certain ways. Relationships are built because of movement between the lines of demarcation as it is only through such interactions that relatioships are forged and identities maintained:

> ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and acceptance but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on which embracing social systems are built. Interaction in such a social system does not lead to its liquidation through change and acculturation; cultural differences can persist despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence (Barth 1969: 10).

So it is simplistic to assume that a national policy of dispersal of a group for example will mean that it is assimilated into the larger group. Nor does accepting a group mean that it will be subsumed by the group accepting it. Finally, for Barth there is the recognition by members within a group that they are of the same kind. This allows for a variety of social relationships in the group based on the same criteria. However, recognising others who are different:

> implies a recognition of limitations on shared understandings, differences in criteria for judgement of value and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common understanding and mutual interest (Barth 1969: 15).

The individual within a group is bound by the group but can also cross the boundary for social relations with members of another group where the differences are recognised but social rules make contact possible. However, the individual is still part of a particular group and would generally behave as such. This is an important point as it is a source of origin and continuity. Barth states:

> Since belonging to an ethnic category implies being a certain kind of person, having that basic identity, it also implies a claim to be judged and to judge oneself by those standards that are relevant to that identity (Barth 1969: 14).

This is a fundamental point that Barth makes because if contacts and judgements are based on the rules of another group then they are inherently wrong and can lead to totally spurious judgements. Certainly, social interactions may be played by the rules of the dominant group but this needs to be recognised and accepted by both sides. We can see this in Barth's example of the minority situation of the Lapps in Norwegian society. Barth rightly points out that participation in the larger society was based on the institutions of that society. He states:

> This system has not, until very recently, taken ethnic identity into account in its structure… there was practically no place in it where one could participate *as a Lapp*. Lapps as Norwegian citizens, on the other hand, are perfectly free to participate, though under the dual disability of peripheral location and inadequate command of Norwegian language and culture (Barth 1969: 32).

This is the central issue that needs to be addressed in relation to the Vietnamese community in Ireland. Can they function as *Vietnamese* or *Vietnamese/Chinese* in Irish society or must everything be carried out according to the majority societyís terms of reference?

Do the Vietnamese satisfy group and individual criteria in order to be called an ethnic group? We can safely say 'yes' if we consider the following points. When the original refugees arrived they were dispersed throughout the country (McGovern 1993: 102) but were not assimilated. Though it may appear strange nowadays to discuss a notion such as assimilation it has to be referred to as it appears to have been the original policy. Rather most people have migrated to Dublin and are mainly self-employed. This is a route taken by many minority groups as they find themselves somehow excluded from the economic life of the host society as, for example, the Vietnamese in Holland (Truong Van Binh, 1993). There is a new phenomenon of young men or women who have lived in Ireland since 1979 or arrived through family reunification looking for marriage partners. They do not generally marry within the wider community. They marry individuals from Vietnam or China so that they are not assimilated though this practice brings problems of its own particularly as marriage partners cannot bring family to Ireland and so are completely dependent on their spouse's family. The mother tongue is thus maintained at home as both parents speak Vietnamese or Chinese (Cantonese and Mandarin) and often Hakka. Children born into the family are consequently bilingual, speaking Vietnamese or Chinese at home or in the Vietnamese community, and using English for interactions with Irish society. We can therefore say that ethnic identity is maintained. As Barth rightly argues, this means that identity does not remain static but is subject to all the pressures that are brought to bear on it in changing circumstances:

> There will be variation between members, some showing many and some showing few characteristics. Particularly where people change their identity, this creates ambiguity since ethnic membership is at once a question of source of origin as well as of current identity (Barth 1969: 29).

This ambiguity is present in Schumann's work and also presents itself in the data particularly with individuals who could be excellent second language speakers but who seem to stop short of a fully -fledged commitment to the new language. Indeed, Barth's work seems particularly relevant to an Irish context as Irish society perceives itself as being an unusually homogenous entity and consequently, attempts to gain access to it must require a sustained effort on the part of the 'outsider.' There must be a feeling that such effort is worthwhile and will lead to participation within the larger society which understands the minority position. Such understanding creates the enabling paths to integration or else frustration and misunderstanding will follow.

Examining the larger framework: Ireland and the EU

We have been focusing on the ethnic group within the boundaries of the large dominant group, namely Irish society itself. We thus need to examine the official attitude to those who migrate to Ireland, and we can consider enforced migration from the country of origin in this context, as well as the secondary development from that situation which is family reunification. As Ireland is a member of a wider grouping, the European Union, we can chart the official response to migration and thus to 'outsiders.' Once 'others' come within the social system they require access to employment, training, education for themselves and their children and such issues have preoccupied the Union since freedom of movement became one of the cornerstones of the EU.

Following Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 concerning the free movement of workers within the Community, the Council of Ministers issued a Directive on 25 July 1977 on the education of children of migrant workers. The Directive was adopted in order to clarify the legal content of Article 12 of the 1968 Regulation which stated:

> The children of a national of a Member State who is or has been employed in the territory of another Member State shall be admitted to that State's general educational, apprenticeship and vocational training courses under the same conditions as the nationals of that State, if such

children are residing in its territory (Regulation [EEC] No 1612/68).

As a Regulation in the EU is legally binding in its entirety and is directly applicable in all Member states (UNHCR, 1995, Chapter 1), it was necessary to redefine any areas which appeared problematical. This was the purpose of the Directive, itself legally binding, but the manner of implementation is left to the discretion of each Member State.

The 1977 Directive applied to children of compulsory school age and specifically referred in Article 2 to 'the teaching - adapted to the specific needs of such children - of the official language of the host State' and also to 'the measures necessary for the training and further training of the teachers who are to provide this tuition,' and in Article 3 to: 'promote, in coordination with normal education, teaching of the mother tongue and culture of the country of origin (*Official Journal of the European Communities*, No L199/32 6.8.77).

Finally, the Directive stated in Article 4 that these measures were to be achieved within 4 years by Member States and that Member States were also to inform the Commission of all 'laws, regulations and administrative or other provisions' which they adopted. Article 5 stipulated that within 5 years the Commission was to receive all the necessary information so that it could report back to the Council of Ministers on the implementation of this piece of legislation.

This Directive laid down a clear foundation which could be adopted by each Member State within its own educational framework, namely specially adapted teaching of the host language, teacher training and finally the teaching of the mother tongue and culture. All of this was to be achieved in a reasonable time span as it affected children of compulsory school age. As one of the key policies of the EU has been the movement of labour within Member States, then, naturally, educational measures have to be implemented, not only to facilitate this, but also to recognise the diversity of languages and cultures within Member States. Indeed, the European Parliament, which does not have general legislative powers, tabled Resolutions on the education of children of migrant workers on 18 September 1981 and 16 April 1985. On the 9 May 1985 it tabled a Resolution on 'Guidelines for a Community policy on Migration' and yet again on 10 April 1987 on the education of migrant workers. Though these resolutions are not legally binding, the European Parliament does act as a forum for concerned debate and as a political driving force so the sheer number of these Resolutions indicates concern.

In 1981 the European Parliament voiced its concern over those Member States who were delaying the implementation of the directive as well as asking the Commission to take direct action against them. Most importantly, the 1981 Resolution noted that some Member States had extended the scope of the 1977 Directive to cover the education of children of non-member States and asked that:

> the field of application of the directive should be extended to cover the children of migrant workers from non-member countries so as to eliminate any difference in treatment between them and the children of migrant workers from member States of the Community, and that the directive should also encompass nursery education (9322/81 Resolution on the Education of the Children of Migrant Workers).

The 16 April 1985 Resolution noted that the numbers of children of migrant workers were increasing and that though these children were mainly not going to return to their parents' country they should still have linguistic and cultural links with their former country. It noted that as many migrant workers were:

> cut off from society, in their host countries, the educational problems of their children are particularly complex." (*Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C122/62, point E).

The Resolution reiterated the need for teacher training, mechanisms for recognising teaching qualifications, terms of employment, a syllabus and further training to prepare the proper administrative mechanisms to implement these measures. Finally, in a fundamental shift of policy direction the Resolution called on Member States:

> to extend, as some already have done either fully or partially, the provisions of the directive in question to the children of residents of all ethnic minority groups whose language or culture differs from that of the indigenous community amongst whom they reside. Urges further, that this should be done irrespective of whether these ethnic minority residents have citizenship of the country in which they are living and even if they are permanently settled (*Official Journal of the European Communities,* No C122/63, point 6).

If we look at the 9 May 1985 Resolution, we see that it laments the lack of implementation of the 1977 directive and also mentions new areas of concern. These range from the problems of racism and unemployment to the mantra of calling for the teaching of the mother tongue. The Resolution states that teaching the mother tongue should be part of the school curriculum and the teaching of language and culture should be in school time. This ought to be extended to the children of migrant workers of third

countries as well. The Resolution also departed from the notion of assimilation and instead spoke of the:

> launching of educational and cultural policy that takes account of the diverse groups and thus prompts integration which does not mean total assimilation but rather openness, growth and respect for the variety of cultural identities (*Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C141/466, 10.6.85).

By 1987 the 10 April Resolution argues strongly for the Commission to act with regard to the implementation of the 1977 Directive, stating that:

> technical, administrative and financial difficulties are not used as a pretext for devaluing the innovative and democratic provisions contained in it; in order to thwart any such tendencies which run counter to the spirit of the Directive and the philosophy behind it, the Commission must take action to ensure that it is implemented throughout the community (*Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C125/168 11.5.87).

The Resolution also noted a lack of teacher training some 10 years after the Directive.

The 1977 Directive laid down that there were to be regular reports regarding its implementation and we shall look at the 3 reports published so far, namely the 1982, the 1989 and the 1994 report. Countries replied individually to the first 2 reports. In Ireland the 1982 report was prepared by a retired civil servant and it was used again in 1989 by the Commission. This was because the Irish government of the time did not reply to the questionnaire sent out by the Commission in 1985 in order to obtain data for the 1989 report. The 1989 report looked for measures taken in Ireland which were favourable to the children of migrant workers. If we consider the three basic principles of the 1977 Directive then we can see what was achieved.:

- Specially adapted teaching of the host language:
  A few reception classes are arranged for Vietnamese refugees (Commission of the European communities Report on the implementation in the Member States of Directive 77/486/EEC on the education of the children of migrant workers,1989: 82).
- Teacher training:
  since there are so few immigrant children and they are widely scattered no special training has been initiated (ibid)
- For the teaching of the mother tongue and culture the French and German schools are mentioned.

The 1994 report departed from the country by country format and produced a comprehensive analysis of the situation. One of the main thrusts of the document is the movement away from treating the issue as something separate and moving towards intercultural education for all. By this is meant:

> a set of educational practices designed to encourage mutual respect and understanding among all pupils, regardless of their cultural, linguistic, ethnic or religious background. Without glossing over differences or even conflicts between cultures, the approach aims at helping pupils, through the study of cultures, to discover the factors that unite and differentiate humankind... (Commission of the European Communities COM (94), Report on the education of Migrant children in the European Union, p 17).

The Report points to the improvement of the education of immigrant children regardless of where they come from (ibid, point 15: 4) so that there is no discrimination as:

> The Community has always been a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic entity whose diversity enriches the community itself and benefits all its citizens but not without creating challenges for society as a whole and its immigrant communities (ibid, point 17, p 5).

In conclusion, we have to say that no mention is made of the Vietnamese as a minority group with specific educational needs in the 1995 White Paper on Education: Charting Our Education Future. Paradoxically, the Department of Education extended a service to include Vietnamese children at primary level in October 1993 (Brennan1994). This was a service originally launched in 1992 for the children of Bosnian programme refugees. The Department of Education thus acknowledged in I993 that there was some kind of problem with Vietnamese children despite the fact that some of those children were born in the state. We have to wonder about the statement in the Refugee Agency Annual Report (1995) that: ‘the Vietnamese community are now well established in Ireland (Refugee Agency 1995: 12). They may have been here for some time but their status as a minority group in Irish society has yet to be fully addressed.

The Vietnamese/Chinese community in Ireland

So far we have spoken of the 'Vietnamese community', which implies a neat homogenous group. In fact, the original 'boat people' accepted by the Irish government of the day in 1979 were a heterogeneous group (Dean, 1983; McGovern, 1993) of Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese. Dean (1983: 73) stated that one

of the immediate requirements of the group was ‘economic survival’ and that consequently language learning was seen as something of a luxury. This seemed to be particularly the case with those people originating from the former North Vietnam where: ‘consolidation of the political doctrine of communism allied to military activity took precedence over education beyond the meagre minimum (Dean 1983: 74).

They would be in stark contrast with the ethnic Chinese from the former South Vietnam characterised as coming ‘from one of the oldest and most sophisticated Overseas Chinese communities in the world. The Vietnamese Chinese community had a very rich and well-educated elite, a strong organisational structure, and their own Standard Chinese schools (Pieke & van den Berg 1993: 284-285).

Dean (1983: 72) does point out, however, that the Chinese schools were closed down in 1975 so that there were educational 'problems' within this group. We can thus see that within this group, united by their common experience of being refugees, there were already the seeds of particular educational needs if second language learning was to be successful. Both Dean and McGovern (1993, 1994) say that these challenges were not met at the outset.

The students in the present study reflect the mixture of linguistic backgrounds as already outlined. On arrival, some were monolingual speakers of Vietnamese while others had more complex linguistic histories. Of these, there are ethnic Chinese from Vietnam who speak Vietnamese but not Chinese and there are ethnic Chinese born in Vietnam but who fled to China in 1979 and have been educated in China but have a smattering of Vietnamese in which they are not literate. Older family members would be literate in both languages. Those educated in China speak Cantonese but also know Standard Chinese or Mandarin, which is taught throughout China. Some of these students have to learn the Roman alphabet, though those students educated to a good standard in China do know the phonetic symbols used in standard EFL textbooks. Yet others speak Cantonese, Standard Chinese through education and also Hakka as the first language. Hakka is a Chinese dialect spoken by a minority in South-East China, including Hong Kong and Singapore. For example, Hakka speakers communicate with each other in Hakka, with other Chinese students in Cantonese and if they have a knowledge of spoken Vietnamese can also talk with the monolingual Vietnamese students. There is thus great linguistic diversity and interaction among the group of students learning English in this particular study.

Vietnamese speakers will use Standard Vietnamese though there are 3 dialects: Hanoi, Hue and Saigon. However, Truong van Binh (1993) writes that the partition of Vietnam in 1954 ‘left ... a deep mark on the development of the modern Vietnamese language (Truong van Binh 1993, p 310). For example, he cites the use of the Vietnamese word for 'comrade' which replaced the complex system of traditional forms of address. As Vietnamese uses Quoc Ngu or Romanized Vietnamese (developed in the seventeenth century by French Jesuit Alexandre de Rhodes and replacing Han or Classic Chinese and Nom or Ideographic Vietnamese in 1918), students have no problem with the writing system but rather with pronunciation. Vietnamese speakers also have divisions according to whether they are Buddhist or Catholic and from the north or the south of the country.

The new brides, who have been a feature during the school years 1995-6 and 1996-7 are different again. Brides from Vietnam may already have prepared themselves by following an English course prior to their arrival in Ireland. This is not necessarily the case for brides from China though English is taught at secondary school. However, these young brides quickly become pregnant and so are easily lost to the system. It is difficult for them to return to English language classes as there are no creche facilities. Also, parents-in-law may be learning English at the same time. Then the only way a young mother can return is if the in-laws sacrifice English language lessons in favour of the younger family member. This in itself may not turn out to be long-term solution so that grandparents disappear to mind the baby at home and economic necessity forces the mother to abandon lessons and contribute instead to the family income. Fathers, of course, will also disappear as they too try to support their young family and some fathers simply ‘give up’ on the language in order to concentrate on their economic role in the kitchen of a restaurant or takeaway where there is no possibility of improvement. Indeed, a good language learner, the aunt to one young baby more or less sacrificed her own learning in favour of the mother and her sister by minding the baby in class. This way all the family members could attend English lessons, which were seen as a high priority but attendance could only be achieved at some cost. As this was a small family group there was no other solution to their dilemma such as grandparents or any other extended family member.

We can thus see even from a few examples the tight family structure that exists and the loyalties within it. Where it is possible students will work part-time as well as attempt to keep up language study. However, this means that there is no time for homework and attendance can also be affected by tiredness. As the family network stretches back to Vietnam or China there is pressure to support this unit as well. The *necessity* to earn money will be put before English language classes. This of course does not bode well for the learning of English and restricts job opportunity to the restaurant and take-away business. We can see similarities with Truong's (1993) account of the pressures encountered by the few

Vietnamese educated beyond second level in Holland in the 1980's. They were forced: 'to switch their study plans to the 'loempia' business (loempia: spring roll)' Truong 1993: 316). There are those in the community here who may have gone on to second level but not finished their studies and though they may be unwilling to say why one strong possibility is the requirements of the family business. This reference to the 'spring roll' business echoes a reference to the Vietnamese/Chinese community living in Ireland in the OECD's 1994 Annual Report on Trends in International Migration. This was the first year of such reporting by Ireland, which has thus acknowledged the importance of migration to the Republic. In the section on foreign population in Ireland the following comment is made:

> Another significant (but smaller group) consists of self-employed proprietors in the catering trade (mainly from Asia) who may also employ unskilled manual workers of the same nationalities (*Trends in International Migration*, Annual Report, OECD, 1995: 7).

The Vietnamese/Chinese community is thus officially acknowledged as a minority group in Irish society. They arrived two years after the 1977 EU Directive.

Research findings: an introduction

The research was proposed to students after a year of working with them when a situation of mutual trust had been established as they were very distrustful of outsiders and officialdom to whom they gave polite answers. It was also carried out on a basis of anonymity as the community is so small. The results are best considered on a qualitative basis because of the few participants involved. A questionnaire was given to 22 students involving 23 questions some of which used a rating scale though most were direct and a few were open-ended inviting students to add their own comments. This approach was taken in the light of findings by Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980) as they found the use of direct measurement to be the most successful in their research on English attainment at secondary level in Hong Kong.

Questionnaire 1: June 1996, 22 respondents

The first point was to see what reasons gave people a feeling of self-worth in their own country prior to coming to Ireland. It is necessary to ask this question because there is a life rooted in the 'before' by which the 'after' or the new life is finally judged. 10 people felt that their importance or self-worth was due to three factors in their former country of residence: job, family and language. It is likely that these factors also contribute to their sense of ease in Irish society. Most people already have some family here so therefore language and a job are factors which we need to be alert to in the results. Also there must be a level of sustained long-term motivation in order to succeed in both language study and further vocational training with the national training agency. Previous efforts with vocational training had not generally been successful, due in large measure to the national training agency's lack of understanding over many years of the necessity of providing further language support in English as a second language. There was thus an air of uncertainty regarding training especially when past students recounted their failures or expressed their outright hostility to a process which they had succumbed to and which they felt neither understood nor wanted them. A former student, a chef, describes his situation: 'I hate my job. But I'm an Asian boy. What can I do?' The kind of 'ad hoc' approach that Cohen and Joly (1989a) describe undermines the whole enterprise from the beginning.

Though 6 individuals most definitely wanted to leave their former country and become part of Irish society they also wanted to keep their own language and culture. Nobody was prepared to sacrifice either in order to gain membership of Irish society. They were ready to integrate but not be assimilated. This was also the case in Meisel's (1977) study where the Spanish-speaker solved the problem of second generation language loss by returning his daughter to Spain to continue her education. The Vietnamese/Chinese minority group has 142 children (Refugee Agency, 1995) growing up in this society where they do not have *equal* access to both their cultures. Vietnamese children born here speak Vietnamese as their L1 and often learn English at school which creates difficulties for many of them (Brennan, 1993) particularly as literacy in the L1 is not developed in school. Such youngsters are occasionally encountered at the Language Centre when students mind younger relatives during shorter school holidays. Such children are unused to praise for being bilingual or being consulted about their feelings concerning their dual inheritance. One young boy was asked if he liked speaking Vietnamese. 'Don' like it' was his response but his whole demeanour changed when asked if he would like to learn to read and write *both* his languages at school. Developing literacy with both languages creates stable bilingualism as Gardner and Lambert (1972) demonstrate in their Maine studies. It also avoids problems of identity associated with the students in Gardner and Lambert's Louisiana study. Siegel (1997) believes that literacy in the first language aids the learning of the second. If issues regarding ethnic identity are not taken seriously by the majority society then we can see how situations arise such as Taylor (1977: 70) describes where: 'feeling one's ethnic identity threatened served as a deterrent to bilingualism.'

Other people gave more ambiguous answers and we have to bear in mind that they are answering the question after arrival in the host country. 15

people felt they did not really want to leave their former country but at the same time 9 of them were ready to become members of Irish society with 2 'maybes' and the rest not knowing. Such ambiguity indicates conflict of some kind regarding identity, as the host country is not completely rejected. Where we have an indication of such conflict then we have to ask how much contact exists between the majority and minority groups. Taylor (1977: 70) demonstrates the importance of intergroup contact as the greater the contact the less threatening each group is to the other: 'Where contact was high, there was little fear of identity loss in general, and certainly no special concern about the effect of learning English on one's ethnic identity.

There is an indication here of social distance as otherwise identity would not be proving so troublesome. There are also many Irish people who are unaware of the existence of the Vietnamese/Chinese community in their society or that 'boat people' came to Ireland as programme refugees. Such general lack of awareness of another culture implies that the institutions of the majority culture have not acted over the years to accommodate it nor raise awareness of its existence. How then do the majority and the minority inform each other of the social rules which make for ease of contact ? By whose rules and on what grounds can social contact be initiated?

Nobody was prepared to give up their language or culture in order to become Irish though everyone wanted their children to speak both the parental mother tongue and English, that is, to have access to both cultures. As we know this clearly does not happen and both Taylor (1977) and Skutnabb-Kangas (1991) believe that only action by the majority society can achieve this. Nobody felt it necessary to restrict their children to only their language so there is an openness of attitude to integration but *on equal terms.* Disregard for this fundamental point is an indication of a majority disregard of the minority group. From private conversations it is something which is keenly felt. We have to remember EU policy regarding maintenance of or access to a former mother tongue in a multicultural setting of equality. How, or if, this is carried out at national level by the host country is very telling of that country's attitude to minority groups. Both Pieke (1993) and Truong (1993) indicate difficulties in this area where the minority community is expected to provide mother tongue classes and draw up its own curriculum when it may not necessarily have such expertise. Verhoeven (1996) states explicitly that it is national policy which determines whether a minority community achieves bilingual literacy. So, for example, we need to ask if a Saturday morning class achieves this aim or a policy which integrates the language, history and culture of the 'other' in mainstream education.

Friendships within the community were the norm with students having friends from their own culture. The Language Centre provided a ready source of friends for new arrivals, particularly the young brides who were coming to a new country, a new family and leaving their own far away. In private moments they would often express their acute loneliness to their teachers as well as confide in them and show family and wedding photos. Sometimes certain behaviour would appear strange but there would eventually be an explanation. For example, one young bride refused to go on any school outings. A teacher discovered that she was very respectful of her new husband's wishes and as he had said that she could go to school she felt unable to include outside activities as part of this. One teacher always stayed behind with her. Contact with school was also important for providing the impetus for parties or large social gatherings outside school which teachers were invited to attend. These would generally be meals with lots of people assembled together and it always provided a relief to see students, older family members and children laughing, joking and being themselves in their own language and culture. Unfortunately, apart from teachers there would often be no other English-speaking people present so it is not surprising that 10 people said they had no Irish friends at all. Everyone felt that they spoke hardly any English after school. For example, when one student was asked how much English he had spoken the previous day the answer was : 'When I went to the shop.' There does appear to be a *social* barrier regarding friendship and the subsequent socialisation which gives the opportunity to speak English. But then as we have already asked: how do you set about talking to Irish people? The students themselves could not answer that question. Both Schumann (1975) and Macnamara (1973) raise the issue of the difficulty of adult socialisation which appears to be compounded by ignorance in this context. The usual source of adult contact is at work but the students who were working were all in the Chinese restaurant or takeaway business which did not give them much opportunity for speaking English. For example, a chef categorically stated that he did not speak English at work whereas a waitress spoke it sometimes. If the place of work does not provide much possibility for speaking English then another barrier to learning and speaking English has been raised.

Finally, 16 people did not visit Irish friends or neighbours and 14 people also *never* went out socially with Irish people. There appears to be little contact with the majority society which further lessens the prospects for socialisation. 10 people said they felt lonely even though they belonged to a Vietnamese or Chinese community here. Loneliness is an issue that surfaces with these young students. The vast majority answering this questionnaire were young adults in their early twenties for whom a social life with friends was of great importance. If asked

what they had done over the weekend the answer would mostly be that they had stayed at home or had made the effort to visit a school friend. It would be noticeable on Monday mornings that students would have to gather their thoughts before speaking English. This would be particularly true for the complete beginner with no English at all. We can say that the trend is for little personal contact with Irish people and this is also true at primary level where Brennan (1983) states that youngsters have "few contacts with native English speakers outside the school context and few opportunities to practice the language they have acquired," {Brennan 1983, p 3-4). She says that primary school children are in fact actively encouraged to socialise within the minority community and family networks and this is borne out from paty photos. We do not know whether this is fear of the majority culture which could erode traditional values or whether it is due to the need to protect youngsters from racism. That racism exists we know from such studies as McVeigh (1992), Gash (1995) and from Fitzgerald's (1992) personal account of being an Asian living in Irish society. Students at the Language Centre have experiences ranging from offensive remarks to sustained neighbourhood abuse. Such matters do not favour the kind of social contact that Barth (1969) describes as necessary for building majority and minority relationships.

Questionnaire 2: June 1996, 19 respondents

Everyone had experienced English as being very different from his/her own language and this had caused surprise. Almost everyone also thought that Irish culture was very different from their own, though they did not mind this fact. Interest in the English language was high, with ten people having been keen to learn English prior to coming to Ireland and still keen to do so. Two people who had been less keen felt more motivated now they were living in an English-speaking country. Most interestingly, seven people were only somewhat interested in learning English before coming to Ireland and almost all changed in their motivation on arrival. Though invited to give reasons for the change only four specified their reasons, which are as follows:

- Because the language is a key for my life
- Because I live here
- Because I want to know about Irish culture
- Because I live here for ever. I only can use English in here

We see that desire to learn English is present and that it is a long-term motivation despite evidence for social distance.

Everyone considered it difficult to learn English and gave reasons such as:

- pronunciation, grammar, speak
- no chance to talk in English
- speak, listen, write
- difficult to remember the words
- I think it will take a long time to speak English well, pronunciation
- grammar and pronunciation

With such an acknowledged level of difficulty, motivation would have to be correspondingly high and sustainable which would be possible if there was a clearly identifiable language and training programme producing tangible results evident to members of the group. In this context we can take Peirce's (1995: 17) view of motivation as being an investment for the future full participation in the new society: ‘Learners will expect or hope to have a good return on that investment - a return that will give them access to hitherto unattainable resources.’

If full participation in society is hindered and the situation is not remedied, then ambiguous feelings about the whole process must arise, as well as a more half-hearted approach to the business of language learning. For example, employment is virtually only possible in the restaurant business owned by members of the minority community. There is little emphasise or put much effort into language learning when accommodation to a new society is already psychologically taxing.

Most people were happy to live in Ireland though loneliness did feature: ‘but sometimes I am sad because I missed my friends. Some students felt sad at leaving their own country and also felt this was a cause of illness. Many students have sicknesses, which they did not have before such as travel sickness. There is also a feeling of anger at having to adapt to new situations as in the following: Some students felt sad at leaving their own country and also felt this was a cause of illness. Many students have sicknesses, which they did not have before such as travel sickness. There is also a feeling of anger at having to adapt to new situations as in the following:

- Language
- I'm frustrated"
- I must learn a lot of things

Despite such feelings, most of the students felt they had done something which made them feel more Irish such as:

- change food: Irish food, drinking, go on holiday
- eat hamburgers in McDonalds
- drink milk

Finally, though most people believed their community welcomed Irish people, not everyone considered this to be reciprocated.

Two questions looked to the future: one concerning permanent residence and one marriage. 12 intended to remain in Ireland permanently. Of the others 2 did not know, 2 maybe and 2 were not going to stay. This is an interesting answer when we consider that in the previous questionnaire many had felt that they had not particularly wanted to leave their former country. We had stated that there seemed to

be a certain amount of ambivalence in their attitude to leaving. Yet most want to stay, which still seems to raise questions about identity and adaptation. Finally, when asked about ethnic identity and marriage, 4 people specifically stated that they wanted to marry a Chinese person. Pieke (1993) has emphasised the strength of Chinese identity even in cases of language loss. 9 people did not mind whether the person was Vietnamese or Irish.

Undoubtedly, there are feelings of difficulty, including sickness, though it is difficult to categorise these as culture or language shock. Openness to Irish society and intermarriage was considered, both of which were generally positive and outward looking. There is certainly a process at work of moving from one type of society into another and then having to adjust or rather accommodating both as one is not given up for the other. Indeed, the majority also need to re-evaluate their attitudes and accommodate to a minority group or groups as part of their society which is also a point made by Loh and Li (1978) as well as Skutnabb-Kangas (1991). If we consider that social distance operates not only with those who are on a family reunification programme but for children born here then it is worth heeding Taylor (1977: 70): 'The success or failure of second-language programs is not limited to instructional and learner characteristics, *account must also be taken of the intergroup relations context within which a second-language program operates.* Lopez (1991) supports this judgement in his overview of the situation of language minorities in the United States.

Two Follow-up Questionnaires

These questionnaires were shorter and open-ended with students being invited to give their own opinions.

Further to Social (Distance) Questions, October 1996, 7 respondents

When asked why they wanted to keep their language and culture students stated that they were expressions of national identity. One student gave the following answer: 'your face, your body, your blood says, you are a Chinese or Vietnamese,' which is a very strong statement of identity. It also recognises racial difference which is an issue with students, though questions concerning racism were not specifically sought. Over half of the students were also interested in having their own place of worship. They mostly felt that they did not have their own newspaper for financial reasons, as their numbers did not make it a viable project. It is worth noting that Chinese speakers have access to Hong Kong magazines and popular culture. Vietnamese speakers can receive reading material from relatives in the USA which has large concentrations of Vietnamese as in Texas for example.

Speaking English and having a job were important factors for being part of Irish society. Students gave the following reasons:

- I'm trying to speak more English but I'm not yet to be part of Irish society
- I'm not yet a part of Irish society. I need a job to be part of Irish society

They all experienced difficulty in finding opportunities to speak English after school citing lack of friends, jobs or money to socialise. With one exception everyone had experienced difficulty in finding a job and cited their inadequate English as the main cause. When pressed again to give reasons for not going out with Irish friends, the replies given were a lack of friends, language difficulties, fear and nervousness. Nobody had asked Irish friends out with the exception of one person who was refused. Finally, when asked what would facilitate contact between the two communities, students did not know or thought that language hindered such a step. That is an interesting answer considering that the initial group of programme refugees arrived in 1979.

Further to (Psychological) Distance Questions, October 1996, 6 respondents

Irish culture was felt to be different because Irish people were considered to be more outgoing and also because: 'it's different place, different people. We celebrate New Year. We don't celebration Christmas.'

There were conflicting points of view over the ways Irish people welcome students:

- They invided me to their house and had a cup of tea. Some time I talked with them about school, job and different way.
- No, they don't

Interestingly, one student who had learned English prior to coming to Ireland gave the following reason for doing so: 'I learned English in Vietnam because I wanted understand another language.'

The pressure of learning English is absent here and learning English is an interest that turned out later to have the kind of increased value that Peirce (1995) remarked on.

Permanency of residence produced a variety of answers:

- in here, I've got more freedom
- I don't like to live here for ever because it's quite quiet to me. No job for me and I can't choose the way for the future"
- Not really. Because I don't know my future

Such uncertainty about the whole process of coming to a new country with the potential for a new life, when there has been a community here since 1979, is troubling and must affect second language learning.

Concluding Remarks

The purpose of this research has been the attempt to understand a situation that goes against experience, namely the lack of success of many Vietnamese and Chinese speakers learning English in Ireland. Dean (1983) wrote of the difficulty of finding a context for her research. By placing it in a multi-disciplinary setting we have the means of finding a context, that of a minority group in a largely homogenous society which forms the majority group. In such a situation second language learning is a process beset by many other considerations such as group relations, identity and motivation. Evidence of social distance does not point towards a balanced set of group relations. Thus, if we ask Barth's question of whether a Vietnamese or Chinese person can function as such in the majority society the answer, unfortunately, has to be no. The majority society and its institutions have little awareness of Vietnamese, Vietnamese/Chinese or Chinese social structure, culture or language. They have no status in the majority society so that issues that have flowed over the years from the 1977 EU Directive, the reports and the EU Parliament Resolutions have yet to be acknowledged on a footing of *mutual understanding and respect*. Where such matters have been ignored over the years then it is harder to overcome mistrust.

We have to note that in the present framework there is no unified educational service in this area covering primary, secondary, adult and third level education in a coherent manner. Shockingly, those youngsters who entered the education system at secondary level will say that they are not particularly able as they did not do well at school. When asked if they had extra help the response was no. There is no curriculum or professionally produced local material, which has been tried and tested, to serve the learner. Nunan (1988), for example, presents a flexible system of curriculum development used in the Australian Migrant Education Program. Such a curriculum evolves from the *partnership* of those working and researching this field, a situation which is beyond politics and politicking. Such partnership would no longer come across situations where, for example, a student who is unschooled and illiterate in the mother tongue is asked to learn on the same basis as literate, schooled students who already have some knowledge of the second language. Differing needs have to be analysed, accounted for and appropriate course content be provided for the learner. For example, young adults in the 16-18 age group requiring further second language learning are not appropriately placed in schemes created for English language speakers who left secondary education with no formal qualifications and who may have personal problems. Such examples, of which there are many, do not provide conditions conducive to second language learning nor, unfortunately, do they reveal an understanding of the process.

A minority has to make some adjustments in order to survive and equally majority attitudes need to be accommodating. It is necessary to speak in such terms as otherwise there is no institutional change as Skutnabb-Kangas (1991) notes. We know from Taylor (1977: 67-8) that it is through intergroup relations that attitudes of the majority change. Taylor says: 'the key to promoting effective interethnic group interaction hinges then upon the motivations of the members of both group.'

Indifference at best or hostility from the majority do not inspire motivation from the minority. We know that the students were open to their new society. There has to be reciprocity in such processes or there is an erosion of positive attitudes and sustained motivation. Indeed, during the two years of language learning there is generally considerable motivation shown by virtually all students in the first year of language study. In the second year there is a noticeable waning, absences and dropping out as realities bite at the dreams of the 'new life' and economic pressures take over. We are left with the feeling of 'if only' in the face of avoidable underachievement.

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Steering a course somewhere between hegemonic discourses of Irishness

Breda Gray

> The shift from emigration to immigration is, indeed, an epochal change in European social history over the last 50 years. Perfectly understandably, because of Ireland's belated development, it is only now directly affecting this country (*Irish Times* editorial, Friday, June 6, 1997).
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> "The modern multi-cultural, multi-coloured world has finally hit Dublin and we can no longer see Ireland as a green pasture packed with white faces", says Bobby Eager a prominent immigration lawyer (quoted by Paul Cullen, *Irish Times*, Saturday, May 17, 1997).
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> If you see a country as its people rather than its territory, then, far from being small and well-defined, Ireland has been, for at least 150 years, scattered, splintered, atomised like the windscreen of a crashed car...Ireland is a diaspora, and as such is both a real place and a remembered place, both the far west of Europe and the home back east of the Irish-American (O'Toole 1994, p. 27).

News about immigrants in the media, even when apparently 'neutral', tends to have negative dimensions (van Dijk, forthcoming). Tuen van Dijk's critical study of news reports and their role in the reproduction of 'racial and ethnic inequality' found a systematic negative portrayal of immigration and 'Others' and positive images of 'Us'. The nation, or the 'we', he argues, is either represented as 'victims', or as taking action against the 'threat' of immigration [58]. In this way, discourses of immigration [59] are constitutive of the 'Us', the nation and national identity.

My aim in this paper is to consider the ways in which 'They', whether they be immigrants, refugees or emigrants, are invoked in order to represent an 'Us' and an Irishness for the late twentieth century. There is evidence within some parts of the Irish (print) media of a less straightforward use of Us/Them dichotomy, than that identified by van Dijk. This dichotomy is complicated by representations of immigration as potentially 'enriching' which are evident mainly in the pages of the *Irish Times*. Discourses of Irishness as 'diasporic', most evident in ex-President Mary Robinson's speeches, also emphasize an expansion and enrichment of Irishness through the diaspora [60]. Contemporary discourses of immigration as 'enrichment', and discourses of the diaspora as expanding the boundaries of Irishness, can be seen as different responses to, what Wieviorka calls, the 'crisis of modernity'. I argue in this paper, that they also represent different responses to questions of Irishness in an increasingly globalised era, and at a time when Irishness is being renegotiated north and south of the border.

What is this crisis in modernity? And how does it relate to Ireland? Michel Wieviorka (1998) characterizes the crisis in terms of a general cultural fragmentation that is related to the globalization of the economy, the development of mass society, mass consumption and a weakening of national societies. These processes are seen as leading to a disintegration of nation and state (see also Wieviorka, 1993 and 1996). In many western countries, he argues, 'the state and nation are no longer the territorial, political and symbolic privileged framework for economic, social and cultural life…' (1998, p. 74). There is a crisis then, in the assumed correspondence between economic and social life and between political and cultural life, which have been viewed primarily in terms of the nation-state (ibid.) [61].

Gerard Delanty (1996) locates this discussion in relation to as a crisis in national identity in Western Europe. This is related to a 'new' nationalism, which

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[58] 1. Note, for example, the ways in which some politicians set out to make immigration and asylum seekers an election issue in the 1997 general election campaign, projecting debate about longstanding social inequalities and divisions onto the issue of refugees and immigrants. Thank you to Orla McDonnell for bringing this to my attention.

[59] These discourses are generated largely by politicians and the media. The voices of immigrants and refugees themselves are rarely evident.

[60] Discourses of Irishness as a diasporic identity are also articulated by columnists in the *Irish Times* newspaper, Fintan O'Toole and John Waters in particular.

[61] Alain Touraine argues that '[t]he nation is modernity's political form because it replaces traditions, customs and privileges with an integrated national space reconstructed by a law inspired by the principles of reason' (1995, p. 135).

appeals to identity more than ideology [62], and whose 'Other' is more likely to be immigrants, than other nation-states [63]. Like Wieviorka, he argues that there has been a decoupling of the nation from the state. New nationalisms are arising from below and are often articulated against the state, for example, the rise of militias in the United States (ibid.). However, the crisis of national identity, for Delanty, is less about increased immigration, than the alienation and frustration arising from inequalities, social divisions and social exclusion. In other words, the national welfare state appears to have contributed little to the promotion of social citizenship and an inclusive national belonging. One response is to project the dissatisfactions that arise from continuing social divisions and exclusions onto refugees and immigrants.

In this paper, I use the term 'discourse' to mean a way of constructing, organizing and classifying society. Following Foucault, I see it as an active political force that systematically produces, rather than reflects, 'the objects of which we speak' (1972, p. 49). In this way, it is possible to see discourses of diaspora and immigration as producing Irishness in the 1990s in particular ways. Teun A. van Dijk (forthcoming) argues that in a context of 'new racism' which is based on *difference* (often focussing on cultural incomensurability and the perceived social deficiencies of certain groups), and not on notions of *biological inferiority*, the symbolic and discursive take on a new significance. [64] Politics and the media represent important discursive sites within which 'difference' is constructed and reconstructed.

Discourses of immigration and of diaspora in Ireland are deeply ambivalent. This is because they often involve the negotiation of two competing hegemonic discourses of Irishness. One is a 'postcolonial' discourse of Irishness that constructs Irishness in terms of colonialism, decolonisation and the cultural legacies of these processes. This discourse often represents Irishness as a 'victim' identity marked by an 'oppositional' politics. Contemporary discourses of immigration and diaspora relegate this formation to the past as a resource to be mined in the present. The second is a more recent discourse of Irishness as a progressive European identity that is taking its place amongst the identities of developed Western countries. [65] The discourse of the 'Celtic Tiger' represents one strand of this emerging hegemonic formulation of Irishness (see O'Hearn, 1998; Sweeney, 1998). Fintan O'Toole argues that 'the newly rich Republic can hardly continue to claim membership of the oppressed, impoverished colonial world' (*Irish Times*, December 4, 1998, p. 14).

However, such clear distinctions do not do justice to the complex negotiations of Irishness within 80 years of partition and independence for the south and within four years of the cease-fires in the north [66]. In this paper, I focus on the ways in which discourses of Irishness as diasporic and some aspects of recent discourses of immigration are producing particular forms of Irishness for the 1990s. This paper is necessarily limited by such a focus because it does not deal with the prominence of discourses of immigration as 'threat' and the underlying nationalistic assumptions that Ireland should 'look after its own'. However, my main concern, within the boundaries of this paper, is with those discourses that represent immigration or diaspora as *expanding* or *enriching* Irishness and which are most often articulated in the pages of the *Irish Times* newspaper.

Discourses of immigration[67]

The discourse of immigration as 'threat' is probably the most prevalent one. This representation of immigration in Wieviorka's terms might be seen as resisting the crisis in modernity. This is because such discourses attempt to reintegrate the disintegrated features of nation and state, national identity and culture. These discourses often articulate a desire to (re)create a national identity that brings apparent unity to a socially and politically divided community. For example, Aine Ni Chonaill (who launched the *Immigration Control Platform* on January 13th. 1998 in Ennis Co. Clare) argues that Irish people have the right to the 'integrity' of the national 'homeland' (in Walsh, 1998). The discourse of immigration as 'threat' arises from the prevalence of the notion that the ideal society should be as uniform or homogeneous as possible (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998, p. 117). Homogeneity has come

[62] For Delanty (1996), 'old nationalism' was an ideology in the sense of being a comprehensive belief system and was comparable to other ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism and socialism'. He sees ideology as having 'fragmented into a politics of identity'.

[63] Delanty (1996) characterises this as 'more a matter of xenophobia than jingoism'.

[64] van Dijk argues that new forms of racism 'appear as "mere" talk, and far removed from the open violence and forceful segregation of the "old" racism. Yet, they may be just as effective to marginalize and exclude minorities…' (forthcoming).

[65] See John Waters' *Irish Times* column, ' "Debate" on Taoiseach's suggestion as a non-starter', in which he discusses the issue of Ireland's rejoining the Commonwealth. He refers to an editorial in the (London) *Independent* regarding this subject in which Ireland is represented as a modernised 'young country' with a 'dynamic economy' and a 'self-confident outlook' (December, 1, 1998, p. 16).

[66] Full consideration of these issues would involve engaging with debates about Ireland's contested history, its political culture, its formation as a state, including partition, its specific process of industrialisation and development and the current negotiations following the Belfast Agreement.

[67] I do not differentiate between discourses relating to asylum seekers and other immigrants as I am taking a broad brush approach here. These categories are often conflated in media discourses.

to be an implicit norm. Therefore, resistance against heterogeneity is regarded as normal.

While Ni Chonaill's call for the maintenance of an Irish 'homeland' is seen as extremist, and she has not been able to command a significant following, it is important to note that many may share some of her underlying assumptions. Blommaert and Verschueren (1998), for example, point to the continuing purchase of the nationalist ideal of the homogenous nation state (albeit a recent historical invention; see Hobsbawm, 1990). They argue that the viewing of 'diversity as a problem' is 'what the "tolerant majority" tends to share with the extreme right' (ibid, p. 3) [68]. The anti-immigration discourse feeds on people's fears that they may loose out because of the crisis of welfare state and immigrants' demands on national resources. Instead of engaging with the crisis of social citizenship and the existence of a transnational flow of migrants, there is an attempt to reintegrate nation, state, culture and 'the people' through the exclusion of immigrants.

The discourse of immigration as 'enrichment' can be seen as an attempt to 'manage' difference and is often allied to calls for celebration of 'multicultural' society. For example, Oliver O'Connor (an investment consultant) stated the following in an article in the *Irish Times:*

Some refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants are a gift of intellectual capital, which simply arrives free of charge at our national doorstep. We would be mad to ignore it. Others contribute by setting up small businesses. Others will do what jobs they can. In total, they are very few in numbers. We have much to gain and nothing to lose *from managing our small diversity well* (*Irish Times*, 13 March, 1998; emphasis added).

These sentiments reflect those of management consultants and academics in the United States for whom 'managing diversity' is seen as moving beyond equal opportunities and affirmative action programmes towards enabling organizations to 'celebrate' diversity (Roosevelt-Thomas, 1990; Greenslade, 1991) [69]. Managing diversity, according to Roosevelt-Thomas, (Executive Director of the American Institute of Managing Diversity Inc.) 'is no longer simply a question of common decency, it is a question of business survival' (1990, p. 108). Questions arise as to on whose terms, and in whose interests diversity is 'celebrated' (see Gray, 1995). There is little evidence of such an explicit 'management of diversity' approach in Irish media discourses of immigration, however, an emphasis on the positive contribution that immigrants might make is evident. One *Irish Times* editorial had the following to say:

A recent survey indicated that the majority of asylum seekers are well educated and capable of providing for their own needs [70]. They should be encouraged to contribute in a full and positive way to this society. Our own history of emigration demands such a response (*Irish Times*, Wednesday, July 8, 1998, p. 15).

The discourse of immigration as 'enrichment' is an abstract discourse based on the *potentially* enriching contribution that immigrants might make to Irish society. These discourses are invariably articulated in the future tense. They point to possibilities rather than a return to some putative past state of harmony and homogeneity. They are framed in terms of an inclusive 'we' who can gain from immigration. If we create the right circumstances, there is the *potential* for us to benefit from the presence of immigrants:

When refugees are allowed to rebuild their lives, they can enrich the society around them. If given the chance, they can contribute to our society. Recent European history has shown that anyone can become a refugee. It behoves us all to guarantee the highest levels of protection to those who do (Maura Leen, 'Ireland has a moral duty to welcome the displaced, *Irish Times*, 16, September, 1997).

A moral obligation to welcome refugees is articulated here alongside an appeal to the collective public interest and the potential enrichment that refugees would bring if given the chance. Appeals to the collective interest tend to be abstract and appear distant from immediate concerns (Blommaert and Verschueren , 1998). These characteristics make such arguments difficult to sustain. However, this discourse is made more concrete in the Irish context by making connections between *immigration* as contributing to Irish society and the Irish experience of *emigration* [71]. For example, the following quotes draw on a national *past* and memory of emigration to bring the circumstances of immigrants closer to home. They also imply a moral obligation in the present based on our national history:

While we fear economic migrants to our "tiger" economy, it is ironic that in the 1980s a generation of Irish saw the Morrison and Donnelly visas as passports to economic well-being and

[68] Questions of the close alliance between 'whiteness' and Irishness at official and popular levels have barely begun to be addressed.

[69] More than half of the workforce in the US now (i.e. late 1980s) consists of women, minorities and immigrants; this proportion will have increased to 80% by the year 2000 (Hanamura, 1989).

[70] It is also important to recognise that many arrive without high level skills and encounter language difficulties in negotiating their everyday lives here. These needs also need to be acknolwedged and provided for.

[71] One obvious association between the plight of immigrants to Ireland and that of Irish emigrants in *the past* was made by Garda Joe McCarthy when he said: 'I have served in Wexford for 30 years and this was the closest to a coffin ship I ever saw' (in Kathy Sheriden, *Irish Times*, Saturday, August 8, 1998, p. 9).

opportunity in the USA [72] (Maura Leen, 'Ireland has a moral duty to welcome the displaced', *Irish Times*, 16, September, 1997).

The Irish state's attempt in the 1980s, to finds ways of legitimating Irish migrants' entry to the US is presented as a concrete challenge to our fear of immigration. The category 'economic migrant', which is often used to delegitimize immigration to Ireland, is 'brought home' as Leen associates the lobbying for American visas with Irish 'economic migrants'. The following quote brings the phenomenon of Irish emigration and its relevance to current immigration even closer to home by invoking the trope of the 'family':

A little more compassion and less vitriol is essential from all sectors of our society, a society which has benefited immensely over the past 150 years from the generosity of spirit and kindness of other nations in accepting into their countries *our relatives and friends* and offering them the opportunity for happiness and prosperity (Niall Andrews MEP letter to *Irish Times*, Monday, July 20, 1998, p. 13; emphasis added) [73].

The possessive pronoun 'our' is invoked in both cases as an 'ingroup designator'. However, it is used *less* to establish a clear contrast between Us and Them, as van Dijk found, and more to trouble such a dichotomy. Our history of 'economic migration' is invoked in order to complicate the 'ingroup-outgroup' polarization that marks most media discourses on immigration. Instead of using the possessive pronoun 'our' to relate to our nation in a territorially bounded nationalist sense, it is invoked to characterize a diasporic 'national history'.

In both of the above quotes 'our emigration' is pushed into the *past* as a resource for dealing with a *present* marked by immigration. The following quote from Fintan O'Toole pushes our experience of emigration even further into the past as it re-emerges in his account as memory:

No one would deny that immigration, like any other social change, needs to be managed and prepared for. No one would suggest that there is no need for laws, processes and policies. But underlying those policies must be a memory of the experience of Irish people over the generations (Fintan O'Toole, 'Immigrants do not have to be seen as a problem', *Irish Times*, October 31 1997, p. 14).

In these quotes, the experiences of generations of Irish *em*igrants are reconstructed into a 'useable past' that can frame a more inclusive and liberal discourse of *im*migration to Ireland in the present. Ireland and Irishness are positioned as a post-emigration country and identity. Emigration and immigration are produced as distinct experiences and implicitly linked with the past and present respectively. Contemporary emigration, particularly that of the less well educated and less well off, is once again, edited out of public analyses and debate[74]. The increasing stratification of the national and global labour market resulting in continued emigration and the increased numbers of young destitute Irish presenting at Irish Centres in England (and elsewhere) are made invisible in this representation of Irishness as taking its place among the modern 'Western' identities of the world.

I want to argue that *em*igration and *im*migration cannot be separated, either as distinct phenomena, or in time, as appears to happen in these accounts. One means of bringing these phenomena into engagement with one another is via the term 'diaspora'. James Clifford (1994) argues that the term 'diaspora' is now 'loose in the world' and is being applied to many groups because it helps to describe their experiences. This term is increasingly invoked to describe the large number of transnational populations characterized by multiple allegiances. The term diaspora privileges the idea of multi-located identities. This experience of multiple membership has led, according to Baubock (1991), to the development of 'interstate societies' [75]. However, the use of the term 'diaspora' in contemporary theory is much contested (see Brah, 1996; Clifford, 1994; Cohen, 1996; Gilroy, 1993, Safran, 1991; Tololyn, 1991; Van Hear, 1998). A major weakness in the theorization of diaspora is the emphasis on cultural phenomena and identity formations, often without reference to structural features of, and constraints upon, diasporic groups. My concern in the next section of this paper relates more to the recent emergence of discourses of Irishness as diasporic and the relationships, if any, between these and discourses of immigration.

Discourses of diaspora

The use of the term diaspora to represent identity formations or communities is more possible now, according to Wieviorka (1998), precisely because of the lack of correspondence between nation and state, the economic, social, cultural and political. Wieviorka is conscious of varying meanings and definitions of diasporic communities and identities. He argues that one diasporic logic focuses on *historic trauma* and the maintenance of a mythic relationship

[72] See O'Hanlon, 1998.

[73] 16. Of course there is a lot of evidence from Britain, the United States and Australia that the Irish were not always welcomed with such openess.

[74] While 39,200 immigrated to Ireland in 1996, 31,200 people emigrated from Ireland in the same year (Central Statistics Office, *Population and Migration Estimates*, April, 1997).

[75] Van Hear (1998) notes that the formation of diasporas and transnational communities is not an inevitable concomitant of increased migration. He argues that if diaspora has accelerated in recent years, so also has the 'unmaking of diasporas' via the regrouping of migrant communities often via return to their places of origin.

with the point of departure. Another diasporic logic centres on, what he calls the softer process of *emigration*, when migrants maintain strong links with their country of origin, as well as the countries they live in. Of course, the Irish diaspora has been characterized in both of these terms, but can also be seen in terms of Wieviorka's third formulation of diaspora. This is a kind of *self-production* in which a group creates its cultural identity 'and gives to this production a trans-frontier dimension' (p. 73).

The most important aspect here, is not the point of departure, but the *creativity* of the group. The diaspora is not an ascription, but an achieved status and identity. Wieviorka argues that this diaspora is less about traditions and reproduction than about inclusion in modernity and self-production. The very notion of diaspora is, in this case, developed by the group itself as a resource. He offers Paul Gilroy's (1993) 'Black Atlantic' as an example of this logic of diaspora. In the 'Black Atlantic', Blacks 'are supposed to be able to articulate their social and racial inclusion in various societies and their transnational cultural existence' (Wieviorka, 1998). The logic of diaspora becomes visible in the various cultural activities and innovations ranging from music, dance and literature to sport. Diaspora offers the individuals who constitute it, 'a chance simultaneously to belong to a specific group, with its own identity, *and* to participate in the general life of the country where they live' (ibid. p. 75). In this way, according to Wieviorka, the logic of diaspora can be seen as *engaging with* the crisis of modernity rather than *reacting to* it.

The discourse of Irishness as diasporic, which emerged in the 1990s, incorporates all of the elements of diaspora outlined by Wieviorka. First, the historic trauma of the Famine and associated emigration; second, the process of emigration, where emigrants keep contact with their country of origin; and third, the self-production of a transnational identity. [76] Like the discourse of immigration as 'enrichment', the discourse of Irishness as diasporic also emphasizes 'enrichment'. For example, in her speech to a joint session of the Houses of the Oireachtas[77] entitled 'Cherishing the Diaspora' President Mary Robinson stated:

> [O]ur relation with the diaspora beyond our shores is one which can instruct our society in the values of diversity, tolerance, and fair-mindedness. The men and women of our diaspora represent not simply a series of departures and loss…We need to accept that in their new perspectives may well be a critique of our old ones (Robinson, 1995).

The Irish diaspora is represented here as a pluralist and progressive entity that has the potential to enrich and expand our sense of Irishness. Yet, like discourses of immigration as 'enrichment', discourses of diaspora also tend to operate at an abstract level. As a potentially all-inclusive concept, it is difficult to pin down diaspora temporally or spatially. It comes to represent everything and nothing at the same time. This may partly account for the rather negative and lack lustre political and public response to the President's speech. Indeed, Paul Byrne's attempt to rescue the significance of the speech for Irish society emphasized the more concrete implications of diaspora for Irish families (see Byrne, 1995).

As well as ex-President Mary Robinson, media commentators such as Fintan O'Toole and John Waters in the *Irish Times*, and Anne Holohan for the *Irish Post* in England, as well as philosopher Richard Kearney emphasize a new less boundaried sense of Irishness (see Kearney 1988, 1990 and 1997). Fintan O'Toole asserts that '[e]migration means, quite simply, that the people and the land are no longer coterminous' (1994, p. 18). Anne Holohan suggests that 'for younger Irish people their Irishness has nothing to do with territorial sovereignty or where they live' (1995, p. 7). John Waters likens the diaspora to the Irish soccer team: '*any* team, band or group purporting to be Irish would not be an accurate representation of Ireland *unless* it contained people who were born somewhere else' (1994, p. 130). While I would not be as skeptical as Mark Ryan, who argues that this cultural diasporic identity is being produced for the consumption and self-production of the Irish middle-classes (1995, p. 21), I think it is important to recognize the limits of this discourse and its exclusions in spite of its repetitive theme of inclusiveness.

Despite the 'inclusiveness' and 'enrichment' that marks this discourse, these sentiments are not evident when it comes to the concrete issue of political participation. In the debate in 1996, regarding the constitutional amendment to allow representation for emigrants in Seanad Eireann (for up to 20 years after they emigrated), regardless of their Irish citizenship, emigrants were largely represented as 'outsiders' and the proposal was dropped. The extent to which emigrant belonging has been relegated only to the realm of cultural belonging is alluded to in a letter to the *Irish Post* (England) which suggested that '[e]migrants appear destined to occupy only the

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[76] Irish culture has, of course, been produced in a variety of national contexts for many centuries. However, developments in global communication systems and technological advances in recent decades have enabled a more interactive approach to the production of Irish cultural products between those living in Ireland and the diaspora, for example, Riverdance and the Pogues.

[77] For the President to address both Houses of the Oireachtas on any topic it must be deemed by the President to be an issue of significant national importance. President Robinson's representation of the diaspora as an issue of significant national importance was, however, largely dismissed in political and media circles (Byrne, 1995).

St. Patrick's Day constituency, when government ministers jet all over the world to pay lip service to them' (Michael Hurley, *Irish Post*, November 2, 1996, p. 10). The emigrant, as potential voter, is represented less in terms of potential 'enrichment' and more in terms of 'threat'. The concrete issue of political participation, during the debate about emigrant representation, lapsed into an appeal to national self-interest in which a more transnational refiguration of the political was seen, at best, as a 'romantic' notion. Wieviorka's three logics of diaspora: historical trauma, contact with country of origin and cultural production operate at a cultural or symbolic level but do not translate easily into new forms of political belonging.

The 'enrichment' that the discourse of Irishness as diasporic celebrates is partly mined from the *past*, which may account for the limits of this discourse when it comes to new political imaginings in the present. Commemoration of the Famine and associated emigration is an important feature of this discourse. In her speech at the Famine commemoration ceremonies in Millstreet Co. Cork in May 1997, Mary Robinson noted that the event was:

> a dignified commemoration of all those who died during the Great Famine of 1845-50 and...a tribute to those who succeeded in their terrible journey to the New World...In its way the memory of the emigrant steerage has long been held as an icon in Ireland's oppression...but we must also remember that most Irish emigrants made it safely to the other side during the famine years and initiated the creation of a new, Irish, Diaspora (Robinson, 1997).

This form of diasporic remembering may be seen as a symptom of what Bhabha (1996, p. 59) calls the 'anxious age of identity' in which the attempt to memorialize past time, authorizes different identities in the present. The act of commemoration can, by juxtaposing 'us' and 'them', channel the present through the past in order to produce a modern and 'new, Irish Diaspora'. Those who died and emigrated during and after the famine become both a sign of violence and of 'progress' out of which a cosmopolitan Irish diaspora emerges (Chow, 1993, p. 45).

Yet, this 'modern' identity is haunted by a moral debt to those who have left and those who have survived adversity. In her speech at Gross Isle in Canada in 1994, President Robinson noted that:

> It is also our sense, as a people who suffered and survived that our history does not entitle us to a merely private catalogue of memories. Instead it challenges us to consider....with compassion and anger those other children to whom we can give no name who are dying today in Rwanda and whom I saw in the camps in Somalia (Robinson 1994).

The commemoration of the Famine is represented as a self-reflexive gesture, which establishes a relationship with the present, we remember the Famine but discover ourselves in the 1990s. Irishness in the present is (re)negotiated here as a globally located and implicated identity.

Commemoration, in the discourse of diaspora, like the relegation of emigration to the past in the discourse of immigration as 'enrichment', involves the negotiation of Ireland's contradictory position as a country that has experienced colonization, Famine and emigration and that now defines itself as the 'Celtic Tiger'. Commemoration of former times of dispossession, starvation and poverty may help to resolve difficult moral dilemmas, as Irish citizens at home and abroad try to steer a course somewhere between discourses of Irishness as 'postcolonial', European and global. Discourses of diaspora and immigration render this identity crisis visible as each reveal an uneasy negotiation of a moral and responsible Irishness in relation to the past, present and indeed the future.

Conclusion

This paper is an initial consideration of how we might begin to consider the unique position of Ireland in relation to both emigration and immigration. I have looked at how these phenomena are discursively produced and pointed to intersections between some discourses of immigration and diaspora. I have argued that both these discourses incorporate contradictory responses to the 'crisis of modernity' and uncertainties about Irishness at the end of the millenium. In other words, the 'crises' in the projects of national identity (including social citizenship) and Irish identity in the 1990s are partly channelled through discourses of immigration and diaspora.

Instead of being two distinct expressions of these 'crises', these discourses overlap and intersect in many ways. Both represent notions of a transnational experience that can be seen as 'enriching', but they also incorporate a sense of the transnational as 'threat'. The impetus, in these discourses, towards notions of 'enrichment' can be seen as a positive force for the refiguring of the national. Yet, the national re-emerges in both as a persistent reference point. Also, these discourses operate at such an abstract level that they can either lack momentum, or evoke a reactionary response. These are all issues that require further investigation.

For Wieviorka (1998), the development of the concept of diaspora to represent the experiences of many groups at the end of the twentieth century, can be seen as an engagement with the crisis in modernity that requires looking beyond national boundaries. Yet, the production of Irishness as a diasporic identity may be seen as involving the self-construction of the southern state, at least as much as representing a transnational Irishness. Discourses of diaspora and immigration involve the negotiation of Irishness at a time when the southern state is struggling to find an

acceptable moral path between its past and its present. If we are, as Delanty (1996) advocates, 'to see more closely under what circumstances a genuinely post-national identity can be constructed', it may be necessary to shift these discourses into the present. Calls for the implementation of the Refugee Act and for an open discussion of public policy on immigration in the present appear to go unheard. Ongoing exclusions receive passing attention while continuing emigration remains a taboo subject.

It seems easier to remember the past, the Famine, even 1980s emigrants than to remember those leaving today. They are as much part of our 1990s Ireland as those who are returning and as other immigrants. We are living a transnational Irishness now, but it cannot be neatly packaged into a past and present associated respectively with a 'postcolonial' or 'Celtic Tiger' Ireland. Perhaps we need to face the kind of Irishness we have in the 1990s with all its contradictions and brutal exclusions. Then perhaps we can begin to address the kind of Irishness we want as we enter the new millennium.

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The migratory patterns of the Roma since 1989

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In this paper I want to look at how the Roma migration to Western Europe and, in particular the European Union since 1989, follows the pattern of most if not all previous migrations since their first arrival in Europe. The Roma originated in North India and apparently left sometime in the 10th century arriving in Europe around the 14th century. Although they are often seen as a single entity, they do not constitute one ethnic group, but rather have many distinct ethnic identities, for example, the Quinquis of Spain, the Jenisch of Germany and the Vlachs of the Balkans.[78] Diversity among the groups causes a great disparity in the data available on the differing groups of the 'Roma'. In the absence of any generally recognised body who can speak on their behalf, the data on the Roma is sometimes difficult to interpret. In fact, even the size of the Roma population in Europe is disputed, with people putting the figure at anywhere between 6 and 10 million.

Common trends can be seen in any historical study of the successive Roma migrations within Europe and all have been due to social and political pressures exercised upon them. European migration of the Roma can be divided into five general 'waves'. The first occurred in the late 14th century, soon after their arrival in Europe. With the decline of the Byzantine Empire, they pushed into the north west of the continent, arriving in Transylvannia in 1416, in Hungary and Bohemia in 1417, and France by 1419. By the beginning of the 16th century the Roma were spread across Europe, even as far west as the British Isles and north as Scandinavia. Soon, repressive measures were introduced throughout Europe as the Roma were accused of being spies, the carriers of the Plague and traitors to Christendom. Organised Roma 'hunts' took place in the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany in the 17th and 18th centuries, and in 1725 Frederick William I of Prussia condemned to death all Roma over the age of 18 who were found on Prussian soil. In the Romanian principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and Besserabia the Roma were reduced to the level of slaves. This repression continued until 1865 when slavery was finally phased out. This permitted a freedom of movement that resulted in the second 'wave' from the South East of Europe. In an attempt to escape from previous repression, many made their way towards Germany, Belgium and France from the mid-1800s onwards. This wave continued until shortly before the 1914-1918 war. Like Roma migrations before and after, this wave 'came about as an outcome of dynamic change in order to adapt to new circumstances and [also] as a response to historical opportunities' (Reynier, 1995).

The third 'wave' was a direct consequence of the Holocaust of the 1940s. The systematic character of the devastation inflicted upon the Roma has not always been recognised. In the absence of any powerful pro-Roma lobby, it is difficult to gauge any figures for Roma deaths in World War II. However, it is estimated that somewhere between half a million and a million Roma died, particularly but not exclusively, in the camps of Dachau in Germany, Lety in the Czech Republic and Jasenovac in Croatia. The Roma in Poland and in the Baltic states were almost entirely wiped out and some people have estimated that between 50 and 75 per cent of the entire Roma population of Europe was exterminated (Refugee Council, 1996). The actual percentage is likely to be lower than that, although, in places like the Czech Republic, 90 per cent of the Roma population were exterminated. Despite these facts, the US Holocaust Memorial Council waited until 1990 to take the Roma within their purview.

The policy of the so-called 'socialist-states' of Central and Eastern Europe was one of forced assimilation rather than exclusion and containment. Only in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, were they ever recognised as a national minority and not forcibly assimilated. This enabled many Roma to use the freedom of travel available in Yugoslavia to move westwards.

This constituted the fourth 'wave', which resulted in large numbers of Roma moving to Western Europe in general and in particular into West Germany (FDR) as *Gastarbeiter* or 'guest-workers' from the 1960s on. These numbers increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s as the ethnification of Yugoslavia escalated. In a war defined by its conflict between Serb, Croat and Muslim identities, the Roma found themselves totally peripheralised. They fled in great numbers; the OSCE estimate that by 1995, 30,000 Roma from Bosnia and Serbia had sought refugee status in Austria alone.[79]

The fifth and most recent wave began in 1989. The Minority Rights Group believe that the extent of Roma migration since that date is exaggerated. However, as in the case of previous migrations, the movement by the Roma since 1989 is largely the result of 'push factors' involving for example 'physical attacks, racist pogroms, murders and burnt out homes' (Liegeois and Gheorghe, 1995:

[78] The term 'Roma' is internationally used and is the accepted term used by such people as the European Roma Rights Centre. Therefore I will be using this term throughout this paper.

[79] OSCE HCNM Report

15). All of these phenomena have been continually reported throughout Europe over the last decade. In fact, some see the nomadic activity of the Roma as a manifestation of a 'reactive nomadism' which is imposed upon them by the societies surrounding them. This created a culture of itinerancy in the Roma communities and has served to develop a collective consciousness which is 'clearly expressed in the emergence of a transnational Roma/Gypsy identity' (Liegeois and Gheorghe, 1995: 17). Again the host society's response towards the Roma has dictated their movements. Liegeois and Gheorghe believe that 'the present crisis is, for the large part … the crisis of the surrounding societies. They too are finding it difficult to adapt, and find expression in a mounting rejection of others' (Liegeois and Gheorghe, 1995: 17). One thinks of incidents like those in the Czech Republic where a mother of four was beaten and then drowned in a river, or a man who was beaten unconscious, left in the middle of a road, and was subsequently killed by a passing lorry.

According to many reports 50 per cent of Hungarians [80] and 77 per cent of Romanians (ERRC, 1996) openly admit to harbouring resentment towards the Roma. Such stories and attitudinal studies point to a persistent and widespread prejudice. The situation has deteriorated even further in some countries, like the former Yugoslavia, where the growing ethnification has resulted in attacks on Roma communities. Between 1991 and 1994, attacks have been reported in Mostar, Belgrade, Gilane, Zrenjanin and Kazarisi. The Roma, as yet without any clearly defined and defended ethnic nationality, face growing hostility throughout Central and Eastern Europe. According to the Minority Rights Group, 'the Roma … exodus of the 1990s is manifestly linked to the frequency with which they encounter violence, the passivity of local and national authorities and the absence of an adequate judicial response' (Leigeois and Gheorghe, 1995: 15).

Economically and socially, the Roma have been suffering disproportionately since 1989. Except in Yugoslavia, they were expected everywhere to assimilate completely. Under the former regimes of Eastern Europe, the Roma were provided with a secure job and an education. Nomadism was outlawed in Romania and the Roma language was forbidden. However, the jobs they received were usually unskilled, low-level jobs which, although they did temporally provide virtually full employment, were immediately lost during the economic crisis of the 1980s.In all this the Roma suffered 'as much because they were seen as Gypsies as because of their lack of skills' (Reynier, 1995). The move towards a free-market economy in 1989 further exacerbated the situation. The privatisation of lands, the shut-down of obsolete labour-intensive industries, the resulting lay-off of unskilled workers and the growing ethnification of the job-market meant that by 1995, only 30-40 per cent of male Roma were employed as against 85 per cent in 1970. The general decline in economic fortunes and the growing competition for low-level jobs further fuelled the resentment towards the Roma. Intolerance and aggression grew as 'the weak and vulnerable needed a scapegoat - the other, the foreigner, the coloured one - to punish for their misfortune' (Biro, 1998). The Roma, like the Jews before them, fitted the requirements perfectly. The incidents mentioned above served to push the Roma onto the road again, and so, after a period of relative integration in which a secure job and wage had broken the habits and attitudes of centuries, the Roma began to migrate again.

Between 1989 and 1995, the OECD estimate that 200,000-280,000 Roma have migrated from East to West, with 170,000 of those living in Italy, Germany and Austria. These countries, generally, have been the most popular destinations for the Roma. However, since 1990, Germany, the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Austria have all tightened up their border controls and have, in some cases, re-introduced visas. Austria, in 1990, expelled 7,000 asylum-seekers. 12,450 Romanians tried to enter Germany illegally in the first six months of 1992. Bilateral agreements have been made between Romania and Germany and Romania and France to return any illegal nationals to their country of nationality. All these measures have been taken to halt the perceived 'tide' of asylum-seekers to the West. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities believes that the perception of a large number of Roma migrating to the West is not necessarily true. As they tend to be more visible, their numbers are thought to be large, but if their estimated contribution to East-West migration is divided over time, population and geography, then their migration is roughly in proportion to their size. Between 1960 and 1992, only between 0.25 per cent and 0.46 per cent of the Roma population migrated as compared to 0.84 per cent of the rest of the population of Central and Eastern Europe between the years 1946 and 1982.

Donald Kenrick (1998: 59) believes that, amongst the Roma, there is very little desire to migrate en masse. As the Roma cannot be guaranteed political asylum in the West, the cost and risk of going illegally are very high. Also, the freedom of movement has allowed the Roma to seasonally migrate around the Balkans, towards the South East of Europe and the Middle East. Furthermore, with the new opportunities in some countries for expressing their own culture, a plethora of Roma organisations have grown up. In Hungary the Roma 'have shown no desire to get up and leave the country.' Civil liberty bodies such as the Raoul Wallenberg Society and agencies like the European Roma Rights Centre and others have helped to articulate the Roma community's concerns. 'As a result, Romanies, although still subject to assaults by skinheads and

[80] *Budapest Sun* April 9, Issue 14

racist police, have shown no inclination to emigrate' (ibid).

So what can we make of the migratory patterns of the Roma since 1989? What can we learn from their patterns? Firstly, it seems that the Roma, contrary to popular belief, are not flooding the asylum queues, but are rather migrating in numbers at most in proportion to their size if not less. The migration that does occur is difficult to gauge due to the numbers that migrate illegally.

Secondly, the social welfare systems of the newly emerging free-market economies of Eastern Europe are failing to respond to the needs of the Roma. Faced with economic and social difficulties, the majority (non-Roma) population has (as often before) turned on the 'other'. Without any ethnic homeland or a large well-educated and funded lobby group to support them, the Roma face exclusion and discrimination throughout Europe. Kenrick believes that measures need to be taken from both 'above' and 'below' (ibid). Any application to join the EU should be contingent upon binding undertakings to protect vulnerable minorities within their borders. This should be complemented alongside a more professional and co-ordinated approach by the leadership of the Roma community which could transcend the diverse interests and groupings of the Roma.

To ensure that there is no need for forcible migrations, all efforts must be made to support the Roma particularly with programmes to combat illiteracy, and to improve economic and employment opportunities for them throughout Europe. The causes of racism and of xenophobic attacks that might lead to the movement of the Roma must be dealt with, both at the local level and at the state level. All across Europe we must try to recognise the 'joyful diversity' and 'rich history' that President Mary McAleese has recently described and commended. It is only then that we can appreciate the significance of what has been described as the only true European community, rather than using them as perpetual scapegoats for racist and xenophobic purposes.

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